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THE Fr ANCI AL H:':" STORY OF THE 
Iii OTI OlJ PIC TU I?.E I NDU STRY 
Introduction 
On April 14, 1 95 1, the Motion pj_cture Industry 
wi ll have been unofficia lly in existence for fifty-five 
years . Duri ng t h at period of t ime the industry has g rown 
from bein t:, a mere idea to become one of t he top media of 
entertainment in the Uni ted Stat es . The rise of the indus-
try ¥as not one of continued success and pros oerity. There 
were time s when the indust1~y was beset with patent li tig a-
ti on, i nferior film pl" oducti on, and short-s ighted rnanag emen t 
to t he extent that many of the public felt that the movies 
wrn1ld never advance beyond the stag e of a fad. Hovever , as 
t ine went by, names--later famous in the industry, such as 
D. , .. . Griffith, Adolph Zuko:r>, Georg e Me l ie s, and many others 
--beg an to crop up and le ad the indus try upon the road to 
success, vvhi ch culmi n a ted in the peak year of 1 946. 
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Howev e r, since 1 946 , t he industry has been va:i.nly 
tryin g to overcome t he adverse e ff ects of declinin g forei g n 
business o r~ casioned by do llar s h ortag es an d exchang e restric-
tions, k een competition from televi sion, a nd h:!_ gh amortizat i on 
char g es on releases when mo vie a tten dan ce vvas in the doldl:'ums . 
In s p -l te of this g loomy situation, the industr y forecast s 
increased bus ~ ness and attendance over 1 0 49 because of t h e 
rearmar;Jent prog ram brou ght about by the Korean ' ::ar. Fur t her-
more , the notential t h reat of television had lessened on 
prospects of cutbacks by manufacturers in t he construction 
of new sets. 
On the other hand, the earning s outlook is damp ened 
by t h e t hreat of an e x cess profits tax levy in 1951, although 
s om e com panies., as in World '.'!ar II , may d erive tax benefits 
from the creation of f ore i g n subsidiaries to h andle business 
outs id e of the Western Hemisphere . The conm anies beli eve 
t hat profi ts accruing to such subsidiaries wou ld be doubtless 
exemp t f rom t h e excess profits tax. In add :;_ t i on, t h e effects 
of the separation of pr oduction and distr~bution from ex-
hibi tion as a re sult of the e l e ve n-year o l d anti - trust suit 
shou ld no t be ovel' l ooked. 'r he comp anies realize that t h e 
pr oducin g end of the busin e ss h as ne ver been c ons istently 
profitab le., as is evident from t h e oper a ting results of 
Columbia and Un iversal, whi ch are eng aged solely in produc -
ti on a nd di str i bution. 
Ther e f ore, t he question f a c i ng the mo t i on pi cture 
i n dustry tod ay is whethe r it will survive such comp et i tion 
fr om televi s i on, s u ch loss of pr ofi ts f rom curtai l ment of 
for e ign marke ts, or t he anti-trust d ec i sion of t h e g overnment, 
or whe ther i n the f uture t h e indus try wi ll e xpand or at least 
cease to contract and oe a producer and di stri butor of films 
fol' phone-vision - -a :ne t h od wh ereby set owners of television 
would pay to see fil"' st-run novies on h ome screens. 
The problem facin g not only bankers and f i nanciers 
but a lso the investing public as a whole i s whether the motion 
picture industry is a sound investment risk foX' t h e future in 
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view of the current downward trend i n profits and new competi-
t i on. Th e investment banker i s interested in t hree g eneral 
aspects of a business. He must know:-
1. The elements of risk to the safety of 
ne••r capita l which lurk in the back-
g round of t he industry's history. 
2. 1!t/heth er a particulax· company's histol"Y 
indicates t hat n e w c apital may be in -
vested wi th safety and also with 
reasonab le prospects of satisfacto~J 
earn i ng s i n t he future. 
3. Whether the company's background is at-
tractive enoug h to interest the publ i c 
suffi c ien tly to create a satisfactory 
:marke t for the securitie s offered. 
The purpose of this repo1•t i s to reveal the present 
condi t i on of the motion pi cture industry by an analysis of i ts 
past financ :tal hist ory with a view toward estab lishi ng it s 
posit i on in t h e futu re. This report will encompass only the 
in dustry as it stands in the Uni ted States, but it will be 
neoe s sal">y to mention the variou s p olicies instituted atai nst 
Un i ted States films by foreign countries, especially the 
75 percent British tax. 
As f al' as can be determined, little has been accomp-
lish ed in compi ling a f inancial h i story of the film i ndustry. 
lVIost b ooks such as Rosten 1 s HOLLYWO OD Ol"' Jacob's RI SE OF TI-rE 
8 
A.iY"J.BRICAN FIIJ'.~ devote only a small space to t h e financial side 
of t h e i ndustry and t h ese usually consist of only excerpts of 
financia l facts collected for the purpose of revealing some 
spec i fic p oint relat i ve t o their writing s. 
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CHAPTER I 
HISTOHY AND Bl.,.CKGHOUHD OF Tllli I NDUS'lRY 
•t; 
Creat ion of the First Motion Pictures"'· 
The vast motion picture i ndustry had its start 
in the humble beg inn i ng of the pee p -show Ki n etoscop e in-
ven ted by Thomas A. Ed i son in conjunction with Georg e Eastman's 
development of fiL'D for rolle!' photog!'aphy. r.rh e first exhibit 
was actually a one-man peep s how and took p lace in October of 
1889 . Edison 's interest in the kinetoscope was st!'ictly from 
a scienti fic point of view and he never even at t empted to 
patent it i n Europe. However , showmen and promoters qui ckly 
re a lized its monetary value and on the night of April 14, 1894, 
the first film pictures were presen ted to t h e public at the 
Kin etos cope Parlor in New Yo!'k City . Only one customer at a 
time could p ee k into t h e machine , but as the months went by 
t h e promoters realized that a un i on of t h e Kinetoscope and 
the mag ic lantern was neces s ary so tha t a screen could ente!'-
tain a whole au dience. 
By the sprin g of 1896, the junction of the Ki neto-
scop e and the ma g ic lantern was achieved, and this in real -
ity was the beg inning of the mot~ on pictures as we know them 
today, however crude t h ey might app ear comp ar•ed to present 
day standal"ds. Since the making of the pictures was still in 
~:- 21, P• 1. 
the hands of mech anics and low-c e.ste showmen, t h e t yp e of 
subject selected was not condu cive to havin g t h e public :flock 
to the exhi b :i. tors and demand entrance even at the 5 cent 
level for a &niss i on. For exam p le, in London i n 1898 , the 
scr een "Sensation" was the microscopic studi e s of l i fe in a 
st~ lton ch eese; wllile in k nerica Joseph Jefferson presented 
some excerpts from "Rip Van Winkle " but w :~ th little i nter e st 
aroused. On the other hand, a Biog raph picture entitled 
"Gi rl Climbing an Apple Tree" became a hit. 
At this stag e, the :f ortunes of the movin g pi cture 
industry were at low tide. The pictures were use d at t h e 
end of vaudeville shows to clear t h e house an d were g i ven 
t h e unsavoury name of 11 ch asers . 11 Probab le g ood r e a s ons for 
t h e n ame "ch asers" were the facts that the Battle of Santiag o 
was pictu red wi th models in a Brooklyn bathtub and the Boer 
War was fought for the screen in 11'latbush with g l5.mnses of 
t h e c i ty i n the backg round. 
Development of the 11 Stor:y" Pictures 
rn the year 1903, "':J.lhe Gr e at Train Robbery" was 
produced and is now famous as the "first story picture" pro-
duced by the movie indu stry. Heretofore , the pictures ex-
lnbited were mere ly flashes of boxin g scenes, vaudeville, or 
anything li lre ly to e x cite the interest of those makin g the 
pictures . However, it took two years for this p i cture to 
make a hit and hig hlight t h e prog ram of the Nickelodeon , a 
little house casually opened to a fi lm prog ram for lack of 
other entertainment by John P. Harris in 1905 in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
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The industry was beset by l i tig ation and patent 
i nfring ements until Jeremi ah J. Kennedy reorganized the 
I'1Iutoscope and B:Lograph Company i nto the Ivlotion Picture 
Patents Company. The Kennedy Patents Company also org anized 
the distribution side of the industry with the General Fibn 
Com_p any, ·whi ch had a national s y stem of film exch ang es. As 
a result, more order s from theaters carne into the film ren-
tals and more profits accrued to the memb ership of the big 
combin e. 
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The audience of the theaters beg an to expand. No 
longer wel~e the customers only those of the lmvel~ working 
classes. The middle and upper-middle classes beg an to t ake 
i nterest in t he shows and as such deman ded more selectivity 
in their pictUl"' eS than had t heir predecessors. rrhe motion 
picture's battle wi th the stag e had proved successful in that 
the movie s catered to a broad segment of the population while 
t he stag e p layed only to the "carriag e trade." 
The short sketches which heretofore had character-
ized most pictures were suddenly substituted by t h e long 
fea ture such as Adolph Zukor 1 s four reel "Queen E l i zabeth," 
which was followed by the European "Quo Vadis" and D. W. 
Griffith's 11 Birth of a Nation" in 1915. The audience of 
the screen began to g row wider and as it did so the demand 
fo~ larg er and more pretentious theaters also g rew and re-
sulted in the construction of the Strand The a ter on Broadway. 
z ulcol1 ' s success with 11 Queen 3 lizabeth" brought him 
into battle with the General Fi lm Producers, who comp lacently 
did not be l ieve that Zukor could break their hold on the 
indus try with his f eature runs. However, upon refusal of 
t h e Patents Comp any to g ive lrlm a license, h e went ahead and 
produced h is films wi th oth er in dependents joining i n the 
movement. In s pi te of litigation by the Patents Comp any, 
Zukor succeeded and the Patents Comp any disbanded before the 
issues were settled. 
The coming of the inexpensive automobi le surpris-
ing ly enough had an effect on the movie industry. The pub-
lic were be tter able to shop around f or t h e better type of 
pictures and as the industry grew larg er, it resulted in a 
smaller n~~ber of theater houses but each with larg er seating 
cap ac i ty. Th e walking distan ce location for theaters was 
doomed and vvi th i t the serial type of pic ture wh ich p layed to 
the sarae audience week after week . As a result of the auto-
mob ile, t h e larg er, luxurious t heaters beg an to rise i n the 
res identi al and suburban districts of larg e cities and towns. 
World War I g ave t h e United States fiLus a better 
g rip u p on the world mark et s i nce our films at home were 
directed at a larg e segment of our own population made up of 
many races, whi ch in turn proved popular wi th the yari ous 
countries of t h e world wh ose production was ch opp ed of f by 
the war . 
The effect of the talk ing pic t ures on t h e industry 
was n ot as beneficial as might be expected since many of the 
actors and actresses were imp ort a t i ons from t h e stage and the 
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typ e of fi l m drru.na and dialogue was not of the fami ly type 
with resulting threats of censorship followi n g . As a result, 
Will Hayes was elected as a czar or chief censor of the in-
dustry's production in order to allay the fears of t h e public 
t h at the movie s were be c oming too objectionable. 
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World ,1Jar II brought the g reatest wave of prosperity 
to t h e film industry. The increased wag es and salarie s of 
the war workers c aused line s of patrons to form at box offices 
for entertainment. However, as the war ended, foreign nations 
became more nationalistic and each country des i red to produce 
its own films rath er than imp ort them from the Un i ted states. 
Evan the British r ealized that now t h e films vvere no lon g er 
mer•e en t ertainment but a form of product which actually ad-
vertised the Un i ted states pr oducts throughout the world. 
This was one of the main reasons why the Br i tish put the 
75 percent tax upon American films and not solely the fact 
t hat t hey wi shed to chok e off the supp ly of American dollars 
leaving the empire to pay f or our films. 
The British l i ttle realized what t h e full effect 
of the tax would be in the future but hopefully believed that 
the f low of dollax•s to the United States could be severed and 
funneled back into their own industry. 
CHAPTER II 
BRIEF COHP OHATE Hi srr ORY OF T:F!Ji: E IGHT l.1AJOH COMP.AH I E S 
COIIIPRI SING 'l1Jf£ ~~ OTION PI C'rUitE INDUSTHY 
Although an overall survey of an i ndustry may be 
beneficial to business as a whole, it i s necessary from the 
fi n anci al point of view to review the history of the major 
com9anies comprising t h e industry. This background of mater-
ial assists in t h e acquiring of a perspe c tive or sense of 
direction i n whi ch the business h as been developing from i ts 
inception to t he presen t day.~*' 
r.rh e eigh t major com);Jani es of t h e industry are 
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Loew's In corporated; Columbia Pictures; Paramount Pictures 
Incorporated ; Radio-Keith-Orpheum; ' arner Bro the:r>s; Republic 
Pictures Corpol, ation; Universal Pictures Com any, Incorporated; 
and Twentieth Century F ox Film. The comj)anies wi ll be anal-
yzed or surveyed with emphasis on their history or incorpor-
ati on and c onsoli d ation, their p lants and propel''ty, their 
most recent dividends and profits, and their capital struc-
ture. 
Loew's Incorpor ated 
Hi story 
This com~)any was in corp or a ted under the De laware 
laws , October 18, 1919, to take over t h e bus iness of Loew's 
Theatrical •nterprises (formed under t he laws of Ne w York, 
.. ;t- 1, P• 37. 
Apl..,i l 17, 1911). Initially the comp any controlled sixty 
theaters. 'rhe comp any has mad e numerous acquisj_ tiona from 
t im e to t i me. In May, 1924 , Loew 1 s organized Metro Goldwyn 
Pictur e s Corp oration by a merg er of Goldwyn Pi ctures Corpor-
ation and Iiletro Pictures Corpol'ati on. The new comyany had 
~~ 
as a subsidiary the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Cor porati on." 
In February, 193'7, t hey a cquired fr om r_rwen tieth 
Century F ox Film Corporation 50 percent of the outstandi ng 
stoc lc of the Uni ted American Investing Corporation, a h o lding 
com:';) any for f or ei gn pi cture operations. Twentieth Century-
F ox declared a trust in favor of Loew 1 s in 2,449 Class A 
shares (now· a bou t 24.5 percent) of the voting stock of the 
llletr opo l i s of Bradfoi'd and Bradford Trust Company, Ltd ., 
con trolling ab out 58 percent of Goumont-Bri tish Pictures 
Cor p orati on. In 1944, Loew 1 s sold minority interest in 
I'Ietropoli tan and Bradford 'r rust Comp any, Ltd. 
Busine ss and Products 
Loew 's Inc orporated i s eng a g ed in production and 
di stri buti on of Metro-Goldvvyn-lvT ay er mo t i on pi ctu re s and 
t hrough su b s i diaries in exhibition of mo tion pictur es . 
Th e pr oduction of motion pictures is carried on 
mainly in company studios loc a ted at Culver City, California. 
Di stri butim1 in the Unite d States of the comp any's 
pi cture s, whi ch in cludes feature p i c tur e s, newsreels, short 
subjects, and occasi onally s ubjects produced by others, j_s 
~.t- '7, p . 591. 
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carr ied on through b~anch of fices c a lled film e x ch an ges, 
whi ch a~e located in thi~ty-two cities t~oughout t h e 
count~y. Distribution in forei g n countries is carried on 
by subsidiax•ies of the comp any. -?f. 
Another subsidiary of Loew 1 s opel'"' ates radio sta-
tions WMGM and 1JlHNF and also maintains a. theat~ical emp loy-
ment a g ency. 
Th e comp a.ny also owns stock in corp or ations eng ag ed 
in music publi shing and phonograph record business. 
Plant and Prop erties 
The company owns in fee a fully equipped motion 
picture p~oducing studio at Culver City, California. The 
land comprises approxi mately 168 ac~es. The company also 
owns a tract of land in Holl~vvood which formerly was a site 
for picture producing. Fo~eign subsidia~ies ovvn in fee a 
motion picture studio in Eng land and a recordin g studio in 
Barcelona, Spain. 
Th e subsidia~ies own, lease, or oper ate unde~ 
manag ement contract a total of 188 motion picture t h eaters as 
~t­
of December 31, 1944. 
Financial Pacts--Capital Structure 
17 
The funded debt consists of issues of Debenture 3 1 s, 
1965, with an amount of $ 28,000,000 outstanding and an issue 
of Debenture 2.85' s, 1 965, with an amount of f; 9,000,000 
-><- 7, P. 591. 
4t 7, p. 592. 
outstanding . In 1948 f ixed charg es wer e earned only 5 . 37 
time s in c om~ar is on to 13.67 times i n 1947. The c a p :i. tal 
stock cons i sts of an i ssue of c ommon stock of no par valu e 
with an ar.aount of 5, 142 , 615 s h ares outstandi ng . I n 1 948 
the c ompany e a~ned 82 cents per sh are a s compa~ed to ~2.05 
p er s h are in 1 947 . Di vi dends p e r sh are were 0 1.50 i n 1948 
and ~ 1.50 in 1947. 
Th e total op eratin g revenue s of the corp or a t i on 
(cons o lidated ) was e l64,421,468 in 1 948 , an app~oximate in-
crease of ~3,000,000 ove~ that of 1 9 47 . Th e total op er a ting 
r evenue s ran ged from $ 119, 480,567 in 1942 to t he h igh of 
$ 165,353, 08 6 i n 1946. 
Th e net i n cor:1e t o surp lus was ::~ 4 , 212,392 in 1 9 48 or 
a decr e ase of over ~? 6 , 000 ,000 f~om t h a t of 1 947. Nineteen 
fol"ty - s i .x wa s t he peak year for n e t in come to surp lus with an 
arnoun t of (r l7 , 958 , 945 . 
Loew' s uses a stra i ght l i ne de pre ciati on poli cy 
ove~ b .;_i ldi ng s an d e quipment in a cc or dance with t he fol lowing 
tab le: 
Theater Studio 
Building 3% 5% 
Building E quipment 3 <11 /0 5% 
General E qui pmen t 100& I 15% 
The c ompany ma d e cha n e5 es in i ts a.>n ortization of 
films p olicy so that for pictures releas e d after Au gust 31, 
1944, t h e f ollowi ng tab l e a pplies: 
18 
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Total Fol:'eign Domestic 
12 weeks 44.8% 2 4% • -· 0 59.0% 
24 weeks 70.7% 19. o~b' 88.0% 
36 weeks 85.1% 52.0% 96 .2% 
52 vreeks 95.0% 8o.o% lOO.O% 
78 weeks 100 .0% lOO.O% 100 •. 0% 
Manag ement and Profit Sharing Plan 
The president of Loew 1 s is Nicho las M. Schenck 
wi.·i;h L . B. r.~ aye:r• as first vice president and J. R. Rubin as 
vice president and g eneral counsel. The president of the 
comp any, Mr. Schenck, was employed by the comp any to December 
31, 1946, at $ 2,500 weekly plus 2! percent of defined earnings 
after Federal income taxes, preferred dividends, and $ 2 on 
c01:nnon stock was paid. The contract was extended to De a ember 
31, 1949, with the pl:'ivilege of renewal. 
Th at such a contract has been benefic i al to the 
comp any i s evident by its record of sales and earnings dut· i ng 
the p ast ten years vn~en sales have never dropp ed below 
~;~ 112,000,000 and net ~Lncome to surplus ranged fl:'om its low 
year of 1948 at ~4,000,000 to its pe~~ year of $ 18,000,000 
in 1 946. However, such a p lan h as its drawbacks in that it 
would g ive incentive to manag ement to declare dividends even 
when not earned to the detriment of the comp any as a whole. 
This is illustrated by the fact that dividends were paid on 
t h e common stock in 1948 and 1949 wh en they were not earned. 
Further profit s h a ring p lans are illustrated by 
the con tract drawn up between t he comp any and Louis B. ri! ayer , 
J. Robert Rubin , and Lawrence A. 'Weing arten authorizing t h em 
to individual l y supervis e pi ctul'e s produ ce d by Metro-Gold'I;•Iyn 
wi t h salaries of $ 3 ,000 we ek ly to :Hayer, q~ 2, 000 week l y to 
Ru b in, and 0 3,250 we ek l y to We i ng ar ten. In add i tion, each 
of t h ese e x ecu tives r e ce ives a per centag e of de .:'ined earnin g s 
after preferred divi dends and ~~ 2 on common. The r at es are 
6 . '77 per cent to Mayer, 1.4 percent to Hubin, and 0.35 pe rcent 
for Weing arten. This po l i cy of pay i ng high salari es p lus 
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a ~)el"centage of prof i ts to ma.n as ement e xecu t i ves is in kee ping 
with the moti on picture in dustry's theory of high salar i e s 
with t he r e sulting demand for excellent r e sults. Thus far 
t he p oli cy has b een favorable in t he long run to Loew's 
Incorp or ated . 
Columbia Pictures 
History and Business 
Col u.mbia Pictures was incorporated in Ne w York, 
January 10, 1924. It produces and distributes motion pi c-
tures a nd i s l i censed under patents controlled by r·estern 
E l ectric Company through its subs i diary, ~lectri cal Re search 
Produ cts In corp orated. Ra dio Corpor ation of A:merica also 
controls its patents covering production of so-called sound 
an d talkin g pi ctures. 
Propert i es 
Colu.mbi a own s and operat es full·;y· equi pped studios 
in Hollywood, cal i fornia , an d h as a c;eneral di stributi ng 
office in New York. T~,irty-one branch di stributin g offi ces 
are loc a ted in principal centers of t h e United Sta t es a nd 
other a ;jen ci0 s are scattered t hroughout t h e world. The 
corporation, h owever, owns no t h e ate rs and t h e significance 
of t hi s f act will be n oted later on wh en it wi ll be p ointed 
out t h at t h e production and distribution of pi ctures alone 
are not always pr ofi table. 
The location of t h e ag enci e s of distri bu t i on 
(for•ei g n) rang e f rom Australia, Egypt, and Peru to New 
z ealand, Nol"way, Iceland, and South Africa. All the con-
tinents are re pre s en t ed . 
Sub sidi a:e ies 
Th e corporation owns t h e e ntire capit a l stock of 
the followin g companies: Columbia Pictur es of Louisiana, 
Inc .; Columbia Pictures International Corp oration; Columbia 
Productions Ltd. (Briti sh); and Columbia Music Publishing 
Company, Ltd. Th e Columbia Pictures International Corpor-
ation owns t h e entire capi t a l stock of a number of c omp anies 
operating in foreign countri e s. 
21 
As of J~~e 30, 1947, t here were about 4 ,600 employees 
in the corporation whi le t h ere were about 2,535 holders of 
t h e comw on stock and 1,112 holders of t h e preferre d stock. 
Fi n a ncial ~acts--Capital Structure 
The funded debt consisted of 2!-2~ percent bank 
loan with ~;8 ,100,000 outstandi ng in amount. The c a pital 
stock con s is ted of B.n issue of (:,"4.25 cumulative prefe rr ed 
22 
life. The b enefits ar :i. sing fr•om the poli cy would be payable 
to h is h eirs or h im self u p on t h e death or d isabil i ty of 
Mr . Cohn . It can ':)e seen that s u ch a c on tract is n ot as 
f evor a ble as that of Loew 1 s but it has to be remembered that 
Columbia i s a much smaller company en ·ag ing in only produc-
tion an d di stribution and not exhibj_ tion. 
Paramount Picture s Incorporated 
History 
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This c ompany was incorporated in New York July 19 , 
1916, as F'runous Player s-Lasky Corporation with a perpe tual 
ch arter. Acquired at t h e formation was Famous Players F'ilm 
Corporation and t he Jesse L. Las~J Feature Play Company, In c. 
Later ·the company acquired all t h e stock of t h e Bosworth 
Company, Inc., Oliver Horos co Photoplay Company, and Paramount 
Pictures CorpOl"ati on, which were merg ed in 1918. The name 
was ch an g ed to Paramount F'run ous Lasky Corporation April 1, 
1927, to Parrunount Publix Corp Ol~ation April 24, 1 930, and to 
Paramount Pi ctures Incorporated on June 5, 1935. Paramount 
Publix Col'por a tion wa s p l aced in receiv ership January 26, 
1 933, and on June 16, 1 934, fi le d a pe t i tion for r e org ani-
zation un d er Section 77B of t he Bankrupt cy Act. The p l an of 
reorg anization became effective July 1, 1935. 
Prior to the reorganization, the c om) any made 
numerous acqui s itions including in the peri od 1920 -26 the 
s. A. Lyn ch theaters; Southern Enterpr :L ses Incorpor a ted; 
part j_nteres t of Olyr~Jpia Theaters :i. n Massachusetts; and 
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int erest _n t h e A. H. Blank Theate r Cor porat i on . I n 1 926, 
they acquired control of t h e Balaban and Katz Corporati on. 
Severa l impor tant acqui sition s v•er e ma d e in 1 929 in eludin g 
t he vn tire class A COI1!l1 0n v ot i nG stock of Sa eng e r Theat ers 
Corporation ; control of North west Theater Circuit I nc.; a 
50 percent inter es t in Colmnbia Broad casting Sys tem Inc or -
pox•ate d , whi ch h olding was s old in 1 932 . 
I n 1 930, Paramount acqu ire d t heaters of M. E . 
Comerf ord, control of Faraous Pl ayers Can a d ian Theater 
Cor poration , an d a 50 p e r cen t i ntere st in Pub l i c Ne toco 
Th e ate r s Corp oration. 
I n 1 938 the company acqu~_red an i nterest in the 
Allen B. DuBont Laboratories, I nc., whi ch he l d b asic p atent s 
f or televi s i on transmitting and recei vi ng . 
On Apr il 1 2 , 1 949, st ockho l d e rs ap:Jroved a re or -
g ani zation p l an :9r oviding f or se p aration of the company's 
mo~ion pictur e an d t he ate r d i v i sions i n acc ordance wi th c on -
s en t decree a pproved by the cour t March 3 , 1 949 , v;hi ch ter-
ruinated the anti-trust l i t i g ation b rought by t h e Depar t ment 
of Justi ce ag a in st t h e c om p any . 
Unde r t h e p l an , t wo new c ompanies would be organ-
ize d under t he laws of New York or De laware. ~ ach c ompany 
would have au t hori zed 4 , 500 , 00 0 s h a re s of ::)1 par common 
.... 
stock • . ~ 
.. ~ 7, p. 2539 . 
Business 
The c omp any a.nd :i. ts subs :i.diari es en g a g e chiefly 
in t h e production an d d istribution of mo tion pi cture photo 
p lays , etc., including features , sh ort subjects, a nd news -
reels .:nainly under the trad e name of Paramoun t Pictures . 
The comp any exhibits n ot only it s own ~Jroduct but also tha t 
of oth er comp anies . Pr i nc i pal featur e product i ons are mad e 
at the Hollywood s tudios, although a few ar•e produce d at 
Lon g Island City, New York . 
Plants and Properties 
As of J anuary 4 , 1 941, t h e c -::>mpa..YJy and wh o l l y 
owned sub sidi aries owned in fee mo t ion picture producing 
studio at Hollywood , Cali fornj_a, com:r,>rising 28 acres and 
a l so t h e studio in New York in a ddi tion to t he tract of 
2 , 700 ac re s of l and in Ca l :l. fornia used for makin &; pictul~ e s • 
.~,.'\lso the company held interes t i n 4 4 9 t heaters of whi ch 146 
wer•e owned in fee and the remainder l e ased. 
The number of stockholders in the corpo~eation wG re 
3 3 , 0 15 in December , 1947, whi le t h er e wer e 4 , 000 emp loyees 
at the sarne date . 
F inaDc i a l Facts --Cap ital Structure 
Th e f unde d deb t consis t ed of an issue of 2{t percent 
c onvertible notes due i n 1 951 wi th an amount of ~2 , 000 ,000 
outstanding and in adell ti on no t es p ayab l e to b an l{s •.vhi ch 
amounted to (A , 500,000. 
In 1 948 the conver tib l e notes due in 1951 h ad 
t h e i r ch ar~ es e arned 94 . 64 t imes as a3 a i nst 213 .12 tim e s in 
194'7 . 
25 
The capi t a l s t o clc c ons i sts of an i s sue of c omm on 
par v a lue Gl wi t h 6 ,58 8 , 139 shar es ou tstanding . In 1 948 the 
c omm on s t 6 ck h ad &3 . 36 e a rn ed per s h a r e as compar e d to 0 3 . 98 
p er s h are i n 1 947 . Di vi den d s p e r s h are were j 2 in 19 47 an d 
1 '348 . 
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The ne t i n come t o surp l us i n cr eased from ~; 13 , 125 , 437 
i n t he ye ar for 1 942 t o t h e p eak y e ar of 1946 wi th 8 3 9 ,199,106 
and then dl"opp e d to ~j; 22 ,56 9 ,102 for 1 948 . Howe ver , durin g 
t hat p e:i." i od , t h e net i n c ome ne ve r f e l l b e low t~!.e 1 942 l ow of 
f~ l 3 , 1 25 , 4 37 ; a n d e ven though t h e year s 1 947 and 1948 s h owe d 
decr e as e s , t h e y wer e stil l ab o ve t h e war years of 1 94 2 , 4 3 , 
4 4 , and 45 . 
Ra d i o-Keith- Orph eum 
Hi storx 
Thi s comp any was incorpor•ate d in Delawar e J u l y 24 , 
1 939 , with a perp etual c h ar t a r a nd a cqui re d on Janu al"Y 2 6 , 
19 40 , t h e ass e ts and busine s s of Radio-Kei t h - Orph eum Cor p or-
ati on , which was i n b a nkr u p t cy an d had b e en i n cor por a t e d in 
Maryl a nd in 1 928 . 
I n 1 944 t h e c omp a ny org a ni ze d R . K. o. Tele v i sion 
Corporation t o f urn i s h tele v i s :t on s p on s ors wi t h a c omplete 
pro~ram bui ldi n g s erv ice. 
In t h e same y ear , Ke ::. t h - Albe e- Orp1.1eum Cor p oration , 
a sub s i diar y h olding company f ormerly controlling a ma j or 
pal:>t of t h e com ~l any ' s e astern t h eate rs was d isso l ve d . Th e 
Si n .;er Ci rcuit opera t ing fourte e n theaters i n t h e midwe st and 
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fm•rner•ly 50 percent owned be c arne wh olly owned t h :r:oug h the 
acqui s i t ion of outstan ding inte:r:est and also sever•al mer g ers 
and dissolution of subsidiar i es became effected. 
As of May 11, 1949, Howard Hughes ovmed 929,020 
comm on shares ( 2.4 pe:r:cent of shares outstanding) and the 
Atlas Col' P Ol' ation owned wa:r:rants to pu:r:chase 234, 8 12 common 
shar e s. 
Business 
Through subs idiaries, t h e c omp any eng ag es in the 
p!' odu c tion, distribution , and ex l:libition of ::1 otion pictu:r:es 
throughout t he wo:r:ld but p:r:incipally in the u n::.ted states 
and Canada . In the production and dis t:r:ibut i on b:r:anch of 
the business , the prin cipal subsidia:r:y is R . K. o. Ra di o 
Pictur'es , IncorpoJ'ated, which to s ome e x tent d:tstributes 
the l:)!'Oduct of oth e:r:s as well as its own p:r:o duc ts in t h e 
~ -
Uni t ed States and Canada . 
Plan ts and P:r:operties 
The production of featu:r:e films by R. K. o. 
Ra d io Pictures , Incorporated, :i s ca:r::r: i ed on in i ts studios 
in Hollywood and this subsidiary owns in fee t h e following : 
Hollywood, California--Motion picture producin g studio 
CulveJ• City, ca lifo:r:nia-- 1\ oti on pi ctu.re producin g studio 
Los Ange l es , California- - Tract of land of 89 acres 
used in makin g pictures 
Me xic o Cl ty, Me xi co--studio for• producing rnoti on pi ctu:r:es 
In add ~_ t :l. on, the R. K. 0. Ra dio P:tctures h old s unde:r: 
lease a tract of l and adjacent to t he Cu l ver Ci ty studio 
cor.1pris i ng approxima t ely 40 acr es, vvhi ch is also used in 
mot i on pi ctur-e p r oduction. 
On March 28 , 1 949, sto ckholders a ppr o ve d t h e reor-
g a nizat i on p lan providin g f or t he separ ation of t he ater oper-
at i ng bus ine ss from picture producin g and di stribut i ng busi-
ness. 
The t he ater operating c omp a n:l es i n which t h e corp or -
ation has a n inter e st of 50 percent 01' mor e own, leas e, or 
op era t e 120 t h eaters of which 53 are own ed in fee, 10 were 
bui lt on leased l a n d , an d t h e r emainin g 47 are l eased from 
othe r s . 
on Decemb e r 31, 194'7, t her e we r e 25,500 stockho l d ers 
wh:.. le on July 1, 1 94 6 , there were 10,500 emp loyees i n the 
c oo ~ any and subsidiaries. 
Fin ancial Pacts 
The capi t a l structur e cons i sts of only one i s s ue 
of comm on with a p ar value of :t; l an d t h e am ount ou tstan di ng 
of 3, 899 , 9 1~ sh are s. 
The c ommon s tock earne d 1 3 cents per s h are i n 1 948 
as ag a i n st (~ 1. 30 pe l" s h ar e i n 1 947. Th e dividen ds per s h are 
i n 1948 were 60 cents wh i le t h ey were ~~ 1.20 in 1 947. 
In 193 9 an d 1940 t he corporat i on su f fe red t wo 
defi c i ts, t h e latter year totaling almost $ 1,000, 000. How-
ever, in 1 941 n e t i n come ros e to ~~ 1,003,49 1 but i n 19 42 it 
dr opped t o 0 640,312. From 1943 to 1947 the corporat i on 
ave r a 2; e d a net income of be t '!e en f i ve an d six mi llion d ollars 
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with the e .z:cep tion of 1946, whi ch was ::~ 1 2 , 18? , 805. In 1948 , 
t he net i ncome droppe d onc e more to ~:p 504,044. 
Fr om t h e overall financ i al viewp oi nt and especially 
that of the common stockholders, t h e history of this company 
has not been g ood. Dividends on comm on have been paid only 
during 1946, 1947, and 1948 , with t he latter year's dividends 
not b ein g earned. 
Prior to that of 1946, d i vidends on com:r :~ on v1ere 
not pai d for ten years. Although at t h e present t i me i t i s 
not t he pU11 pose t o analyze t h e tren d of the c ompanies eith er 
as to sales, in come , or dividends , it jnay be \Vell to p oint 
out that this c omp any's net inc ome h as taken a dec ide d drop 
from i ts peak war years at a rate fa:c· in advance of the other 
co:m Danies. The c omp any has liste d as one of i ts major deduc -
tions from :income as that of "Losses on Investments in Pro -
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<"' duction , 11 wh:l ch in 1948 totaled t h e high f i .:;u!'e of •,? 3,400,000. 
Losses on in ves t men ts of current productions me ans t hat the 
coL1p any 1 s selection and production of ce!'tain fi lms proved 
disastrous and t h e company suffered the consequent loss. 
Furthe r more, the comp any lists no manag ement profit sharing 
plan simi lar to the more successful compan:t es such as Loew 1 s. 
Warner Brothers 
Hi story 
Thi s company vJas incorporated in Delaware, April 4 , 
1923, with a perpe tual ch arter, to succeed t h e business 
estab:Li shed in 1915 as a co-par• tnersh ip by t h e four warner 
bl"Ot~1ers. In April, 1 925 , t h ey acqu:Lred for cash the Vitagraph 
Cor:1pany of America, Inc., and its subsidi ari e s, aff ordi n g a 
d i stribut i on syst em in the United States, Canada, and cer-
tain fore ign cou n t :r- i es. 
In Ap:r-i l, 1926, they forme d the Vi taphone Co:r-po:r--
ation to obtain a f r an chi se from ;i~ est ern ~ lec t:r- i c Company, 
I nc., fol~ t h e pul" p ose of rep:r-oduct i on of soun d n ot i on pic-
tur e s. I n June, 1 928, they dissolved Vitag raph Comp a ny of 
Am eri c a a nd i n the same y e ar a cqui re d control of the stanley 
Cor:Jp a n y of America. 
On August 8 , 1941, warner Brothers Pictures, Ltd., 
a wholly own ed subsidi ary, purchased 2,007,000 s h a r es 
(25 p ercent) of Ass ociated Bri t i sh Picture Corp or ation, Ltd., 
who were the own ers and operators of more t 1an 400 t h e at e rs 
in Gr e at Br i tain. The purchase pr i ce was ~903,150. 
In Au gust, 1945, an a ddi tional 1,000,000 ord inary 
s h a r es (12l p ercent) of Assoc i ated Br i t i sh Pi cture Corpor-
ati on, Ltd., were pur ch ased by another sub s i di ary of V! arner 
Bro t h ers. Th e purchase pri ce wa s ~1,125,000 U~4,528 ,125). 
In Au gust of 1 947, t h e 1:·:arne r Bro t h ers Cor. ipany 
pul~chased for ~$ 4,000 ,000 cash, R. K. 0. Path e lJe ws, now 
known as warn er-Pathe News. 
An -Gi-Trust Decree 
On Fe bruary 8, 1950, a Federa l statutory court 
ent e red a fin al decree in t he g overnment's ant i -trust suit 
a g ai nst t h e major moti on p i ctu re comp anies, dire ct i n g the 
d i vorc i ng of t h e ate r h o l d ing in t erests from t he bus i ness of 
30 
producin g and distributing pi ctures. T~1e court r ule d t h at 
no f i lm di stributor or distributing comp any res u lting from 
t hi s divorcement of t he comp anies should en g a g e in e xhibi-
tion bu siness , and no exhibit:'..on c ompany could en g ag e in the 
distribut i on of motion pictures e x ce p t with t h e fut ure ap-
urova l of t he court. Mo tion picture comp anies t h at still 
reta5_n t heatej: holding s t he court directed must file wi. t hin 
six m011th s a plan for t he se pal.,at ion of the two businesses. 
The plans must provide f or the c omplete separat i on of the 
bus ines s in t~ee year s. 
Business and Products 
The compan·y and :t ts subs5_d i aries a~C'e pr omi nent in 
t he product i on, distribution, and e xhibi tion of 11otion pic -
tures and engag e in related a ctivities. 
Picture output under the na!nes of ·~:.;arner Brothers, 
First National, Vi taph one, and ~·farner Pathe News in eludes 
featu res, car toons, shorts, and newsreels. The s t u dios are 
ope r•ated at Burbank , California . 
Subsidiaries distribute the comp any product i ons 
through some thirty-seven offic e s in t h e Dnited states and 
canada and t h :r>ough offices in thirty-three forei g n coun t:r>ie s. 
The c ompany and its subsidl a:r>ies op e:r>ate about 
450 theaters in eighteen states and t he D:l. strict of Co lumbia, 
and a r e also landlords o.f off ice bui l ding s, s:tt e s, stores, 
and oth el" commercial properties. Th e t h eater p:r>opertie s are 
h eld 1a1•gely t h :r>ough the Stanley Company of Am erica and are 
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concentrated most he a vi ly in the sta tes of Penns y l vania and 
:-Jew J ersey. 
Supp l emen tary act i vities include mus i c publisrSng , 
operation of radio station _CFW B,, pr oducing p os i t ive motion 
f i l ms f:r orn the comp any and oth ers ne g ative fi l ms, operati on 
of a research labo:r· at ory , a r1d otl.J.er bus i ness a l l:t e d to the 
f i l m indus try. 
Prin c ipal Properties 
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The c om ~) any owns motion picture studi os in f ee at 
ou~bank, Califor nia, and Teddington, Eng land. As of Au gust 31, 
1949, the c omp any and subs i d i aries owned and/or lease d about 
470 r e al estate properties supervised b y the t h eater division, 
i nc luding 250 properties owned in fee and 220 leas ed . Of t he 
p r op er t i es owned in fee, 95 p ercent were t h eater s open and 
operatin g ; of the leased properties, a pproximately 90 p ercent 
were open and operating . Remai n ing proper t ies c omprised 
clos ed t h e at e r s , s i tes, t heaters sublet to o t b.ers, and com-
me rc ial properties. 
Financial Facts--Capital Structure 
The f unde d d e b t c ons i sts of an issue of a 2 percent 
bank loan serial to 1955 with an amount outstandj_ ng of 
$ 9,546,000. Fixed char g es were earned 56.52 times in 1949 as 
a g ainst 47.88 time s in 1948. 
The cauital stock c on s i sts of a n is sue of ~5 par 
value c onr~ .J on wi th 7,295,000 shares outstanding . The comm on 
stock had earned pe r s hare ~~ 1. 43 i n 1949 as ag ainst ~·.; 1. 62 in 
in 1948. The dividends per s h are were $ 1 in 1949 and ~1.62 
in 1 948. 
The net income to surplus h a d in cr eased from 
:~8, 2 38,000 in 1943 t o the peak year of 194'7 at ~:· 2 2,095,000 
and then dropped to $ 11,83'7,000 in 1948 and ¢ 10, 467 ,000 in 
1949 . 
On Decembe l" 31, 1949, the numl)er of stockholders 
weJ:oe 30,500 and the numb er of emp loyees were 15, 000 , t he 
latter fi gure in eluding subsidiar:.te s. Amortization of 
.films a :re in accord wi th the followin g table: 
Weeks Af t ex' Ee lease 
13 
18 
25 
30 
52 
65 
Manag e me nt 
Peatures 
Neg atives Positives 
57 1{, 
71 
81 
85.1. 
961 2 
100 
69% 
86 
95 
100 
Short Subjects 
64% 
83 
100 
As a lready men t i one d , Y.' arnex• Bl"others was the 
pioneer of sound pi ctures under t he direction of Samuel 
\ 1Va1"ner, who saV'T t h eir value before t h at of his c orap eti tors. 
The c omp any is still practically con trolled by the Warner 
.fanily and be cause of t h ei:r la:rg e ho ld ing s in the c onn any, the 
De pa:rtment of Justice h as o:rdel"e d the family, u u on the reor-
g anization of the company, eithe:r t o p lace a ll t heir 
p:roduction-distribution stock Ol" theil"' t h eater stock in a 
trust and thel''eby los e all voting :rights or dis p ose of one or 
t h e othel"' to a -our ch as er. Such a purch as er wa s to hold t h e 
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stock a speci f i ed l ength of time a pproved by t he Depar t ment 
of J usti ce. 'rhe reason for this movement ·was t he anti -b"ust 
d e cree , which forces the owners to choose between producti on 
and exh ibi tion. 
Con trary to p opular opi n ion , the choi ce of warner 
Br•oth ers , a lon g wi th t h at of the o ther ma j or c om')anies, was 
t o ch oose production instead of exhibi t i on. Production a lon e 
has lon g b e e n h eld to be unprofitable or at le ast not as 
profit ab le as exh ibi t ion and p opular r easoning was t hat 
exhi bi t i on would be the choice. But the major companie s 
real iz ed t hat tele vis i on wa s a com~J e ti tor of exhibi t ion and 
not pr oduc t ion and televis i on would still need production 
faci l :i_ ties. 
Repub l i c Pi ctur e s Corp oration 
Hi story 
Thi s com,:: any was in corpor ated in Ne v!T York in 
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Apri l, 1927 , as Setay ComDany, Incorporated, as a n investment 
and finan ce con:r~J any. Th e presen t naJ.i1e was ado ::_Jted November 26, 
1945 . 
As a result of certain transactions effected in 
1 943, Consolidated F\ l m In dustries, Incorporated, owned 
ap ]_)roximately 67 percent of votin ~.::, secur i ties of t he Se t ay 
Con1) any, Incorp o:·at ed , t he lat t er owned more tha n 99 p ercent 
of the votin g secur ~- ties of the Re pub lic Pictures Corporation, 
and the _ ssoc :i..ated ~:l o ti on Picture In dus t ries, :Lncor•porate c1 , 
own e d approx :~m ately 95 per·cent of t b.e outstanding vot:'Ln g 
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s e c L.,...rj_t ies of t h e M:etrop oLt tan Roy alty Corpor a t ion a n d 20 
percent of t h e ou tstandi ng voting securi ti e s of Cons o l i d a ted 
Pilm Industr ::. es, Inc or pora ted, but n o voting se curi t ies of 
Se t ay Comy any, I nc or porated, or Repu b l i c Pi c tur e s Corporation. 
Effec t i ve Novembe r 26, 1 945, Cons o l i dated Fi lm 
Indus t r i e s, In c or:')urated, form er parent, a n d t h e Republi c 
Picture s Corpor ation ( Delaware), f ormer wholly own ed sub-
sidiary of Se t ay, vv e r e me r g ed into Se tay C om~' any, In COl"p or -
a t e d , and t h e n ame ch anged t o Repu b lic Pic t ur e s Corporat i on. 
Busin ess 
r he com ) an y a n d its ·wholly ovvn e d sub s i d i a rie s 
main l y pr odu ce an d d i stribute motion pi ctures t }:-l..rou ghout t h e 
Un i te d St a tes and many forei g n countri es. The comp an y also 
ope r a tes l ab or at or ie s for f i lm pr o ce s s ~_n g and manufac ture s 
a dvert i sln g acc e s s ori e s. A sub s 2. d i ary mo l d s or manufac t ure s 
p las t i c p r oducts. 
ProrJ e rt i es 
The com ) a ny 1 s sub s :2_ diari e s own an d operat e t h e 
f ollowlng p lants : one i n Nor th Hc l l ywo od , Ca li f ornia , in-
cludines s t u d i os f or f i lm pr oduct i on; one in F or t Le e , Ne w 
J ersey, an d Holly wood, Ca l i fornia, for manuf a c turing adve r -
t i s i n 0 acces s or i es a nd for process i n g motion p icture f ilm; 
an d fi nally one in Sc.ranton, Pennsy l vania, u sed fo.r manufac-
turing p lastic pr oducts. 
Fi n an cial Data--Cap ital Structu re 
The f unded d ebt c ons i s t s of ClL"TTulative inc om e 
d e b e nture 4' s due i n 1965. The au t h orize d amou nt is 
~~5,200,000 an d t he amount outs tanding i s t he same. 
The c a:oi t al stock consists of cumulati ve convel .. -
tible pr e f erl" ed of par value ~:) 10 wi th 400,000 sha:"es out-
stan ding . The common stock is of 50 cents pal" '.r alue with 
1, 8 17, 8 60 shares ou tstanding . No divi dend h as been paid on 
the c ommon . 
In 1948 the com~any suffere d a def i cit of 0 349,990 
but in 1 949 t h e n e t income was ~) 486 ,57 9 . Th i s com:9any i s 
one of the smaller compa nie s com~:;ris in g t ~'le film in du stry. 
Universal Pictures Company, Incorpor ated 
History 
The com . any was incorpora t ed. March 1 3 , 1936 , in 
De laware un de r a perpe tual charte r havi ng broad powers as 
the Un:i.. ver•s a l COl .. porati on t o acquire certain ho ld:tn g s of 
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l lr . Carl Laernm le and ass o c i ates i n Uni vers al Picture s Company, 
In cor pol"ate d , ( De laware), and Big "U" Film Exch ange, In col"" -
p ol"'ate d, ( New York), consistin g of a pprox:!.mat e ly 89 pe r cent of 
t he ou t stan ding common s tock and a ll the outst an d::!.n g s econd 
preferred s tock of Universal Pi ctures Com:·;any, Incorp orate d 
(incorpor ated in De laware in January 10, 1 925) and 80 p ercent 
of t he ou tstandin g caT; i tal stock of Big 11 U11 Fi l m Ex ch an ge, 
Incorpol'ated . The present titl e was ad op ted Jun e 25, 1 9 43, 
when it merged i ts subsidi ary, Univer sal Pi cture s Com:;;any, 
I ncorpo:cated. 
On November 12 , 1 946 , t he c ompany acquire d t he 
entire assets of International Pictures Corporation at a net 
cost of 125,000 shares of Un iversal's common. 
Un i ted Wo11 l d Films , In corpora ted, a wholly ovm ed 
subsid~ ary formed in 1 946 , a cquired control of Castle Films , 
Incorpor ated, f or about ~~ 2 , 400,000 and pu rchased the entire 
sub standard film l ibrary and dis tri bution set-up of Bell and 
Howell Comp any. 
In 19 47 , the coml; any als o a c qui red an intel1 e st in 
fdric a n Cons olida ted Fi l ms, Ltd., distributors of Un i ve r sal, 
International , and J. P..r t hur Rank pictul ... es in South Afr i ca. 
Bus1ness 
The comp any is eng a5 e d primari ly in the manufacture , 
producti on , and distribution of mot ion pi c tures . Pictures 
produced a r e distl ... ibuted through subs ::. diaries or licensees. 
Thl"'ough t he wholly-owned subsidiary, United World Fi l ms , 
Incorp ot·ated, the c ompany p roduces and d is t ributes 16 mm . 
and 8 mm. ent er t ainment , e du c ational, r e lig ious, ne wsreel, and 
docrune n tary films. 
To conform wi t h a c ourt dec i s i on ( United states 
e.nti-tl"ust ca se) requir i ng chan g es in the industry's methods 
of sell:ing pic tures, the company i n 1 946 effected a basi c 
chang e in produc tion po licy. It eliminated t h e so-called 
" Bn pictures --VJesterns and serials--fl"om its schedule. As a 
result of combining pr oduc tion fac i l i t ies of I~ternational 
Pictures Corporati on, production was confined to top-quality 
pictux•es . 
Property 
The c omp any owns studi o property ( known as Universal 
City) in Hollywood, Cal ifornia, cover i ng an area of about 
37 
230 a cres , f ully equipped for production purposes , and suf-
ficisnt surplus stages and sound fa ci l i t ies to p e rmit 
renting of t he s tudio to independent producers. The com-
pany does not own but leases the Park Avenue Theat er in New 
York Ci ty. 
Financial Data-- Capi tal Structure 
The f unded debt consists of notes payable to t h e 
amoun t of ~~ 5, 250,000 and d ebentures ~ ' 4 s, 1959, with an 
amount of ~r, 5, 088, ooo outs t anding . 
The capi tal stock c onsists of 4-! percent cumula-
ti ve preferred of par value ~~ 100 with 62,980 shares out-
standing . The comm on stock is ~~ 1 p a r· valu e and 960,428 
shar es are outstan ding . The c ommon stock had a deficit per 
share of ~ 1.45 per share in 1949 and ~3 . 59 per share in 19 48. 
The comp any suffered deficits in bot h 1949 
(1~ 1, 125 , 8 51) and ~) 3 , 162 , 8 12 in 1948 . However, from 1943 to 
1947 the comp any averag ed be t ween 3-4 mi lli on dollar net in -
cone wi th the pe ak year of 1946 reporting ~~ 4 ,565 ,219 . 
~wentieth-Century F ox Film 
Hist ory 
The company was incorporated in Nevv York, 
F ebr uary 1, 1915, a s F ox Film Corpor·ation wi th a perpetual 
ch arter. The present title was adop ted in August, 1 945, when 
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the a s se ts and business of Twentieth Century Pi c tures , In cor-
po:;_~ated (a mot i on pi ctur e producing e nterprise in corpora ted 
in New York in May 2, 1933) were acquired f or 132 , 513 shat• e s 
of prefe rred and 613 , 26~ common shar e s. rn 1928 , t h e com-
pany acquired c ontrol of Vfesco Corp oration , now National 
The aters Corporation , operating 232 theaters. During 1 9 30 
t h ey acqu5_re d t h e entire stoc k of Un i ted .American Inve stin g 
Col'p or ation, h aving a substantial interest in Ivietropolis and 
Bradford Tr u st Company, whi ch t h en owned 65 p ercent of the 
ordinary stock of Gaum ont-Bri tish Picture Corpor•ation , Ltd. 
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In 1 9 36 , t h e y f o:_raed an En g l i sh p r oducin g unit and constructed 
studio fac i l i ties at Wembly, En g l and . 
In 19 37, t he company acquired the Roxy Theater in 
New York City t h rough the purchase of the entire common stock 
of Roxy r h eater, In corpora ted, for ;:i 650, 000 cash. 
In Ma r ch, 1 947 , the comp any acquired a substantial 
stock interest in Robbi ns Music Corpor ation, a subsidiary of 
Loe w1 s, Incorp orated . 
Bus i ness and Products 
The comp any constitutes a principal producer and 
distr i butor of motion pictur es. Main studios are lo c ated in 
Hollywood, California , wher e approximately thirty feature 
f i Lms are produced e ach year . T 1e comp any als o produces 
short sub jects at 4ovietone Ne ws, Incorp or ated, studio in New 
Yol:ok . A subs i d i ary p roduces and edi ts t wo ed:t t i ons p er v1eek 
of F ox-l.1ovietone News for di str i bution throughout the Un i ted 
States and Canada . 
Th e comj,Jany d istri but e s its ent i re out ut of pic-
tures, maintaining f or this purpose thi rty-one branches in 
the United states and six in Canada, and vari ous oth ers in 
most of t he wot> ld's principal cities . Also t h ey di st:r-i bute 
the produc tions of other comp anies who h ave no dis t ributing 
f acilities . 
The comp a ny is connected wi th the exhibition of 
motion pi ctu res thl~ough i ts own er ship of Nati onal Theaters 
Corpo:t'ation , whi ch op ei•ate s ab out 588 theatel~s in the f ar 
we stern and mi dd l e wes tern p art of t h e United States. 
National Theaters Corporat ion a l so owns 169 t heaters i n 
Australia and 44 in New ';~ eals.nd , i n a ddi t i on to 2 in Chi le 
and ~gypt . 
Principal Pl an ts and Proper t ies 
The pr i n ci pa l studio proper ti es are he l d in f ee, 
COL1 J:)l"ising some 300 acres of l and about 5 mi les wes t of 
Hollywood , Ca l ifornia, and 8 acl"es in Hollywood equ:i_pped 
with various studio s, engineerin g buildin s s, warehouses, 
machine shop s, cond~ tion ing p lants, small p ower p l an ts, a 
d e ve l oping and printing laboratory, and the administration 
build~ng s. 
The newsree l studi o unit a t 54th Street and l Oth 
Avenue, New York City , us ed by Mo vie tone News , Incorporated, 
as its production and as s emb l y p l ant is l eased . 
An ti-Trust Ru ling 
On F'ebruary 8 , 1950, a Federal statutory cour t 
entered a final decree in t h e g overnmen t' s twelve-year o ld 
anti -trus t sui t ag a i nst t he com~J any and others , dir ec t ing 
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the eli vorcing of theater holding interests fr•om the bus i ness 
of production and d istributi on of pictures and outlawed cer -
tain trade practices that led to t h e fo rmation of local 
monopoly practices . 
Th e c ourt ruled t h at no film di stributor or dis-
tx•i bu t i ng conmany resulting from t h is divorcement should 
eng ag e in the exhibition business and no e ·~chibition comp any 
shou l d en g ag e in the d istribution of motion p ictu:r>es unless 
it h a d the auproval of the court . 
The n~mber of stockho l ders in the company are 
prior prefel"•red 900; pl"eferred 7 , 0 0 0; and common 28 , 000 . The 
nur.r:Jbe r of emp l oyees i ncludin g sub sidiaries is about 19,540 . 
Financia l Data--Capital Structure 
The capi ta l stock consists of an issue of 0 4 . 50 
prior :preferred with 74, 469 shar es outstanding and an j_ssue 
of ~\i l . 50 c~mulati ve convertible preferred wi th 142 , 929 shares 
outstanding . 
The common issue i s of no p ar value an d ~1as 
2 , 769 , 137 shares ou t standing . In 1949, t h e pri or : referred 
had t~il66 . 72 earned per share as conm ared to ~n61.73 earned 
' ' - - I • 
per share in 1948 . The cumulative convert._ ble p:referred had 
~84 . 47 earned per share in 1949 as ag ainst ~79 . 77 per share 
in 1 948 . r.rhe common stock had ~~4 . 28 earned per share in 1 949 
and 0 4.29 in 1948 . 
The dividends were 0 4 . 50 per share of pri or pre -
ferr ed in 1 949 and :~: 1. 50 per share for the curaul a ti ve con-
ver t ible preferred in t he same year . Two dollar dividends 
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were gi ven to the common h old e r s in b oth 1948 and 1949 . 
The net income to surplus h as a verag ed be t i!l.r e e n 
0 10- 12 million per year be t ween 194 3 and 1949 wi th the 
e x ce p tion of 1946 and 1947, when the net income wa s 
~22,619 , 5 35 a n d 0 14,003,640 res pe ctively . 
The c om ~)any ' s amor tiz a t ion of f :'L l m e osts is i n 
acc ordance wi t h t h e following sch e dule : 
No . of YJee k s Since All Negative Costs 
Release 
13 53 . 0;& 
26 75 . 5 
39 88 . 0 
52 94 . 5 
65 100 
Summary 
Domestic Pos i tive 
Costs 
95 
100 
This con c ludes the histories of the major com-
p a ni es from t h eir beginning to t 1e present day . No att emp t 
has b een mad e as yet t o analyz e the~r f i na1c i al con d~ t ion as 
t h 5_s wi ll be d one i n a later chap ter . The pu.r __ ose , r ath er, 
h as be en merely t o es tab lis h t h eir presen t condi ti on , to no te 
t h eir fo_m of c a pi tali z a tion , t h eir p l an t a nd pr oducts , and 
to o bserve ' ~ether t~ey are fully integrated or not , to ob-
s ex•ve what their most r ecent in com e f i ::~ur• e s are . '!i t h t h is 
i n .r or raation e stablish ed, a g en eral survey of the in du stry will 
be g iven in t h e succ eeding c h ap t er. 
I n ad d i t ion to e stab l i s hi ng t he present condi t i on 
of e ach c ompany i n t h e mot i on p icture industry, t h e survey 
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of each c onrpany has f or i ts 9urp ose t he detei'm :i..n ation of 
t he dependency of . that particular c omp any u oon fo re i g n 
marke ts f or i ts income . Thi s f ac t is espec i a lly imp or tant 
for t he sma ller , unintegrated c om:;:.an i es which h ave no wi d e -
s ~re ad d! str!bution syst em in t h e Un i te d States. It has 
a l l"eady b een stated t h at Columbia h a s no exhibi tion system 
to s h ow i ts pic ture s a n d t hi s i s li kew~ se true wi th Re oubl i c 
Pictm:'e s . This fact c a u ses t h es e c ompanies to p lace a wider 
de p e n den ce u :9on a broad marke t t o di stribute the ir p ictul"es 
a nd a ny f actor t h a t would ten d t o narrow t h e bl•ead t h of t h is 
market r ou l d h a ve far-r eachi ng e f fects u pon t h e earn i ng s of 
t he part i cu l ar c ompanies i nvolved . 
Pr i or t o World war II , Europ e formed an excellent 
mark et f or Unit ed States pi ctures a nd it h as b een stated by 
Bri tish au t h orities t h at Am e rican Comp an ie s would only break 
even or make a sma ll pr ofit i f j_ t were not for t he larg e 
Br i t i s h ma1•k et for United states films . A furthe r analys is 
of t h is s t a tement wi ll b e made in a subsequent chapter on 
f oreign bus i ne ss, but at t h e pre s ent t ime i t is only neces-
sal"Y t o say that many of t he comp anies h a ve in the p a st 
p laced heavy reliance u p on forei gn markets f or their income. 
This is p art:i. cular l y true of t he smalle r c orrr9anies which h ave 
n o domes tic exhibition s ys tem u p on which to :foJ., c e t h e i r fi l ms 
if t he fore:i.gn rnarket should be curtai l ed . 
Fo ll owing ~or ld wa r I I , a rise of nati onal i sm 
occur red i n many coun tr.i es and 1Hi t h i t a desire to produce 
their own films. In a dd: t ion , exchan~ e controls have been 
establish ed by major countries to fores tall unfavo ~:--ab le 
bala nces of t .:;." ade . Vii th this p olicy the motion pic ture 
c om ;:)anies c ould l ook for-var d to curtai led i ncome from 
f oreig n sources . 
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An other pur p ose of thi s cha:9 ter :1.s t o show what 
c om:9an:tes are and a11 e not integrated . This i s a n ira:.o or·tant 
:Joi n t -oecause of t he recent g overn:ment anti - tr•ust suit, whi ch 
d i v orced production and d is tr ibution frm exhibi t i on . Be-
cause t h e decree :'Ls so recent, t h e full e ffe ct u -p on the in -
dustry c annot be readi ly det e r mined but it should be noticed 
t h at t h e ma jor c omp anie s such as Paramount , Loew' s, far•ners, 
and Twe _ tie th Century- Fox all were fully integrated and no 
in dus tl1 i al analyst could ade quately study the situa t ion wi th-
out a r e view of each ind:t v i dua l c omoa ny 1 s finan c i al c ond ~_ tion 
followed by a n over-all survey of the industry . ~ach of the 
ma jor c om. anies have be en an Blyzed in this chapter and a 
c omplete descri p ti on of t~1e industry is g iven i n t he fo llowing 
chapter . 
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CHAP'J:~~H III 
GB NEEAL S'JR 'T~Y OF TIE INDiJS'I'RY 
The motion pi cture in dustry, whi ch r an ks w· th the 
le a din g industrie s of the Un i ted States , i s di vide d int o 
t hl"ee in:ool"tant phases - - product5.on , di str i but i on , and e xhibi -
t ion . In the Drece ding chapter i t was n oted t hat the larg e 
c omp anie s or maj ors were fully integrated, t at i s , t'1.ey c on -
trolled t heir own pr oduction , d i stribu tion , and e xhibition . 
By c on tro l of ex~~ b i tion , t h e ma jor s are sup~osed to be less 
vuln e rable t o cyclica l ch an b es in business and t o an occasional 
poor run of pictur e s s i nce such pi ctures c an be run w~ th 
t hose of higher cali br e and t h eir p oOl" revenue qu a lities are 
to some de gree eclipsed . On t h e other h and, c om ~o anies t ha t 
are not fully i ntegrated d o suffe r severely from a p oor run 
of pi cture s since t h ey are in no p os i t i on t o force t h eir 
subjects UJ.JOn any exhibitor . In a d d:t ti on , the unintegrated 
de:)en d t o a .sr ea t e :c ten t u p on income from for eign exhibitions 
and t h is fur t h er make s t hem vuln e r ab le to fore i gn exch an g e 
r es trictions and taxe s . 
The pr oducti on cent er i s loc a ted in Hollywood be -
c ause of it s clear climate , scenery, mountains , seas , deserts , 
rui ns , c i t y stree ts , and e ven jung l es which are :i."eached by 
.. 
cross ing in to Mexi c o. ~'" The c omin g of soun d in creased the 
im:oor tan ce of indoor s h ooting and les s ene d s omevvhat t h e 
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natura l adv antag es of Hollywood but because of t he he avy 
i1rres t ment i n 1~eal estate an d equipment, t h e produ ction _p art 
of t b.e in dustry wi ll remain for a long t im e i n i ts present 
loc a tion. Furth e:e:m o:r e, indoor s h oot i n g r e qui r es expen s i ve 
l i g l: t ing equipment and as yet no equi pment as be e n developed 
to e qualize sunlight, which de velops a far bright e r screen 
neces s ary i n larg e t h eat ers and dr i ve-in the a t ers . 
The first step i n malri n g a motion :pi ctul"e is t h e 
selection of a story an d t h e n e~t i s t h e 9rep aration of a 
budg e t. I n t h es e two step s t~e f ac t i s em~hasized that the 
... a ld ng of fi l m :.:-Jlays i s not only an art but a busin e ss t h at 
i s hi gh ly c ompetitive whi ch uses ex tremely expens l ve x•aw 
mate r i als. A def i nit e cost f i eure for every pi cture is 
a llotted i n a dvance. Occas i onally, however , t h e budg et must 
be e xc eede d if in t h e opin :L on of t h e ~~roduce l~ the success of 
t he f uture pic t u r e warrants the extra e ~ ~pend ::l. tux• es • .Su ch 
e z tra e x~enses of ten are beyond c ontrol of th~ ) reduc er s i nce 
u..Dfor e se en ra5.n storms, windstorms, hurri canes, or s andstorms 
will delay ~r educti on f or long pe r i od s of t ime . On t h e other 
h an d u npre di ctab le acts of nature are necessary f or the 
sh ooti n g of p ar ticular scen e s and such must be wai te d for 
wi t h great e xpens e s enta:5.led as the a c tors, equ5_pment men, 
catnera men, and e x tras must be h eld i n l"'e ad2.ness for t h e 
occurren ce of t he scene. An oth er f urther ex~ense in nroduc-
t 1 on i s t h at, whi le a ?)r educer may ch o se hi s l ead i ng star s, 
on ce pr oduction i s under way the s ame cast must be h e ld 
46 
th:_'oughout unti l comp l e tion. To g u ar d a g ainst un f ore s een 
c onti ng en ci es , t h e stars and ma j or roles of t he ca st a re 
insu re d agains t disab l ing accidents s ~ nc e a ch an g e in the 
r o le in many cases results in junking of practically all 
t he sc ene s a lr eady talr:en and i ncreases cos t of product i on. 
Dithin each studi o t h ere are betwe e n 2, 000 and 
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3 , 000 -aor _ er s c om) r i s i ng artis ts, wr i ters , s ten O[;raphers , 
archi tects , c a r pent ers, p aint ers, electr i c ians , c a:r.1eramen , 
la~orat ory wor ker s , and sound men , t o mention but a few of 
the 276 t rades and pr of essi ons re presented . Tne ac tor s 
t h en selves form only a s mall part of a s t u d io 's p opulation. 
All of t he ab ove at·e u t l l i ze d in the cr ea t:L on of t h e pi. c-
ture s ;;;hi ch may rang e f x•om s i ng l e x·ee l s hol1 ts t o fu ll l e ng th 
mas terpiece features . 
The pl1 0du ction of a talking mo tion pi c t u r e j_s one 
of t he mos t c cmp l i c a te d j obs in t he wor l d . * In the f i rst 
p lace, ther e must b e a s t ory of t he t ype t h at c an be made i nt o 
a p ictur e. ~ very imp ortant n o ve l that has been p rinted or 
is ready t o prin t has been read by the story de partmen t. 
· l so, mag azi n es ar e a ferti l e s ource for material for motion 
pi c t u re s . The task of selecting the stor y is not as s imp le 
as it sounds s ince t he c ast :must be fitt e d to t he story or 
t he story fi tt ed to t he cast . 
::Ln a d di t i on , the a ll i mp or tant el ement of cost 
mus t be c o ns i dere d in purchas :l n g a story or boolc x· :"~ ghts for 
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p i c tures . Of a ll of the innum era b l e in tang i b le assets he l d 
by a corporat i on , t h e b o ok-ri ghts to make a pi c ture f luc-
t uate mos t eas i ly i !J v a lue. I.:Iany a ... o t i on pictu r e c ompany 
has purch ased t h e l"igh ts to nake a pi cture at a high pr ::. c e 
on l y t o di scove r t ~at it __ a d not t h e proper c a st t o make 
the picture Ol'' e ls e ~Jub li c i nt e r es t in the s tory had so 
dropped t h at fu ture pr oducti on only pre dicte d fa 4. l u.re . Fr om 
t he financia l viewpoint , the v a l ue of such r i ght s should b e 
r educe d to a nomi nal sum or even redu ced to zero s ~~- nce in 
many ins tan ces there would b e no buyers for the r i gh ts . 
Onc e t he s tol"Y h as bee n selected, t he research 
depar t ment mus t ch eck every de t ai l in e very new scene. Or i g -
inally, b oth the audience and t h e produce .!:s wer e l ess par t i c-
ulal"' abou t t h e accuracy of the scen e s but gradually the 
audien c es b ec ame more f i nicky a n d demande d c om::;:> l e te auth en -
tic i t y in all the scenes. This once rr.0re in creased t h e cost 
of production by r eason of s pec:alists requi red in every 
scene t h at required p ol,trayals of mi l j_ t ary life, civi l or 
chur ch funct i ons, or descr ipt i ons of forei gn countr ie s and 
t h e i r cu st oms. In addi tion, v arious p.rote cti ve s ociet i es in 
be h alf of chi l dren, animals, races , or r e l igi ons d emand that 
cert ain c on di tions on the set must mee t with their a ppr oval 
and t lJi s fur t h er increases t h e cost of production. 
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Finally t h e stag e i s set and c ameras go in to act 5. on. 
Somet ime s a star t is ma d e in t h e midd le of t he script an d at 
other time s t h e l ast scen e s ar e shot fi rst . Occ a s i on a lly , 
t h e whole cast mus t g o on loc a tion and t h e proper organization 
of the work falls on the producet• . E veJ•y stage of pro-
duction must be under expert sup erv~. s i on s i nce mistakes are 
c ostly and may set•iously a f fect t h e fina l value of the film . 
Tho p roducer is t h e guidin g f orce in the ma kin g of a talk ing 
picture . He is re spon s i ble for the s tat·ting and f i nishing 
dates , f or budget i n g i tems, for t h e selection of the story 
mater! al, an d for t h e cast and t h e dire ctor. The director 's 
res p onsibility is to consolidate and t o obtain a smooth 
drrunati z a ti 011 of t h e story . 
It has been est j.!1ated t h at t h e averag e production 
rec ord in t h e lar g er Hollywood studi os is three minute s of 
f i nish ed f::. l ro in an ei ght -hour day . The shooti n g of very 
difficult scenes wi ll averag e c ons i derab ly less f i nish ed 
f i lm p el, e i ght - houl' d ay. Few pi c t ure s are evel' made in less 
t h an thirty days and often it take s a year• or more . This 
small f igure of f i nish ed film per day. emphas izes the imp or-
tance of t h e proper c oordi nation and control of the mera·oers 
of the cast requi red by t h e di rector . Any err ors in the 
shooting of scenes r e sults in re-takes, wh i ch invo lve enor-
mo~s extra costs. 
Dis tri bu t i on 
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The sales and physical di str!buti on of moti on 
pic t ures are handl ed b y t h e sales depar t ment of each c omp any 
or , in a few cases, by a separa te org anization whi ch has con-
tract e d with t h e producer t o d i stribute his uictures .~~ 
~~ 4, p . 8 14. 
Actually, t h e f ilms are not sold to the e ·:hibitors . The 
distr-ibutOl"' grants a license to the exhibitor to s h ow a 
picture at a speci fied place and time, and len ds him the 
necessary p os i t ive print . Most sales of motion pi ctures 
f or merly we r e made by seasonal contrac ts sig ned in advance . 
Various practices instituted by the di stributors such as 
"block-booking," 11 blind- buying, 11 etc., fo l"'ce d the e xhi bi toP s 
to tak e what the d istributors have offered, but such prac-
t i ces h a v e be e n curt a iled by the anti-trust decree. Thes e 
trade pra c tices and t heir effects will be discussed :t n a 
later chapter . 
Exhibi t i on 
Exhibit i on is that phase of the i ndustry that is 
most fm.~iliar to the ave rag e person . The various types of 
moti on pi cture houses ran g e from the hug e de lux e theaters 
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of the larg e cities 1 downtown are a s to the res:i_dent i al 
distr i cts' "neighborhood" houses and t h e small rural t heaters. 
The very larg e t he aters ch an g e t h eir prog rams once or· t wi ce 
a week or may keep t h em longer if attendance warrants it. 
The s maller theaters have two, t hree, or even more ch an g es of 
prog ram depending once more u;~ on attendance. The chi ef · con-
cel"n of the exhibitor is to supply h i s audience with entel.,-
tainmen t to t h eir liking . In addit i on, a d vert i s i ng (locally) 
and e xp loitation of the f i l ms is hi s concern as well as the 
manag ement of the theater . Exhibition has long been con -
sidered the most prof i table phase of the industry and this 
h as b een born e out by c omparison of the income of the producers 
and dj_s tr·i butors as compared to the f'ully inte.,; rated com-
p an i es who do their own exhibition. 
All this inf'ormation is necessary to establish 
the backgr ound of t h e :industry in relation to production, 
distribution , and exhibition. From t h e financial p oint of 
view, production is im p ortant since it is i n that phase that 
the most money is invested, but exhibition in turn i s impor-
tant s i nce it is in that phase t h at the investments are re-
tul .. ned. 
The remainder of the chapter will deal with the 
fi c;ures for investment in t h e industry in its three phases, 
the receipts and attendance, and f i nally the aspect of for-
eit;n business . 
Industry Investment 
In 1948 there were Q2,699,290,000 invested in the 
motion pictul"e industry i n the United States vvhile in 1949 
the amount had increased to $2,881,600 ,000. The investment 
in t h eat ers consisted of G2,525,000,000 in 1948 and this 
also h ad increased to 8 2,700 ,000 ,000 in 1949. 
The studio investment, which included Hollywood 
on ly, amounted to ;:~ 135,690,000 in 1 948 while in 1949 the 
total was 0 141, 000,000 . 
The distribution investment remained the same for 
both years at ~25,600,000. 
Production (United States only) 
I n 1948 the i ndustry p roduced 432 f eature f'ilms 
as compared to 421 in 1949 . The short subjects remained at 
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the srune nQ~ber for both years at 590 . 
The annual produ ction costs ( whi ch i ncluded 
Hollywood only) amomJted to (~447,0 96,000 in 1 948 but t his 
wa s cut to 0 412 , 788 ,400 in 1 949. 
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The annual payroll f or production was · :~ 258 , 48 7,032 
in 1 948 and t hi s also was cut to f;~237, 468,905 for the year 
of 1 949. Th e nmnber of people e mp loyed in production, h ow-
ever, was cut by 2,000 from the 1 9 ,500 of 1948 to 17,500 in 
1949 . 
Distribution ( Uni ted States only) 
The annual payroll for di str i bution totaled 
$ 33,000,000 i n 1948 but i ncreased to 0 33,750 , 000 in 1949. 
By t h ese fi gure s it can be noted that the d i stribution pay-
roll approximately is one-eighth t h at of producti on . The 
total number emp loyed was 12,900 in 1948 and 1 2 ,500 in 1949. 
Exhibiti on (Un ited States only) 
Th e number of t he aters i n operation at the end of 
19 48 was 1 9 ,323 whi l e t he numbe r in 1949 had decreased by 
only 12 to 1 9,311. 
Th e averag e weekly attendance was 87,500 ,000 
persons in 1948 and had dropped sharply to an est imated 
77,500 , 000 pel"' week in 1 949 . Tl"~i s is a n e x c e eding ly imp or -
tant point in the finances of the f ilm i ndu stx·y . The 
fi gure s s h ow that averag e weekly attendance for H:149 had 
dr op9ed ab out 12 percent from t h at of the preceding year . 
The annual revenue for 1 948 was ~ 1,5 45 , 000 , 000 , 
which dropped to (?1, 350, 000 , 000 in 1 949. The f ilm rentals 
paid a nnually by theaters totaled $ 540,950,000 in 1948 and 
~~ 482 , 500 ,000 in 1 949 . rrhe number of per sons emp loyed in 
exhibition in creased f ro:m 172 ,000 i n 1 948 to 180 , 000 in 
1949 . 
Receipts and At t endance 
The movie indus t ry, i n order to have c l oser con-
tJ•ol over its statistics, breaks dovm its annual r ece ipts 
int o avera~ e weekly receipts and its attendance into averag e 
weekly at tendance. The fol lowing tab le vvi ll revea l t h e 
exhibi tion statistics for t he pas t 20 year s. 
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TABLE NO. I 
IiiO'l,IOH PI CTURE EXI-IIBI'l'ION S r::' TISTI CS 
Th e a t er s 
in Uni ted 
s tat es 
( Dec . 31 ) 
1949 19, 311 
1948 20 , 068 
1947 19, 207 
191 6 20, 306 
1945 21,519 
1944 20 , 355 
1943 20 , 277 
1942 20 ,196 
1941 20 , 28 1 
1940 19, 645 
1939 19, 032 
1938 1'7 , 829 
1937 18 , 182 
1936 18 , 192 
1935 15 , 8 58 
1934 15, 273 
1933 16 , 885 
1932 18 , 533 
1931 18 , 715 
1930 21 , 993 
1 92 9 23 , 000 
E Es t i mated 
Avg . We e kly 
ttendance 
O!ii ll i on s) 
78E 
88 
90 
98 
98 
97 
95 
90 
85 
80 
85 
8 5 
85 
80 
75 
70 
60 
60 
75 
110 
95 
Avg . Week ly 
Re ce i p t s 
( Mi l 1i ons ) 
35. 7E 
35 .. 3 
36 . 4 
39 . 5 
34 .5 
30 . 7 
27 . 9 
24 . 6 
21 . 4 
19 . 3 
19 . 6 
19 . 6 
19 . 6 
20 . 0 
18 . 0 
16 . 1 
13 . 8 
13 . 8 
18 .0 
30 . 8 
28 .5 
Avet•ag e 
Adrn i s si on 
Cha:r>ge 
( Ce nts) 
46 . 01 
40 . 1 1 
40 . 41 
1 40 . 4: 
35 . 2 1 
1 31. 7 
25 . 2 
24 . 1 
23 . 0 
23 . 0 
23 . 0 
25 . 0 
24 . 0 
23 . 0 
23 . 0 
23 . 0 
24 . 0 
28 . 0 
30 . 0 
1 I n cludes Admi s sion '!' ax e s 
sou r c e : Standard an d Poors Industry Survey s, P • 9 . 
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Per sonal 
In c ome 
( Bil l i on s) 
206 . 1 
209 . 5 
191 . 0 
177 . 7 
171 . 9 
165 . 9 
150 . 3 
122 .7 
95 . 3 
'78 . 3 
7 2 . 6 
68 . 3 
74 . 0 
68 . 4 
5 9 . 9 
53 . 2 
46 . 6 
49 . 3 
64 . 8 
76 . 2 
8 5 .1 
A survey of Table No. r wj_l l l"eveal that the 
g r e atest number o:f t he aters in t h e United States was in 
55 
1929 vvhen 23,000 wer•e operated whi l e t h e s nallest nmnber 'l.:vas 
i n 1 934 at 15,273 t heaters. The averag e weekly attendance 
was at its peak o:f 110 million in 1 930 and at its lowest of 
60 million in 1 932 and 1933 . 
On the oth er hand , d 1..1rin g the past ten years the 
number of t h eaters in the Un i ted States l"ema~;_ned fairly con-
sistent at a rang e of from 19 to 20 thr·oug hout . In the sarae 
period, the averag e weekly attendan ce rose :from 85 mi llion 
in 1 93 9 to its peak of 98 m ~ llion in 1 9 45, 1 946 , and then 
dropp e d sharply to 78 million ( es t imated) in 1949 . The 
s pread beb'l!een these attendance f j_gures do e s not appear too 
g r e at but it must be remembered that they are g iven by 
week ly reports and any difference should b e multiplied by 
52 to ,:set the true picture. 
Assuming 194 1 to be t h e beginnin g of the war 
years, the averag e weekly attendance was as follows: 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
85 
90 
95 
97 
98 
milli on 
It 
n 
If 
" 
Table No . I s hows that 85 million averag e weekly 
attendance was t he approximate averag e from 1 936 tl-J.rough 
1 9 41 . Theref'ore t he effect of the war was to stimulate movie 
attendance so t h at an in creas e of 5 million per week was to 
occur in a yeal" and g radually increase to the peak war year 
of 1 945 with a fi gure of 98 million . Thj_s, of c ourse, did 
not match t h e all-time record of 1930 wi t h a fi gure of 
110 rnillion but it doe s sh ow t h a t personal income does h ave 
an effect upon mot i on p i cture attendan ce to some de gree. 
Ho·w·e ver, p ersonal inc ome i s not the sole criterion u p on 
whi ch to base f luctuati on s in theater attendance since the 
f igur e s of Tab le No . I s h ow t h at t h e averag e admiss i on 
charg e increased only 84 percent from 1 94 1 to 1 949 wh ile 
pers onal income increased in total 117 percent yet the at-
ten d ance dropped steadi l y after 1 946 in s p~ t e of the in -
crease in personal income dur :ln g t h e sa..rne period. 
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Th e avel"ag e we elcly receipts were at t heir lowe st 
of ~) 13. 8 mi lli on in 1932 and 1 933 while t h e p eak was reached 
in 1946 wi th ~~ 39.5 mi llion. Between 1 929 and 1 939 , the 
year 1 930 represented t h e highest weekly receipts with 
30.8, but the next year 1 931 reve a led the greatest drop in 
the tYJenty-yeal~ p eriod when rece ipt s fell by 12 mi llion 
weekly. 
The averag e a dmission char g e has varied directly 
wi t h business condi tions , d r opping from a h i g h of 30 . 0 cents 
in boomtime 1929 to a low of 23 . 0 cents in t h e depress i on 
years , only to rise once more to a peak of 46 . 0 cents in 
1949 . 
Fr om a direct quotation in Standard an d Poor 's 
INDUSTRY AND SURVBYS , it is stated that in norma l t imes , 
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t heater attendance tends to parallel the mon t h ly index of 
p er•sonal income a lthough f luctuations in either direct: on 
are less marl{ed , e x ce p t when at ten dance slumped bad ly. As 
shown in the table already g iven , the rise in weekly atten-
dance after 1939 was far· les s pron CUll ce d t han t hat in per-
sonal income. However, p a id admissions mad e a better s h owing 
becaus e of t h e hig her prices char g ed in a ll sections of t h e 
country.{!-
The rather sharp rise in t i cket prices in key 
houses in me trop olitan areas t hat occurred durin g the war is 
not reflected in the 36 . 3 cent aver a g e price f or t he eight 
years through 1949. However, since i t i s estimate d t hat be -
t ween 65 percent and 75 percent of t h e total national g ross 
is earned by a pproximately 20 percent of the t h eate rs in the 
country located in me tropol i tan cities, a drni ss :t on receipts 
in t h ese key houses h ave boosted total theat e r 1•evenues pt·o-
por t ionately more t han t h e rise in theate r attendan ce woul d 
indic a te. Thi s is born out by t h e fact t hat around 27 p er-
cent of total t h eaters operat i ng , and around 43 percent of 
over- all seati ng capacity are in c i t ies wi th a population of 
50,000 or more, and i t ls i n t he se areas ·where ac'1Jllission 
• ~E-.;~ prices h ave s h own t he greatest :Ln creases. 
Yardsticks not~~ thstanding , variations in atten-
dance do occur at all t ime s, depending on the p opularity of 
"'~8, p . 8 • 
.,H~S D 8 
, ,J;; • • 
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releases . In oth er words , a r un of poor re leases wi ll 
de press b ox office re ceipts even in t imes of larger con-
smaer income s. C onvel~ s e ly, a "hi t 11 pictur>e wi ll h ave a 
decidedl y stimulating ef fect on attendance even in the de-
pre ss ~ on periods. 
Exhibi tion 
The revenues taken in by film exhibition may be 
broke n down in accordance wi th the foll owi ng t able: 
TABLE NO . II 
/)...LLOC /, ':.!:'I ON 0 .. ~ FILM EXHIBi r roN Rl!;iT.J.i:IIf1JBS 
Film Ran tal . • . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . 35fi/ • ;o 
Pay Roll • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . • 16 
Real 3: state. • • • • • • • . . . . • • • • . . . • • 20 
Advertising and Publicity. • . . . . • . • • . . • • 8 
Electricity and Heat • • • • • . • . • • • . • • . • 8 
Other Taxes and Insur ance . . • • • • . • . . • • • • 4 
:;.:xtra .Attracti ons. • • . . • . . . • . . . • . • • • 3 
Interes t, Pr ofi t, and Dividends. . . . . . . . • • • 6 
lOO% 
Source: International Motion Pi ctu1,e Al manac, p . XVIT . 
The distr:'Lbuting and exhibi t i n g d ivi si ons of the 
motion pi cture industry a r e operated on a more bus i nessli ke 
basis t~1an the producin g end, with sound business judgmen t 
of mor e importance t han i ndi vidual talent. Neverth eless , 
t be c los e ass ociation wi th the pr oducing divi sion, especially 
in t he case of c ompanies operating both production studios 
and t h e a ters , in the p ast (n otably 1929-1930) led t o a dis -
reg ard of costs and a scramb l e for exhibiting properties . 
The effect of the overexpans ion has since be en 
reme di ed. Reo:r•g anizations have writ ten down theater holdings 
well b e low replacement costs. Tn addition, debt reduction 
has been n oticeao le. The s e accomp l i s hmen ts h a ve enab le d 
producer-exhibitors to reali z e substant i al p r ofits on the 
sale of theaters ordered by t h e court as a r e sult of anti-
trust l it i g ation . 
Addi t ional t h eaters made necessary by populat i on 
shifts h ave gradually increased to t a l seati ng cap ac:l.ty . This 
is i llustrat ed by Table No . I , which shows an increase of 
over 800 t he aters from 1 94'7 t o 19 48 even though the averag e 
week ly attendance h a d be gun to drop durin g that period . 
Moti on pi cture t h eaters, once c on structed, cannot eas i ly be 
converted to any other economic pul'"' p ose , a :.1d t he pressure of 
rents, taxe s, and de preciation forces c ontinue d operati on 
e ven when gross declines sh o.rply. 
On t he basis of a n estimated averas e of 85 , 000 ,000 
week ly paid a dmiss i ons s in ce 1 938 , each thea t er is fi lled 
sli bht ly mor e than on ce daily on t h e b asis of the number of 
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theaters curren tly operating . Vith motion pi cture t he aters 
gi v ing an a verag e of 2 . 5 s hows daily and a round four i n t he 
cas e of t he l arg e t he a t e rs, some h ouses are obvious ly oper -
ating at far l e ss t h an cap ac i ty. 
Dr ~-ve-In Th eaters 
During ~ iorld \ ar II , n e w the a ter construction was 
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at a miniml.ll11 , an d t h e e xpan sion of industrial centers per-
mi tte d older houses to operate a t capacity . Alth ough re stric-
ti ons on con struction of n e w the aters were re~ove d in ear ly 
1948 , co n struction on new t hea t ers h as been conf i ned ch i efly 
to drive-ins. Th ere were 2,205 drive -in t he aters in oper-
at ion at t h e beg inn i ng of 1 950 , and a ddi t ional dr~ve -ins 
have s :~. n ce iJeen opened . The i nc.r• ease i n t~ e nu...rnber of cars 
on the road h as contribute d to the p opularity of t he s e 
t heat l"s. 
The increased s eatin g capac i t y in d i cates t h a t 
t here is a nd vid. ll be a s u r p lus of s eati n g cap ac i ty. Thus , 
wi th many new t h eaters l ikely to operate far be low cap ac i ty, 
t h e ave r age b ox offi ce pr i ce will remain re l at i vely low. 
Return on I nvested Ca pital 
The p ercentag e of :r·e turn on i nvested capi ta l by 
t h e major c ompanies is e stimated by Floyd B. Od l um in the 
annals of t h e Ama r i can Ac a demy of Pol i tl cal a nd Soc i.a l 
Sc i en ce ( November, 1947) as f ollows: 
TABLE NO . I I I 
F' ~' TURN ON I J:J\1~ ~3 'l1E D CAPIT1 L 
Fis c a l 
Years Par az'TJ oun t Cen t. F ox i!~arner Loe "! 1 s R. K. 0 . 
1 936 7 1°' . /~ 16.7% 5. 4~~ 11 5d • ,o 12 . 4% 
1 93 7 7.7 18 . 8 6 . 2 13. 5 9 . 9 
1938 4 . 5 13 . 8 4 .2 10 . 0 5 . 3 
1 939 4 .7 8 . 7 4 .0 8 . 6 4 . 8 
1940 7.9 4 . 2 4 . 4 9 . 2 . 8 
1 941 11.6 9 . 4 6 .7 10.1 3 . 0 
1 94 2 15 . 4 13 .2 8 . 2 10 .0 3 . 3 
1 943 16 . 5 1 3 .6 10 . 4 10 . 8 16 .5 
1 944 13 .7 16 .1 9 .6 11.7 11.2 
1 945 12.8 15. 2 8 .1 10.5 12.1 
1946 25.6 20 .7 14.7 11. 6 16 .9 
1 947 20 .5 14.2 17.7 7. 3 5 . 7 
1948 16 .6 12.1 9 . 3 2. 98 . 6 
1949 14 .6 11.4 8 . 0 4 . 34 
Source : Annals of t he 1-.:mer i can Ac adem of Political and 
so c:i_a l Sc i en c e , November, 1 4 , F loyd B. Od u..rn . 
6 1 
An analysis of Table No. III s h ows the ef fect of the 
recession of 1937 - 38 upon re t urn s to invested capital. In 
1 938 for a ll five companies listed, the returns were notice -
ably l ess for 1938 c ompared to 1937. Twentieth Century Fox 
had the greatest drop of 5 per cent followed by R. K. o. with 
a drop of 4 . 6 p erc ent . ~arner 1 s h ad the least dr op of 2 per -
cent, but t h is comp any also hac1 t h e lowes t 1:eturn (6. 2 per -
cent in 1937) to fall from . The effec t of the war y e ars are 
cleax·ly evident . B:a ch comp a ny s h owed a substantial i n crease 
in r e t urns in 1941 over 1940. Twentieth Century F ox and 
Paramount s h owed t h e gre a test jump w:t t h an i ncrease of 3 . 8 
pel"'cent wb::i.. le Loevv 1 s h a d the leas t in crease of only . 9 per-
cent , but t his l atter c o:m!Jany also h ad the h::. ghest rate of 
the five companie s in 1940. 
All of t h e c ompanies showed an in crease in 1942 
and 1943 ovel" -Ghe preceding year , but in 1944 Par a:mou nt , 
l arner 1 s and R. K. o. s h owed decreases from the preceding 
year of 1943 . A g l an ce at ~:ab le No . III shows why 1 946 i s 
reg arded as the peak y ear of the motion pict1...1.re industry as 
e v:i_denced by the hic;hest returns shown by a ll of t h e com-
panies liste d . Paramount l ed 'N:i. th the astl" onomical fi gure 
of 25 . 6 p e.r•cent , Twentieth Century Fox n ext ·wi th 20 .7 per-
cent , R. K. o. t hi r d with 16.9 percent , ~"rarner 1 s ne x t wi t h 
14.7 percent , and Loew 1 s l a st ~ith 11 .6 percent. 
The tabl e a l so shows t hat al t hough all the com-
panies showed de creases in 1948 f r om 1947, three companies 
Par am ount , Tv1en tieth Century F ox, and Warners ma:5..ntaj_ned 
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fai rly high re tur•ns on j_ nve sted c apital in t h e per i od from 
1947 to 1 9 49 . Loew 's, howeve r , showed a s~arp drop of 
5 y e rc ent fr om 1 947 to 1 948 but increased by 2 percent in 
1949 . R . K. 0 . has h ad t l:J.e most el~ratic cours e increasi.ng 
froro 3 . 3 pe r•cent to 16.5 pe1:>cent in one year . Fr•om a high 
of 16 . 9 ne rcent in 1 946 , R . K. 0 . 1 s return dr opped to .6 per-
cen t in two yeHl..,s' t j_m e ( 1 948) and no fi ::;ul..,es were avai l able 
f or 1 949 for t hi s company . 
However , t he oth er f our c ompanies show a fair ly 
ste ady re t urn on i .~·lV e sted c ap:i. tal not on l y du r in g t he war 
y ear s but a lso :i.n · t h e p ost war y eax•s . Pararn ount, F ox , and 
n arner h ave pal,t i m;t l ar l y S 1'l OWl1 steady retu rns , whi le Loew 1 s 
p oorest year was i n 1 948 but s hows a n in creased r e turn f or 
1 9LJ:9 . 
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TABw "f\ f'• 
.... "' • IV 
BfiliAKDmm OF FILL1 P:RODuCrj~ T ON cos~s 
( 3ased on ::;a , ooo, ooo Fea ture ) 
Cast . • • • • • • • 25 . 0% 
Indi rect Co s t s. • • • • • • • • 1.3 . 0 
Se t s an d A1•t Dire ctor s . • • • • 12 . 5 
Dir•e ctors • • • • • • • • • 10 . 0 
Story Pre para ti on • • • • • • • • • • 7 . 0 
""7xtras, Bits , an d C ~J.aracters. • • • • 5 . 0 
Story Costs • • • • • • • • • • 5 . 0 
Soun d J.!: n g in e e r ing an d Neg atives • • • • • • • • 3 . 1 
Costume s a nd Desig n e t•s . • • • • • • • 2 . 0 
Di rec tor Assis tants • • • • • • • 2 . 0 
I nsurance • • • • • • • • 2 . 0 
Lic5h ts . • • • • • • • • 2 . 0 
Pub l :_ city , r r•ans pol"'tati on , Re search , Te ch ., e tc ., • 2 . 0 
CatJer ar:Jen and Crevv . • • • • • • • • • 1 . 5 
Crew and Labor . • • • • • • • • • 1 . 2 
Te :3 ts • • • • • • • • 1. 2 
Cu tters • • • • • • • • • 1 . 0 
Haw Films • • • • • 1. 0 
IJake - Up , Hai r dre ss e J:>s , a nd SUP!) l ie s • • • • • • • 0 . 9 
Stills and Ph otos l.,aphs . • • • • • • • • 0 . 4 
Teacher s . • • • 0 . 2 
Total. • • • • • • 100 . 0% 
I nte rn a tional Moti on Picture Al manac . 
Pn ana l ys i s of T b le No. IV on breakdown of film 
production costs shows p l a in l y that by f ar t~e greatest cost 
of p roduction is the ca s t a t 25 percent of t h e total . 
Closely fo llowing is ind i rect costs at 15 p e rcent , wh:i_ le 
s e ts a n d ar t direc tors r!lake u p 12 . 5 p ercent of t h e total. 
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The direc tors of tl1.e film or comp an y take 10 percent of the 
cost and consider i n g that t h ey a r·e x• e l ati ve l y few in mm(be r 
for each film , t he percentaGe of 10 p ercent is exces sively 
hig h . The t o tal of c a st, sets a nd art directors , and 
di rectors make up 50 percent of the tot al cost a nd t hi s doe s 
not in clude t he extras, bits and characters . Iiowever, such 
high costs are easily defended by the indus try. In the fir st 
p l ace , t h e fi l m is t h e pr oduct and t h e suc ce ss of t hat pl''o-
duct i s d i rec tly propor t ional to the skill and effort p laced 
:.n the making of the f"iLn . I n the second p l ac e, the fi l m Ol"' 
produ ct i s not t h e fina l criteri on of its success but r athe r 
t ::1e nu;ube r of times that fi lm or its rep lica c an be exhibited . 
There f' ol' e , it ha s b een the p olicy of t he fi l m industry to 
pay larg e salarie s to producers , pe r formers, and Cirectors 
who have proven t h eir wor t h i n one c ase or s h ow c onsistent 
box o£'fi ce appea l in the oth er case . 
However, t h e wal"' b oom year s led t o a sharp d is-
reg ard to costs wi th the r e sultin g shar p incre ase in s a l aries 
and i n t h e d irec t costs of production . Fu r thermore , d~ring 
t h e war , extende d pich.1r e run s . ore t h an o:C'fse t h:tg her p :eo-
duction costs , _ bu t l ate:e t he pu blic be {;-,-an to demand 1nore 
v ar·i e ty, wh i ch resulte d in short e r runs as atten danc e fell 
off. Ext en ded r un s , of c ourse , refer t o the prac tice of 
retain::..n g a nd c ont i nually e xhi bi t :2.ng a -oi cture which still 
draws attendance . It i s t h e aim of every yroducing or ex-
h :!.. bit i ng oom 2,1 any to obtain such a pictur e be c ause of t h e 
l a r g e profi t involve d . Such pictures are known as "money 
111 a kers 11 an d t h e t'NO b est exarn ~) les of t h at typ e a r e "Bi.i...,th of 
a Nation !' and naone vvi th the i_;:ind , " which c a n stil l d ra1•r 
cro·wd s de s p i t e t h e i r l on g years of exhl bi t i on . I n t ·!:J. e c a se 
of t hBse t wo films , t hB or i g i na l costs were ex cessive a nd 
t h e d an g er of a g r e at loss i n v o l ve d i f t h e publ i c shoul d 
f a~_ l to b e a t trac t ed . But each fi l m more t h an prove d ~.ts 
worth a n d e ac~ c on t i nued t o be a sound i nvestment f or i ts 
producer ove r lon g p eriod of yeax•s . J u dg ing b y t h ese t wo 
fi l ms and similar successes , it might a ppe ar tha t t h e f i nan -
c i al succe s s of a fi l m would i n mos t c a ses be directly pro-
-o ol..,t i ona l to t h e amount of i n ve stment and costs p lac ed in 
its ~)l'oduction , but such a n assmn _9 t i on vJOuld be f a r f rom 
the t :ruth. Certain f i lms such as "A.nthony Adva r•se , " " iirch 
of Tr iump h , " " Joan of Ar c ," 11 Cae sar an d Cl eop atra, 11 and 
" Ma :Pi e l1ntoine t te " ha ve had mi lli on s in v 0 sted in t hem only to 
have t urned out to be dismal box off i c e fa i lures . On the 
o t h er hand , s ma ll productions wi t h l i ttle ca9i tal invested 
have r e sulted in tremend ous box of fice revenues b e c ause t :1.ey 
h a d t h e prop e r c omb i nat i on of stars , st ory, and s u pport i ng 
c as t . Exar.TD l e s of su ch productions are " Goi n g 1;1y n ay" and 
"The Jolson Story." 
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One of the po l i c i es of the mo t ion pi cture indus-
t r y is to a~oid g i ving out the exact costs and prof its on 
each pi ctur e . Fr om the industry paint of view thi s i s a 
r a ther s ound prac tice s i nce the indi vidu al comp anies have 
long realized that t he pub lic i s very susceptible to any 
information that a picture is not do i n g too well financ i ally 
and wi 11 tend to shun the picture with the a tt :t tude of 
waiting f or some better feature to come al ong . On t h e other 
hand , t h e com-oani es have never fai led to elab oJ:•ate on the 
costs of pr oduction of certain pictures and in many cas es 
have e .x:aggerated such c osts to un b elieva i) le heights . How-
eve r, in many cases the costs are justified and cor rect , 
es p ec i ally when a comp any g oes to foreign countries to pro-
duce pictures requiring sce nes difficult t o reproduce in the 
United St a tes . 
The t h eory beh:t nd the dissem :t nation of information 
r•eg ardi n g costs is fairly s i nh ; le since its purpose is only 
to whet the curiosity of t he pub l ic , which des i r es to see 
what i'i l:m h as had so much s pent u p on it . 
But mot ion pi c t u J.." es do not make a urof it on the 
first or second s howing of a film but rather on the long 
runs or "hold-overs" to which the pub l i c continues to 
flock . If the picture meets wi th a poor -ore-view or .below 
ave l .... a t:;e first s howings , the news travels quickly from city 
to city by means of reviewers in news p apers and mag azines 
and t h e pub l :i_c begins to show ap athy toward the fi lm. For 
t h.:!_ s reason, t h e companies do not wish to exhibit e xact 
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finan cial fi t:;ur e s reg arding par t i cular p icture s because any 
news whi ch tended to p lace t he picture in a poor .f:!.nancial 
l j_ght rni ght f urther• dr ive the public a way . 
Furthermore , each company cling s to the hope t hat 
f u ture releases of t h e same picture might hit t h e raax•ket at 
a time when the public would look fa vorably upon it and in -
cr eas e the revenue obtained from that picture previously . 
Th erefore t he comp any attempts to suppress any unfavor able 
news concerning practic a lly a ll pictures in t he belief that 
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no picture has ceased to be a money maker unt i l it is rendered 
obsolete a s entertainmen t by t ime or by public preference . 
Although for contr ol purposes the averag e weekly 
recei p ts is an e x cellent de vi ce, a truer pic ture of the con -
di tion of t he i ndustry i s obtai ned by noting the total sales 
per year and t he trend of t hose sales . The followin g tab le 
s hows the sales of the eight larg est c om:;J ani es wi th the year 
1939 tak en as t h e bas e ye ar. Ni neteen t hil"ty- nine was con-
sidered t h e norma l y ear for t hi s tab le since it was the 
least affected by t he depression y ears and the coming war -
boom y e ar s . If any year prior to 1939 v~as taken as t h e b ase 
year , it would have r ef lecte d too much of the depre ssion 
inf luenc e , whi le g o:l n g too fal" b ack would have bi..,ought the 
abnol"rna l pl"osperous years of 1 929 and 1929 . Conve rsely, 
g oin g f orward toward 1940-1941 would have weighted t he 
f i6ur e s too much by the war prosperous ye ar s a nd t hi s would 
have distorted t h e effect of t he tab le . 
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TABlli NO . v 
SAU S OF T HJ.<:: EIGHT LARG~ST COiviP.A:NIES--1 929-1949 
(1939=100 ) 
20th United uni-
Co hun- Par• a- Hadio- Ce n- Para- ver - warner 
bia Loew 1 s moun t Ke i th tury :cnount sal Br os. 
1 949 275 14 2 93 182 315 113 238 138 
1948 242 147 103 214 304 113 243 143 
1 947 252 146 117 239 324 121 273 167 
1946 240 149 123 233 343 123 226 16 1 
1 945 186 139 100 187 322 214 144 
1944 1 91 131 165 321 2 16 138 
1943 167 125 15 3 287 195 1 29 
1 942 140 10 7 119 125 164 117 
1941 112 102 104 8 7 127 100 
1 940 114 109 105 85 116 98 
1939 100 100 100 100 100 10 0 
1938 104 97 109 108 84 100 
1937 98 96 103 105 76 98 
1936 79 8 6 96 96 7 3 89 
1 932 59 85 116 
1929 92 101 
source: Internati on a l Moti on Picture Al manac , p . 14. 
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An an a lysis of Tab le No . V r eveals t h at for the 
over- a ll indu stry, sales increased on t h e a ver age from 1939 
t o the peak years of 1946 and 1 947 and then declined to 1949. 
However, t h ere were two ex ce p tions to thi s decline and they 
were Co lu...'Tib ia and Twentieth Century, who actually e x p erienced 
in creases in sales from 1 948 to 1949. Columbia's r eason for 
t h e increase wa s that they had a better than averag e rele a se 
~ .. 
of box office "hits"ft for that period . 
A further study of the tab l e s h ows that w"b.ile the 
maj ority of t h e compan i es s a les naturally follow t h e tl"end 
of t h e i n dustry, there are i nd i v i dual dispersions of sales 
l~i ch depend u p on the ability of each comp any to produce a 
mox•e fav orab le product whi ch further streng t h ens the arg ument 
t hat regardless of business cond i t ion s or trends, a g ood re -
lease will draw customers even in lean years whi le a p oor one 
wi 11 drive them away i n px•osperous peri ads. 
Foreig n Busine ss 
Although at t h e outset of t hi s report i t was 
stated t h at t he survey would i nclude only t he in dustry as 
it stood in the Un i ted States wi t hout reference t o f oreig n 
operations, it wi ll be necessary t o include a review of 
foreign business because of its importance to the f i nancial 
success of many c ompanies of t h e industry . As previ ously 
st a ted, the Am el"'ican films g ot t heir foothold i ~1 the f ore ign 
ma:,:>kets durin g t he fir·st YJ o r ld ·v!ar when practically all the 
-l<- 8 , ( JanuB.l"'Y 18 , 1951), p. 3. 
nations of Bu r ope were precluded from enc as in g .:.n f ilm nro -
duct i on . .Ln a d dl t i on , t h e American f ilms were ma c}. e f or 
A .: e r'i can audj_ e n ces , which at t h at t i me we1..,e c omprised of 
v a:•.' ious races of the world with t h e r e sult t hat t h e fi l ms 
t h at were p opular h ere we re also a success in Eu l'ope . Also 
t h e fi Ls at t hat time b ein s s i lent were l i ttle hindere d by 
du bbi ng in f oreig n lang u ag e sound tract s an d t h e pr o cess of 
ch a n.si n g t h e s i lent screen d i a logue to that of a fo 1•eig n 
lan <51.Wt.:; e wa s easi ly accomp l ished . 
Following V.'or ld War I and up to Ylor l d War II the 
Ameri c an produce r s were a le to hold t heir own '.Vi th foreig n 
_ roducers, with the resu l t that during nol..,mal tir es revenues 
from t h e distribution of film s in f or eig n countries formed an 
7 1 
i mp ortant se gm ent of income and c onstituted between 30 p ercent 
and 35 p ercent of total f i l m rentals . ~'" One - ha l f of t h ese 
revenues c ara e from Great Britain , wh i ch was a l ways a g ood mar -
k et f or luneri can films . 
In August of 1947 the British decided to stop the 
drain of do l lars fron their country, whi ch amounted t o 
~70 mi llion annual l y , as payment by Br~ti sh audi e nces for 
t h e use of .Arneri can f ilms • .;H~ The g overnment imp osed a 
75 p ercent tax u p on t h e "anti c i p ated ne t proceeds" on all 
imported cine::na film . 1'he Am eri c an fi l m indus t l..,Y de n ounced 
t h e tax as dis cr i mi natory and confi s ca tol"Y . rl'l'le Brit i sh 
-:<-s,p . s . 
20 , p . 2 8 9 . 
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countered with the a rg-um en t that t he tax applie d to a ll 
i m) orted film wh et!:1er American or oth erwise , but in actual 
prac tice it remai ns t h at t he tax wi ll affect t he United 
States film comp a n ies t h e g reatest b ecause t h ey are t he 
lai•g e st supp l i ers of fi l ms to t h e Br :l tish . In j_t s re p ort 
u pon the tax, the E CONOHI S'r poin ted out t h at t h e do llar e x -
pendl ture u p on British ilms amounted to on l y 4 p ercen t of 
t h e whole while on the o ther h and t h e Briti s h e xp en di tures 
upon &~erican film const i tute vi rtu ally t he e ntire net pro -
fit of t h e f ilm industry, which does l i tt l e mox•e t han cove r 
.,~ 
i ts overhead and production costs in the American market . h 
The overall e f fect of t h e tax as it stood in August of 1 9 47 
wa s t o reduce t h e revenue f rom t h e Br i t i sh to A'11er i can p ro -
ducers to ~ 17 . 5 mi l lion. 
In June of 1948 , an Ang lo-American yact was put 
into practice whereby American comp anies would be p ermitted 
to \vi t hdraw t;; l7 million annual l y from Brita·i.n , p lus an 
amount equal to e arn j_ ng s on Bri t ish f ilms in t h e Un i ted 
State s . The o alan ce of earnings from ll!-rJer i can pictu res 
sh own i n Br i tain would be blocked in s te J:' ling but can be 
ut :·~ l i ze d there i n mmerous s pec ifi e d ways s uch as for• in vest-
men t i n 1: r i tish companies , and for the pr•oduc tion of films 
whi ch, i n turn , may be e xh i b ited in territories oth er t h an 
the sterli ng area . 
In June of 1950, the p act c Rme up for review and 
after a l on g period of nego tiati ons , a ne~ p act wa s a g reed 
~~ 20 , p . 290 . 
u p on to run for one year f.rom Octobel" 1, 1950 . Under the 
new pact, Axnerican producel"s are permi tted to convert i n to 
dollars a sum equal to 23 pe.rcent of ste.rling e xpend 5_ tures 
for fi l m production in ~ng land; 50 pe.rcent of sterling 
ex~Jendi tures for ou tr~ght pur chase of Bri tj_ sh fj_ l ms; 50 
pe:i:"cent of sterling paid to Br i t 1 sh i nterests for distri-
buti on of their films in the v estern Ii emisph ers; and in 
add i t i on, to remit 0 17 million annually as under the old 
.,...,ac.l- -:!-
1-' u. The f:'i.lm industry estj_ma ted that the present pact 
would :ln crease total rem:'i. ttable s from between (~2 million 
and ~4 million annually . 
As of October 1, 1950 , eight majol" companies had 
around (?7 . 5 mi lli on in fl"ozen sterling available in Bri tai n, 
a p ortion of whj_ ch should be con verted into dollars over the 
ne~d year . Duri ng the term of t he new pact the Ameri can 
producers estimated the earning s to be about ~~> 35 milli on, 
comp ared wi th 0 68 million and $ 56 m:'i.llion earned in 1946 
and 1 948 re spectively. In 1 948 , the total was around ~~ 49 
million . 
The extent t o which different companies have 
de ::?ended on foreign income has var i ed cons iderably . To 
illustre.te, Param ount , with vast t he ater interests, h as 
dex•i ved only ab out 10 percent of gross in come from f oreign 
sources, followed by R. K. o. with about 15 e rcent and 
Twentieth Century F ox , est imated at 17 p ercent . On the 
other hand , more than 20 p ercent of Loew ' s total r e venues 
-:!- 8 , p . 7. 
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in the 1 945 -46 fiscal year was accounted for by for e i g n 
recei p ts, 1:vh ile Un i versal a nd Co l umbia, with no exhib i t i ng 
faci l~ tie s, received from a broad nearer 40 p ercent of 
g ross. 
I.'Jhen .P • .m eri can f i lms a r e e xhi bited in f ore ign 
c oun tri es, the pr ofits ac cruing to such e :;rhi b i tions al'e 
l'eceive d in f or·eig n money but must be converte d to American 
mon ey b efore it is of any value to Un i ted States companies 
unless t h ey wish to invest or purchase abroad . Priol' to the 
wa r (World war II) the exchan g e controls were not too stri ct 
an d money could be c onve1•te d eas i ly, but followin g t h e war, 
t h e s h ortar:e of dollal's ab road caused many nations to e x er•-
cis e str i ct contr ols ove r e x ch ang e wi th the result t h at many 
comp a n i es fou..Yld t h eil" prof its blocked abroad. The c omp an i es 
h ad ag reements for ced upon t h em whereby they could l'ecei ve 
only a c ertain p ercent of t h eir money i n d ollars an d would 
be for ced to leave the rema i nder a broad for i nve stment 
pu :t•p os e s . The result was t h at many of the c ompa n i e s found 
t h emselv es i n var i ous occup ations such as buyi ng and sellin g 
pr oduce, s ~ipbui lding , deep s e a d i ving , etc., in order to 
s et a r e turn on their foreig n money. However , so ing enious 
were the American produce r s in the art of international 
tr•ade t h at larg e s ums of their money were able to be re-
t u l"ne d to t h e United States over and above t h at which had 
been p ermitted in the orig inal agreement. In some oases 
the i n dividual motion p i cture comp anies were consulted by 
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international financier s who de s i red to l{n ow by vha t me ans 
the c omnani es vlel"'e able to c onvert t h eir fol"' eig n exch an g e 
with su ch eas e and facility . 
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C O!'.:BT,. -,-N~I ONS , D TT!.:; GRATI ONS , AND 1IONOPOLTE S 
Th e mo t i on picture industry first carae :t nto 
exi stence at the t urn of t h e century when c onso lida t ions 
and c omiJin ations were ramp ant in all industries and t h e 
effe cts of t h e Sherman _,_1.\n ti - Trust Act we.re just bein g felt . 
Al t h out;;h only a co_np a.rati ve youn g ster i n the fie l d of com-
Ii1erce , the motion pi cture i ndust.ry gradu a l l y reali zed the 
value a nd a d vantages of concerted action . In t he s pac e of 
a fe w years it ch an g ed from an activi ty in t h e hands of a 
larg e number of smal l and f in anc i ally we ak individuals to 
an in dustry controlled by a :fe w l arg e compan ies , ·whi ch 
dm"Jinated its p olicies and controlled its action s . ~~ 
Chan g es in Di stribut i on 
f s the p opula r i ty of t h e e ar l y movie s inc.reased , 
it bec ame necessary to step u p t he v olume of produ ction to 
meet t h e demand . A great many small produ ce r s and n_ lm 
distributox•s entered the fie l d , but t he se newc om e.rs at 
first c on sti t uted no i mmediate tD~eat t o the controlling 
:tnt erests. 
At this t i me a g reat chan g e in t h e business 
metb ods of t he ind11 s try took place . At that time , film s 
lost value to an exhibitor as t h eir novelty was exhausted, 
so ex~ibitors traded films wi th each other . It was soon 
re al i zed t h at t h e owner of a stoclc of f i l ms cou l d make a 
-lt- 23 , p . XII" . 
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profit by rentin g a s i n g le pr:ln t to a number of exhi b i tol"s 
in succession , t hus relieving these exhibitors from the 
necess :L ty of makin g a c ash inves t ment in t he fi l m. As a 
result , t h e ori g inal me t h od of outrigh t sale of fi lms to 
exhibitors wa.s re p lace d by a l icensing sys tem. Under this 
sys tern , t:t tle to a fi 1m remain e d wi t b the e .x ch ange men, and 
each film was licensed to various exh ibitors until the pr i nt 
was no longer usab l e . This me thod of film d i stri buti on is 
st i ll i n use today . 
Ear ly Combinations 
I n 1908 , main ly to escape the effe c ~ s of a p at e nt 
V8 1" conducte d chi ef ly by the -,:;- dison c ompanies , which h e l d 
basic c 2~ era and projecti on e qu ipmen t patent s, t2e ten 
leading companies in the industry org anized the fil.,s t trust 
--the Moti on Picture Patents Company. The trust consisted 
of Edison , Biog raph, Vi tagraph, Essanay, Selig , Lubin , and 
Kalem , who were domes tic manufac turers, whi l e t he foreign 
corn:oanies consisted of L e l ies and Pathe of }!ranee and Georg e 
Kl eine , distributor."(- All patent interests and rights were 
p ooled , and t h e co operating comp anies were li~ensed to manu-
facture and lease motion pi c tures . The E as t man Kodak Company 
cooperated ·oy refusing to supp ly raw films to unlicensed 
manufacturers. 
Film s pl"oduced by t h e " Patents Pool" Yvere hand l ed 
by l icensed e xch ang e men , who ag reed to sell only to t~1eaters 
23, P • 4 . 
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with lice n sed proje c tors a n d t he e xhibitor s were requi red 
to pay for t he ri ght to use projec tors in a ddi t i on to f ilm 
rentals . Throu gh t hi s system of licensing , t he ;)o o l at -
tenpted control of t h e e n t ::. re :~ ndustry. 
Tl1.ose wh o resente d t he tl ... ust, attemp ted evasion by 
means of boot l e g g ing film s and projectors and a t t _e same 
t ime protective org an izations vere for med and e ven t h ese or-
g an i zati ons in turn prospere d . On t h e other hand , even 
li cen sed exch anges vi olated t h e i r contrac ts. 
T o ch eck t hi s tren d , t h e paten ts p ool i n 1 910 
or g an ized 57 of t h e 58 film e x ch an g es t h en in exist ence int o 
the General Pilm Comp any to dis tr i bute the fi l ms of t h e ten 
pr oducers on a nationa l sc a le. The se l i censed exch an g es 
a g ree d t o buy on ly "trus t" pi ctures. 
De s pite t h e attemp t to monop oli z e production and 
c on trol di stribu t i on , t h e independent c ompani es mul t :i.. p lied , 
flou rish ed, and cont j_nue d to make pi ctures.-:~ By 1 912, 
dozen s of new produce rs a n d distributors, le d by '.1i lliam 
F ox , oper a tor of t h e 58 t h e xch an g e, were offe r i ng t h e trust 
c ons ::i. de r ab le c ompetition. In t h ::i.s year a l a '.'Jsu:L t was b r ou ght 
ag a i ns t t he trus t as an unlawful c ons piracy · n t h e restraint 
of tr a d e. n ith anti-trust s entiment s we e p in g t he country, 
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t he General Fi l m Company wa s di ssolved by the Feder a l cou rts 
in 1 915. In 1 9 17 , t h e United States Supreme Gour t r u led t hat, 
after ye ars of he arin g s, the pat e nts comn any cou l d not force 
23 , p . 4. 
exclusive use of l i censed fi lms on p atented projec tors in 
t heaters, and the trust was d eclared leg ally dead. 
One of the pecul i ar results of t h e trust was that 
be l i eving itse l f t o be a p erfect mon opo ly was one of the fac-
tors c ontributin g to it s downfall . The trust, i nterested 
primarily in quick and inex ? ens ive production, g reeted fea-
ture len g th films wi t h di s taste a nd x•ef'used to d istr ibute 
t hem . The i n d e p endents , howe ver, realizing t he value of t h e 
feature leng ths and encourag ed by the reactionary atti tud e 
of t h e trust , produce d full-len g th f e a t ures and sold e xh ibi -
t:Lon rig hts to indivi dual distributors , each repres enting 
on e or more states. These e x change men became mown as 
"States Ri g hts Di stributors." They were so successful that 
in 1914 a number of t hem joined w:l t h a f ew inde p endent ex-
h ibi tors to f orm t h e Paramount Pictu:e e s Corpol.,a t ion , whi ch 
finan ce d a nd di stribute d fe a ture-len g th p i ctures roduced 
by affi l iated ind e p endent stu dios . The main p oin t to be 
not e d h ere i s t h at t h e trust h a d not at t~at time realized 
t h at one of t h e most im!)Ortant creeds t o be remerabeJ:oed by 
t h e fi ll.11 producers was t h at quali ty in the long run v1Tould 
determ:L ne t he return upon the f i lm. Thj_ s polnt was reali zed 
by the inde ~ e ndents, who g ave such c om oeti t ion to t he trust 
that t he latter ·would in a ll nro-t; a b i l i ty have fai led even 
if t h e Court h ad d ecreed oth erw1se. 
During -.lorld Y ar I , comj)eti t i on be c a7lle ruth l e ss 
and the producers beg an t o l.,e a l ize t~1.at if t 'J.ey were to have 
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full exp loitation of t h eir f i l ms, t h ey u s t control distri-
but ion and t herefore estab lish ed ai'fil i at :t ons for t h at nur-
p o s e . Thr ou ghout t h e \var p el"i od an d t he y oa1,s f ollowi ng , 
t h e i n dustry was c~1aracterized by larg e-sc a le e conomic war-
far·e be t we e n t h e povver.ful org an i z a t ions whi ch conti nually 
sought c on trol. 
Th e Post War Battle F or Control 
Du r•i n g Wor l d. :Jar I , Paramount de ve loped b lock 
booki ng , a p lan whereby e xhi r.)i tor s contr a cted in a dvance to 
buy a nmu ~:J e r of fi l ms to b e p aid wi th·i n a sti pu l a te d t ime • .;~ 
Th.:. s p l a n, he lpi ng in gr•e a t p ar·t to eff e ct qu antity di stri-
but i on, was a dvantag eous to pl"oduc ers s i nce it assur e d t h em 
of a steady outlet f or t h eir fj_l ms. Exhi bitors Yvere con-
fr on te d b y t h e necessity of de p en din g on t h e block -bookin g 
s ys t em con tro lled by t h e producer-distributors, much to t h e 
ec onomi c di sadvanta,se of t h e formal". As a r•esult, t h i s 
me t h od of sale was op pose d a l most from i ts i n c e p t i on by 
inde p e ndent exh i bi tors. So intens e was the a n imos i t y a g a i nst 
block b ookin g t h at the practice was temp orari l y sus p en d ed in 
1918 . 
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F ormerly the strug g le f or sup remacy in t h e i n du stry 
h ad b e e n b ase d on p atent contro l an d mar k et mon opo l y , but 
nmJ i t eme r g e d i nt o a bat t le fo r t h e at e rs . Larg e t he ater 
holdin g s s treng t h ened bal,g a i n i ng p owe r an d t h e fi ght for 
c ontrol of outlets i ncr e ased on a l a r g e scale. Real estate 
developm ents requir:tn g lar ge-scale f ~_ n an cial oper a t i ons led 
23, p . 5 . 
to the a l most comp let e i nte c:;ration of the three branches of 
t he i ndus tl"y--pr oduc t ..:.. on, di stribution , and exhibi t ion --
in t he hands of the large c om nani es. By t he eat•ly t went:t es , 
most of the import ant inde pendent corporat i ons and .:. ndi vi -
duals were e l iminate d or submerg ed . 
The l arg e c ompan ie s, t o provide me ans for ad-
justing t heir i nternal disputes wi t hou t r ec our se to c ou r ts 
and to c ombat t h e censorship moveme nt, i n 1922 f ormed t h e 
I.~otion Pictu1•e s Produc e t•s and Di stri butors of P...raerica, I n-
c oru orate d . Thi s c ompany, s ome t imes l;:nown as the Haye s 
or l~anizat i on , is h eld to oe a perfect examp le of c oope ration 
of lar:~ e !Ju s :1_n e s s uni ts for self pro t ec t i on . At t ha t t :i_me 
an d a lso a t t h e present, t h e c ompany was supp orted e x clu-
s i ve l y by t he larg e unit s of t h e comp any. 
By 1927 , t h e i n dustry star t ed a period of reckless 
s pendi n g and e-·cpans i on , whi ch would h ave ruin e d any other 
busine s s of a mor e se t t le d line. As a resu lt, financ i a l 
depende nce u p on ·a ll St reet i ncreas ed tr~rn endous ly. New 
coro~ e t i t ~ on centered u p on t h e bui l din g of more e l aborate 
t he ate r s and bidc.Ung in salaries for stars. Admi s s :i.on 
_r i ce s rose to mee t r~s1ng c osts and an a s semb l y l ine t ech-
nique f ol' !aak in g pi ctu :(' e s was de ve l ope d . Pic ture s of p oor 
quality b ecame more t h an f r e que n t, and t h e ..:. ndustry sa;; a 
shar p declin e of p r ofi ts . 
Howe ver , sou nd s aved t he day for the industry . It 
wa 3 intr oduce d in 1926 by 1·;a1"ner Br o t !:l.ers when t h ey we re on 
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t h e verg e of ban kr up t cy and the innovation -~vas recei ved by 
the nu~ lic wi t h immediate approval . * 
F ollo vi n g the stock market crash, t h e battle f or 
soun d :eights reached a climax . For years vari ous c om;)an ies 
had been experimen ting wi t h sound. 'l.~ arner Brot~1ers develope d 
Vitaphone whi le F ox develop ed Movie t one . _hroug h allian c es 
vvi th r!arner and F ox, E l ectri c a l Re search Products , Incorpor -
a ted ( E . R . P . I .), g a ined control of t h eir p atents . The Radio 
Cor~.Jor ation of Ameri c a ( R . C. A.) with p atent r ights to 
Photophon e was E . R. P. I . 1 s main contender . However , ~ . R . P . I . 
was s u ccessfu l in signin g long - term a .:reeme nts )Ji th five of 
the lat•g e producers f or t he u s e of sound e quipmen t. The 
corJDanie s were rE - G- M, Parrun ou nt, United Artists , Firs t 
Na tional, and Un i versal. Th ese a g reemen ts ~ere so success -
ful that R . c. A. was vi rtually elim~nated f rom the field . ** 
R. c. A. . finally filed a c om _,) laint ch a r in g u n-
lawful restrai n t of trade by A:me r:i.can Te leph on e and Te le-
graph Company and i ts aff i l iates . In 1 935 a p e aceful a g ree -
me nt was con elud ed be t Yveen t he two c o.rnoratj_ on s wl-d ch ;];ave 
R . c. A. new and s ubstantial r i s h ts . At t~at t ime it • as 
s tate d t h at t h e e nt i re mo t j_ on pi cture indus t r y was UI1der a 
won on ~ ly control far b eyond t h e ear l y as i rations of the 
I.Ioti on Pi ctur•e Pa tents 
2 , p . 42 . 
23 , p . 7 . 
3 , p . 42 1. 
~~·:i-~~ Corp or a t j on . 
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I n t h e ear ly p art of th~ depre s sion t h e i ntra-
du cti on of s ound ke~J t up t h e b ox office r e c e:l :)ts , ~Jut as 
t he n ovelty ~ ore off receipts fe ll and the h eavy f inan cial 
bm."d en of sound ins ta llation ~Jegan to b e felt . The big 
t h eater .. 1o l dings a nd the re a l e st a te i nvest2r1en ts of the 
~~ 
motion ~i c tur e comp anie s d e pr eciated quickly . l'!Iost of 
t he large cornp ani es exper j_en ced diff i cult ies an d :n 1 933 
P al"amo:.mt wa s ad j udic Bte d bankrulJt; .1. . K. o. and Unive1'sal 
went i nto l"e c e:t ve rship ; the F ox F:l l m Cox• pora t ion was rear -
g anized; a nd many of the theaters whl ch had been acqui red 
durin g ear l i er exp ans i ons wel"e dropped . From 1930 to 1 935 , 
the nu_r:1ber of theaters owned by t~le ma jor companies decli ned 
fr om 3 , 600 to 2,225 . By 1 940 , t he numb e r of t heaters op er -
ated by each of the ma jor companies i s d es cr ibed in aocor -
dance ~i th the fo llowin g table . 
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TABLE .J O. VI 
1940 
20th 
Cen- I"{adi o-
Para- tury ] al"- Keith-
Reg ion and state mount Loew 1 s Fox ner 1 s Orpheum •rot a l 
New ~"I:n [:S l and 
lila in e 39 39 
~T e·w Hamp sh i re 10 10 
Vermont 8 8 
L1 a s sacl1.usetts 82 5 16 5 108 
_ h ode I s land 3 1 2 6 
Conn ecticut 6 10 35 51 
Uidd l e Atlantic 
Hew York 26 67 1 49 58 20 1 
Ne·w J ersey 3 3 92 16 114 
Pennsy lvan i a '72 3 195 270 
i.Zas t Nor th Ce ntral 
Ohio 16 10 38 21 85 
:.:::n diana 8 3 3 14 
I llin ois 122 21 19 3 165 
I!li ch::.. g an 16 6 7 29 
rJisc0nsin 5 53 19 77 
.. Jest NOl" th Centl"a l 
I1i ne sota 42 3 45 
I o-vva 64 6 6 76 
~Ji s s our i 1 2 48 51 
3orth ~akota 10 10 
South Dakota 20 20 
Nebraska 14 10 1 25 
E:ansas 56 56 
South Atlantic 
De l aware 1 6 7 
I.Taryland 1 3 8 12 
Dis . of Co l mnbia 4 16 1 21 
Virg in ia 17 2 9 28 
\Je s t Vir c;inia 3 11 3 17 
North c ar ol i na 69 1 70 
South c ar olina 23 23 
Georf· ia 38 1 39 
Flor:i.da 109 109 
rJ:ABI.J~ ITO . VI ( Con t d ) 
20th 
Cen - ::1a d i o-
Para- tu.ry 1!Ja r - Kei th- · 
Regl on and state mount Loew's F ox ner 1 s Orph eum Total 
3ast South Centl.,a l 
Kentucky 11 1 8 20 
Tennessee 28 2 1 31 
lab ama 33 33 
Mississi ppi 35 35 
Wes t South Cen tral 
lli"kansas 47 47 
Louisi an a 20 1 1 22 
Ok l ahoma 6 14 20 
T exas 208 1 209 
mountain 
Uontan a 17 17 
Idah o :9 9 18 
rJyomi ng 14 14 
Colorado 9 1 36 1 4 7 
New Mexico 7 6 13 
~\riz ona 8 7 15 
Utah 21 2 23 
Pacifi c 
\·Iashin g ton 28 3 3 1 
Ot•eg on 1 3 2 15 
califol"nia 4 1 205 12 4 226 
Total 1 , 273 122 538 557 132 2 , 622 
Source: Bertrand , Daniel:: The Motion Pi cture Industl"y --A 
Pattern of Control , Uni ted States Gove l."nme nt 
Printing Office , Hashing t on , D. c ., 1941 , p . 10 . 
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Alth ough t h e t h eater s r e pres e nt ed b y Ta b le No . VI 
c omprise on l y 16 .pe r cent of a ll t h e ate _'r>,s l· n · t • t , 
_ _ ope.ea-lon , n ay 
tak e on added i mpor t ance when i t i s n o ted that more t h an 
80 per c e n t of a ll fi rst-run t h eaters ar e a f fil i a te d ; in 23 
key c i ti e s a ll of the f i r st-run t h ea t ers a r e a f f ili a t ed ; out 
of 92 c i t i e s with popula t ion ove r 100, 0 00 t he ma j or s c on -
t rol e xhibi t i on in '73 c i ti e s; in these same '7 3 ci ti e s t h e 
maj or s "op er a te" enou gh first-ru n t h eaters in each t o re-
c e i ve a sub s t an t ~.a l major i ty of the t otal fi lm l''e venue sup -
p l 5 ed by each of t h es e ci ti e s; t h e r e a r e 28 3 c i tie~ wi th 
po<Ju l ation s b etwe en 25, 000 and 10 0, 000 in 200 of wh i ch the 
majors op e r' at e one or more theaters; 11 b y c on trol of fir st-
run t h eat e r' s a lone , affili at ed e xhibi tors have be e n a b l e to 
s e cur e a s much a s t wo-thir d s of the total t heater a iliai ss i ons 
p a id i n c i tie s a s l ar g e as 250,000; 11 and the a f f i l i ates con-
tr o l exhib:'L ti on i n a ll Un ited Sta t e s c i t i es wi t h popu l a tion s 
of mor e t h an l, Oo o , ooo . * 
Ta b le No VI I r eveals t h e c i t ie s wi t h p opu l at ions 
of 100 ,000 Ol" mor e i n whi ch exhibi t ion :'L s c ontrolle d by the 
ma j or c ompanies of t h e industry . I n addi t ion Table No . VIT 
e nu mer at es t h e number of f irst - run metropo l i tan t heat e rs 
op erated by ea ch of the major comp a n i e s in 35 k ey c i ti e s i n 
1948 . 
~t. 
' 2 3, P • 11. 
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TABlli NO. VII 
CITII; S HITH POPULA'I' I ON OF 10 0 , 000 OR MOiill 
City 
Syracuse , N. Y. 
Ok lahoma City, Okla . 
San Dieg o, California 
Worcester , Mass. 
Ri chm ond , Va . 
For t 11iorth, Tex . 
Jacksonvi lle, F la. 
Mi arni , F la. 
Youn g stmvn, Ohi o 
HaJ.~tf ord, Conn. 
Gr·and Rapi d s , Mich . 
Lon 0 Beach, Calif . 
New Haven , Con n . 
Des Moin e s, I owa 
F l int , J,Ii ch. 
Sa lt Lake City, Utah 
Spr in ~field, Mass . 
Br~dgeport, Conn. 
Norf olk , Va . 
Yonkers , N. Y. 
Scranton, Pa . 
Paterson , N. J. 
Albany, .N. Y. 
Chattanoog a , Tenn . 
Tren ton, N. J. 
Spokane, F ash . 
Camden , N. J. 
Eri e, :Pa . 
I!' i chi ta , Kans. 
Knoxvill e , Tenn . 
WiLming ton, Del. 
Reading , Pa . 
Tampa , F la. 
sacr~~ento , Cal if . 
Peoria, I 11. 
South Bend, Ind. 
Lowe ll, Mass. 
Ut ica, N. Y. 
Char lotte, N. c. 
Duluth, Minn . 
Populat i on 
Rank Controlled By 
41 Loew 1 s, R . K. o., Varner 
42 Paramount, War•ner 
43 F ox 
44 Loew's, Paramount , Hal"ner 
45 Loew' s 
46 Parruuount 
47 Par•amount 
48 Paramount 
49 warne r 
51 Loew ' s, Pararnount , VJ al"ner 
52 Paramount , R. K. o. 
53 F ox 
54 Loew' s, Pararnount, \Va~rner 
55 Pal"B.ru oun t, TI • . K. 0. 
56 Paramount , R. K. o. 
57 Pal.,amount 
58 Loe w' s, Pal"araount , 1.·a :rner 
59 Loew ' s, Harner 
60 Loew ' s 
61 Loew1 s , Paranount , TI . K. O. 
63 Paramoun t 
64 Paramount, ':Varner 
65 R . K. o., warner 
66 Paramount 
67 R . K. O. 
68 F ox 
71 war·ner 
72 Wal.,ner 
'74 Fox 
'75 Paramount 
76 Loew 1 s, Warner 
79 Loew's, ~arner 
83 Paramount 
85 F ox 
86 Paramount 
88 Pal.,amount 
89 Paramount , R. K. o. 
90 warner 
91 Paramount 
92 Paramount 
8'7 
88 
TA3LE VII (Con 1 t) 
C_ 1l'D~S WITH P OPULATION OF' 100,000 OR IilORE 
- H \'.rE I CH :SXHIBI TION IS CON'l'ROLlliD BY HAJ Ort COi:·tiPAlJI2 S 
City 
New Yor k , N. Y. 
Chicag o, I ll. 
Phi l adelphi a , Pa. 
De tro i t, itli ch . 
Los _n gele s , Calif. 
Cleve l and, Ohi o 
Boston , i!Iass . 
Pi ttsburgh, Pa. 
Washing ton, D. C. 
s an Fran cisco, Calif . 
L'li l waukee, Wi s. 
Buff alo, N. Y. 
New Ox•le ans , La . 
Minneapolis, Minn. 
Cin cinnati, Oh:.o 
Newark , N. J. 
Xansas City, liio. 
Houston, r_r exas 
seattle, ·w ash . 
Roche ster, N. Y. 
Denver, Col . 
Portland , 0l"eg . 
Colu..rnbus, Ohio 
Oak l and , Cali f . 
Atlan ta, Ga . 
Jersey City, N. J. 
Dallas, Tex . 
Mernphi s, Tenn. 
St . Paul, Liinn . 
Bi r mi nghm a , Ala. 
san ru1tonio, Texas 
Ofn aha , Nebraska 
Day ton, Ohi o 
Population 
Rank Controlled By 
1 Loew' s, Pararaount, H . K. o., 
warner 
2 Paramount , R. K . o., warner 
3 Fox, Paramount, warner 
4 Fox , Par arnount 
5 Fox, Loew1 s, Paramount , 
R. K. o., warner 
6 Loew's, R. K. 0 ., 'Jarner 
9 Lo e w 1 s , Par a.rn oun t , \" ar ne r 
10 Loew 's, war ner 
11 Loew's, R. K. o., warner 
12 Fox, Lo ew 1 s , Parrunount, 
R . K. O. 
13 li' ox , 1:,~arne:r-
14 Loew1 s, Par run ount 
15 J.,oew ' s, Pa:eamount, R . K. o. 
16 Paramount, H. . K . o. 
17 R . K. O. 
18 Loew ' s, Paramount, R. K. o., 
warn ex· 
19 Fox , Loew's, Parara ount 
21 Loew's, Paramount 
22 F ox 
23 Loevv 1 s, Pararnount, R . K . o. 
25 Fox, Loew 1 s, R. K. o. 
26 Fox 
27 Loew's, R. K. o. 
28 Fox 
29 Lo ew 's, Pararaount 
30 Lo ew 1 s, n. K. o., warner 
31 Paramount 
32 Loew ' s, Pararaount, · n arner 
33 Paramount , R. K. o. 
35 Paramount 
37 Paramount, \'la l"' ner 
39 Pararnount, n. K. O. 
40 Loew 's, R. K. o. 
source : Uni t ed stat e s vs. Par amount Pi ctur e s, In c ., e t. al . 
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As a result of h is s t udi e s i n t h e conc e n bra tion of 
econ omi c p o ver i n t h e mot i on picture i n du stry, Da n i e l 
Ber tr a n d s tat ed t hat inte ~ration in the mot i on pi ctu r e was 
c om) l e t e f r om t h e in ce p tion of a n idea f or a - :L ctu r e t h r ough 
t o t _e a ctu al e xh ibi t ion of t h e f ilm. Furt~ermore, t h e 
im port an ce of t h e i nt e grat i on of pr oduction , d istributi on , 
ru1 d e xh ibi tion lay i n t h e ac c omp l i s b_rn ent no t of mor e c los e ly 
kn ::.. t o ·_) e rat i on but of v i rtu al e Ltmination of com_ eti t i on . 
At t hi s t ime n ot only we r e many of t h e ma jor 
t hea t ers t h oroug h ly i nteg rate d but a lso t h e y p os s e s s ed 
vaj_, :t ou s t rade pract i ce s such as b lock-b ooki ng , b l i n d bu y i ng , 
d e s i g n a ted p l ay dat e s, a n d many othe :, s whi ch p laee d t h e in de-
p ende nt px•oducers, d istributors , a n d e xhi b i t ox•s at a d is-
advan t a~;e . Th e enumerated trad e pr a ctices were t h e cent e r 
of a t wenty-y e ar di s pu te withi n t h e ln dust J:> y wh i ch f i n a lly 
culmi n a t ed in an a nt i - t r u st su :i.. t t h a t was pr i nci pally i n -
sti ··a te d by t h e injure d i n de p e ndents. 
On J u ly 20, 1 9 38 , the De p artment of J u sti ce fi l e d 
an anti-tru st s ·~.:Li t a g a i n st t h e major c orl'q ani es of t h e indus -
t ry . The s e c ompanies ·wer e a c cus e d of c ombin in e; and con-
s piri ng t o restrai n tr ad e i n t h e pr oducti on , di stri bu tion , 
an d e x ~ibi t i on of m ~ ti on pi ctur e s , and wi t h at t emp tin g 
succes s fully to monopo l i z e such trade i n vi olat i on of t h e 
Sh e r man Act . Th e major s we r e spe c i fi c a lly char~e d wi th 
t wenty - e i c;h t of f enses, a ll of whi ch were alle ,·e d t o b e ins t ru-
me n tal in cre a t i ng t h e mon opoly . To el i mi n a t e t h e se of fenses, 
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t h e Depa r t ment of Jus tic e as k ed t h at t he court declare the 
con tracts and combinat ions i lle g a l, forbid t h e d efendants 
f r om c on t i nuing to en g as e in monopolis t ic practices, e s tab-
l ish a na t ionwide syst em of impar t ial tribun a ls for arbi -
tration t o secure prohibiti on of t h e i l leg a l ~ractices , 
declar>e the i ntegration of production a nd exh:i.b:'Ltion an 
un l a wful instruraent of mon op oly, requi re t ha t t he defen -
dants wni ng t h e a t e r s divest t hems elves of ei t her t h e theat er 
or t h e ~ 1~oducti on faci l i ties, and t b.at t he defendants be 
pe x•manent l y en j oj_n ed from en ,sag j_ ng di rectly or i n d ii'e ct ly in 
both -~ act :~v :!. t ie s. 
After a long d rawn out trial, in November of 1 948 
t h e u 1 i ted defense of t he e :: .. ; ht de fen dan t co~np anie s broke 
when 1 adi o - Ke · th- Orph eu..rn reached 2.n a g r ee:men t on a con sent 
.. ..  
decree . ~'"~·- Under the cons ent decree , R . K. o. will divorce 
its t he ater ho lding s from its pr oduc tion-dist r:i..bution s et -
u.p by s p litt5.n g u~J i nt o two separe.te comi) a ni e s with t he 
p r e sent stockholders gett i ng s t ock in b oth compan ies on a 
pro rata basi s vv-1 th t he e .·c: ce p t :l on of Howard Hughes , vho mus t 
mak e a choic e b etween ) reduction ancl. exh:lbi t i on s l nce he 
controls 24 p ercent of t h e stock of R. K. 0. 
I n March of 1949, Pa l''amount f ollowe d suit b y 
a g l..,ee i ng t o s p lit in t o two comp an:t es wi t h the l eading exec-
utives ch oosing t he producing end of t he bus i ness rather t han 
.;~ 2' p . 139 . 
~H!- 1 6 , P • 8 0 . 
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t h e selli ng end , a step which was s imi l ar to t h at tak en b y 
t he e x ecutives of R . K. -"· o." 
On Febru ary 8, 1 950 , a Feder•al sta t utory court 
entered a fina l decree in t he g overnmen t's anti -trust suit 
ag ainst t he ma,j or companies in t h e industry di r e cti ng t h e 
di vor ci ng of t heater - ho ldin g : nterests from t h e bus i ness of 
p rodu c ing and di stributi ng and outlawed se veral trad e prac -
tic e s tha t le d to the formation of local monopolies . Th e 
mo t i on pi cture c ,Jmp anies t hat still retained t hej_r t h eater 
ho l d in g s wei•e required to fi le a p lan wi thin s i x mon t h s for 
t he sep arati on of t he two bus i nesses . As a r e sult , Warner's 
Bl'"'oth ex•s fi l e d a p l B.n of action but T··aen ti eth Century, F ox , 
and Loew' s as of June of 1950 had insti t u t ed no p l an and 
the action b y the g overnment is still p endi ng . 
Thus tl1.e lon g y e a r s of c onso l i d ations , inte -
g rat ion s , and ~ on opoli stic pract i ces i n t h e mot i on pi cture 
i n dustry whi ch carried from the ear• l y d8 .. y s of the i ndustry 
to t h e pr esent day fi nally culmina t ed i n the Federa l anti -
trust decree of February 8 , 1 950 . However, the eff ect of 
t h e decree i s n ot s o i mp ortant as misht be ant icipate d by 
reason )f the fa ct t h a t tele vi sion has ch an g ed the exhibi -
tion aspects of t h e ind"LJ.. stry . ...reviously exb.i b :l t :.i.. on was 
the most profi t ab le side of the busin e ss and t h e bett i n g 
·\vas t ha t t he ch oice of the exe cu ti ve s would be t h at of the 
e~rlbi t ion end and not t h e produc i ng en d when the s p l it - up 
-l} 17 , p . 98 . 
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wou l d oc2ur . But as alre ady stated, the e x ecu t ives chose 
t he pl~oduc ti on end wi t h t ~l.e vie vJ for produ cing for te l e -
v i sion and in addi tion t he revenue s of 1 94 9 were 20 per -
cent of f t he :i.l" p eak in exhibit i on and vvere e st imate d to b e 
~~ 10 percent to 30 per cent l e ss f or l 950 . ft As a result , t h e 
im0ortance of e :~ibi ti on had dropp e d and in all pr obabi l i ty 
the c ompanies would have divested themselves of many of t h e 
theaters anyway reg a r d l e ss of t he anti- trus t de cree. 
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CHAPTli:R V 
BUSII'f!LSS A.IIJD PIHANCIAL PRACTICES 
Block - Bookin g 
Block- booking may b e defined as the p~actice of 
sin ultaneous l easing of a g~oup of films a t an agg regate 
fixed price upon the condition that all the films 5.n the 
g iven b loc k be t aken . This usually me a nt t h at the unaf fil-
iated exhibi to~ had to take the entire b l ocll: as offe:r'ed or 
none a t a ll, s i nce t h e price of t he pic t ul"es on an indivi-
dua l basis '!la s usually too mu ch . This _9racti ce 1.vas modified 
by t h e consent deci•ees but should be eliminated by the anti-
tr,_lst decree of February 8 , 1 950, which ~Jrohibited a ll mono-
po li.stic or unfair trade practices . There are many arg mnents 
for and a g ainst block bookin g but t h e val idity of t h e latter 
seem to preva.:l. The pr op onents of t h e practice claim t ha t 
i n ef.fe ct it is permi tting a v,rho lesal i ng of g ood and p oor 
pictures tog eth er 2. t a lmver price , whi ch reduces the costs 
{~ 
of the exhibi tor . On the o t h er hand , its opp onents claim 
t h at it is mere l y a. me thod whereby the e xhibitor is f or ced 
to tak e p oor films which he wou l d n ever r.mrch ase by t hem-
selves or else take n othing . Tha t the practi ce is evident ly 
monop·: listic is born out in its prohibit:lon or mod:tfication 
in t he anti - trust decree • 
.;: 2 4, p • 2 98 • 
Blin d Buying 
Thi s practice i s t h e method of leasi ng film s 
sig h t u nseen , usually in advance of t h ei r actua l produc-
ti on . It is c ons i dered to be an i nteg ral uart of b l ock-
booking because di stributor s usually do not carry a stock 
of f i nished f ilms t o be offe l" ed to e xhibi tors . Thel"efor e, 
in or·der to se ll i n b lock s, i t wa s necessary t o s e ll fi l ms 
a s yet unmad e . Fl"om t he cU stributor ' s poi n t of v iew, 
blind- buyin g assured h i m of a solid market f or h~_s pr oduct s . 
It furt~1erwore tended t o eliminat e t he independent producers 
s~nce t he exhibi tor's time was tied up by hi s contract wi th 
t he distributor . Another adv antag e to distributors -wa s 
economy of sale s and marke tin g by t h e g roup selling of t h e 
film s. The exhibi tors argu ed a g ainst the practic e b e cause 
of i ts monopo l isti c natu re and t he fact t h at they were 
l i a b l e to be stuck time and a g ain wi t h pi ctur e s of p oor 
qual:t ty . 
Des igna t ed Play Dates 
This prac tice i s closely a llied to b l i n d - buying 
and b lock bookin g an d i s a me t h od of desig nat:on by t h e 
di s tr i butol" of the day s i n t h e we ek on whi ch certain ni c-
t ur•e s must be s h own . The whole p a i nt of t he arrang ement i s 
that mo vi e attendanc e is higher as mu ch as two to t h ree 
t ir,1es on saturday, Sunday, an d h oli days t h a n on the ot her 
we ek days . The advantas e t o t he d i stributors i s ob v :"Lous, 
wh:i_ le t he exh:'Lbitor s al"gued t hat it in t el"fere d wi t h the 
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manag emen t of t h eir t he aters , it overemphas i ze d g ood pictu res 
and underemph asized t h ose of fair or poor qu al i ty . The ex-
hibitors would have p J.."eferr ed putti ng the higher qual j_ ty 
pi ctu~ es durin g t he midd l e of the we ek i n order to attract 
add;_ t :~ onal cust omers and pu tti11g t he p oorer film s on the 
other days be c ause attendanc e would h ave b een :; ood anyway . 
rrh e ar j"uments i n behalf of the exhibitors in t his cas e are 
n ot too strong . In t he f ~rst p lace , their r ac t i ce might 
have driven establish e d customers away by t he p oo.r .fi Lms arJd 
still not 'have attracted any a ddi tional steady customers by 
pu tting the g ood pi ctures on t he off days . 
Prote ction 
:?r otection is the ~)recess of t he divi sion of t h e 
t heater mar ke t with respect t o clearance and zonin g . Fir st , 
t :1.ea t ers a re c l a ss ifi e d 'N:: t h res pect to t heir run, or t 1e 
order i n whi ch they have access t o fi l ms . Sec on d , e ach 
t he ater i s g iven a cel1 tain amount of c le aranc e ove r c ompeting 
t he a t ers . Thi s s tates t h e leng t h of t ir.1e requiJ: ed to elap se 
before oth er t eater s may sh ow f:_ l ms exhibi t ed in t h e ear·lier 
run s . Both runs and c l earance operate i n a given zone , t h e 
area defined a s c on t ain i ng c ompetin g t h eaters . The imnor tance 
of thi s pl1 act i c e is t h e un ique attract::ton of t he ater - g oers to 
new fi l ms a nd t he fact t hat t h e later run s c an ~ever offer 
c or.1p e t i t ion to t he pr efe rred runs . As a result , t h ose exhib-
j_ t or s ou tside t h e ring of protection had no cho:t ce but to 
acce p t t h e l a t er J:uns and t ake reduced profi ts . This further 
2, p . 125 . 
illustrate s the value of a thorough l y ,intec;rated motion 
:!_)i cture uni t from producti on t h rough di stri bution to ex-
b.i bi tion . 
ever-Buying 
Over - buying i s the practice t hat de,.relop ed in the 
motion pi c ture in dustry as competition became ke ener in t h e 
ent e r t ainment centers wi t hin ci t ie s and towns; i t s inten t 
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was to deprive a c ompeting exhib i tax· of suf f i c ient de sir•able 
fe ature ni ctures to meet his norma l requiremen ts . ~:- The 
industry has -enerally re6 2rded the use of t hi s in strwnent 
as inherently wr ong but t h e practice prevailed never•theless . 
5efore t he re wa s any attempt to re gu l a te the industry by 
g ovel'nment c ontrol, t h e bus i ness as a whole h ad l :.i. ttle su c -
cess in pre venting an d e liminat ing overbuying . T~ee meth ods 
of overbuying were s enerally recog nized : 
1. A..t'l e.~chibi t or l i ce ns e d mor e feature p ic tur e s 
t h an he used in operating hi s t h eater , t hu s t1freezj.n g 11 t h e 
surplus . 
2 . An e .:;chi bitor a d op ted an operating poli cy of 
unnece ssary and too frequen t cb.anges of pro~rB.m . 
3 . An exhibi to1., e x acted f rom a d istr:i.butor , as 
a c on di t i on to en ter•in g in t o a contract , t . a t t he di stri -
butor I•e :Lrai n from l i cens i ng pic t ure s to a c ompet i tor . 
The code f or the Nati onal Industry Ti e 8overy _ ct of 
1933 dec l are d each of t he above , and any s i~i l ar a ct s, to be 
~~ 25, p . '70 . 
unfai r t r a d e practices but as such or wi t h l i tt l e var i ation 
t h ey pers i sted to the present day . 
F orc ing of Short Subjects 
All t he ma j or compani es produc e s h ort subjects in 
conjunction vi t h t he produ c ti on of feature pic tures . Th e 
practice of f or cing t he pur ch as e of " shor t su b jects 11 such 
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as comedi e s, travelog s, and edu cational pi cture s of on e or 
t wo reel leng t h s as a condi t i on for t h e contrac t in g of 
fea t ure s h as long been a n es t ab l i s h ed practi ce wi t hin the 
indus try . The pr o cess ori ginally devel op e d from a d emand 
f'or· a v a1~ied e ntertai nment prog ram. Producers a lso f oun d 
t h at the ~ educti on of s h ort sub jects was a con ven i ent 
me t h od to tr·ain talent for f e atur e pi ctl.Jl" e s and to develop 
d:ire ctors for the more re s p an si b le du t i es of fe atur e pr educ-
t i on . -iE-
The ~Jr act _· ce of 11 forc i n g s h or t sub jects" is s imi -
lar in some .,Nays t o b lock b ooking a n d the a r guraents pro an d 
con a re simi l a r t o t h ose f or block -bookin g already menti one d . 
But , in t~~ s c a s e , t h e obj ec t i ons of t h e publ i c are f elt to 
as g r eat a de g ree as t h at of t h e i nd e pe n den t exhibi t or s. 
l!Iany of t he publi c, s i tting t h rough a pi cture or short of 
ex c e e d~l ng ly p oor qual i t y , have l i ttle realized that t hey were 
t h e v i ct ims of t h:t s practi ce of "forcin g short subj e cts " and 
in : ost c a ses have a ssign e d t h e b lame to t h e p oor man a g ement 
of t h e lo c al exhib :t tor, who •:Jas pr actically p owerless to 
* 2 5 , p . 98 . 
p revent t h e ~ractice . 
The above-enumerated t1~ade practices are a list 
of t he ~)rincipal methods use d by the integrated and i.J ower-
fully situated majors to control comp etition an d streng t hen 
t heir own stand i n the industry . The an ti - trust decree 
s ~ecifically ment i oned t h es e pr ac t i ces as well as oth ers of 
Ed n or iL1 -·J ortan ce . In adc.i t i on , t h e de cree calls for the 
divorce::: :~ent of exhibi t i on and production and t his v.,ri ll 
fuPther cut d o·wn the abil i ty of the major companies to ef -
~e ct t he se methods , but t he decree unfortunately comes a t 
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a time when the im:oortance of exhibiti on l'1as dropp ed con -
siderably by reason of competiti on , especially t h at of tele-
vis i on . 
Financ i a l Poli cies of the rndustry 
The wri t ing off of rapidly declin i n g c a y i tal c ost s 
is closely allied to t h e d e pre ciati on of the cost of physi -
cal property . It is a process of wr i t ing off the cost of 
forms of capi tal assets , whi ch from t h eir very nature de -
cline ra~id ly in value . * Many thous and s of dollars are re-
quired to pl"'Odu ce a picture , yet the period of exh:lbiti on, 
both in t hi s country an d abroad is limited to a few months . 
u sually t h e li f e of a year for a pi ctut•e is t h e exception 
r ather t han t he rule . As a result , the cost of production 
must be cb.arg ed off from the earnings of t h e pic tul"'e dur i ng 
the period i t i s being exhibited and t he recei pts from the 
5 , p . 60 6 . 
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picture must rapidly amortize i ts cost . What t~ pe:ri-od ---:_of 
amorti zat ion wi ll b e generally depends u Don t he 3! 0 l i c:tas - of 
- ~ -
t he individual c ompany , but an over•a l l survey sh ows ·_t b at.:>-_<_-
~-- -· 
100 p e r cent amortization at t h e end of 65 weeks is g enerally 
t he r u le . However , t h e percent of amortization in the inter-
vening weeks varies gre a tly be t ween t h e c om panies and i s 
g en erally different for fea t ur e s , . sh or ts, a nd newsreels . 
The followin g tab le sh ows t he amor t ization p ol i cies of the 
s Lc maj or compan ie s of t h e i ndustry. A survey of t he tao le 
reveals t h at Loe"l:v ' s has the lon gest and si:r.J 2J lest sch edule 
ex tendin g to 78 weeks but wi th on ly f i ve dates at whi ch 
the amoi>ti :0 ation rate s are i ncrease d . On t he o t b.er end, 
t here a1~ e t • K. o. an d 'rwentie t h Cen tury F ox with araol~ ti -
zation date s at fifteen each dur~ng a peri od of 60 and 65 
weeks res pective l y . Un i ve r sal f ollovs Loew ' s meth od of 
in f Pequen t ch an g es ln t h e percentag e rate of amor t i zation 
but s ure ads i t over a period of 60 weeks or 18 week s less 
t h an Loew 1 s . 
Th e 1~eason t h at t h ese amor t ization s -:::hedules 2-:re 
f oll owe d is t~1at over a pe r i od of years , fi l m arnor ti zat i on 
~~ 
charg es must equal actua l co s ts . " RoweveP , th~. s r:Jeth od of 
accounting di s t oJ:> ts :prof i t c omp e.:d.son s fr01n one y ear to t h e 
ne :ct and fl~ om one interim period to anot~1.er . t1he n gross 
l"' evenues ex~) and , film costs likewise ten d to ri s e , but are 
les s ra~Jidly reflecte d i n amort i z a t 5.on charg es . Accol',d i n 3 ly, 
~~ 8 , p . 6 . 
-
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net i ::1 come benefits , but conv e l~ s ely a dec l ine in g r oss 
i n c ome c ompe l s a re cluct·_on in costs whi l e amor t ization on 
t h e old er• e · _pen s ~:.. ve f ilms c 0nt i nues h igh for some t ime . 
r:L'herefore , as a result of these 2mor t ization p ollcies , 
comcj fl_r ison of t h e n e t income of the c om ~::J an 5_ es e i t her between 
e ach oth er or over a period of y e ars d oes not necessarily 
r eflect t he true condi t ion of that company at any one t:tm e . 
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'EABlli NO . VI I I 
FILM AMORTI ZATI ON SC:t-EDrJ W S 
c --l.rr; :::.N.!:' I v~ l.'!OH LD R . ..t~T.G S li' l 'll::( - v_~.. FK\.'::.'UR ·' :'I CTURD S--P3 R G '' NT 
20th 
Pa:ca- Ce nt . u ni - i} a:r.n er 
1Jeeks Loe w' s mount H. K. o. F ox ~Je:r. s al Bros . 
4 35 . 0 14 . 50 14 . 0 14 . 0 
8 63 . 0 30 . 00 35 . 0 35.0 
12 44 . 8 80 . 0 46 . 00 50 . 0 53 . 0 
1 :3 83 . 0 53 . 0 46 .75 5'7 .0 
1 6 89 . 0 5 9 . 50 60 . 0 6 6 . 5 
20 92 .7 69 . '75 6 6 . 5 75 .0 
2 4 7 0 . 7 95 . 2 78 . 25 7 2 .5 80 .0 
26 95 . 9 75 . 5 76 . 5 0 82 . 0 
28 96 . 5 84 . 00 '7 8 . 5 
32 88 . 25 
36 85 .1 91.25 
39 98 . '7 8 8 .0 8 9 . 50 90 . 0 
40 98 . 8 93 . 50 88 . 5 
44 95 . 5 0 
48 9'7 .00 
52 95 .0 100 . 0 98 . 00 94 . 5 96.'75 96 .5 
5 6 99 . 0 0 96 .5 
60 100.00 98 . 5 100 . 0 0 100 . 0 
65 100 . 0 
78 100 . 0 
S ource : St andar d a n d Poor's I n clu stt•y Sur v eys , r/I8 - B, ,January 18 , 
1 95 1. 
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Divide nd Poli cies 
The depression years of the 1 930 ' s resulted in 
s e vere finan cial d epression for mo s t of' the lar -:.·e c ompe..:·Jies , 
which fina lly culmi n ated in larg e - scale reo:rg anizat :i_ ons. ::n 
some ins t ances , long-term debt 1rve. s re p laced by comr.1 on stock, 
burdens o::ne con tracts vmre almos t u niversal l y c an celled , a n d 
the le ading c omp a nie s emer g ed fr om t h e depression in a 
stron 6 er p os i t ion t an ever before. At the pr esent time , 
Parar:1 ount , 1. • K. 0 . , and Twen tieth - Centu:ey F ox h ave n o funded 
de b t, w:."li le Loew' s make s use of de benture 3 ' s and 2 . 8 5' s . 
\.' al., ne:c- 1 s funde d debt cons i s t s of a 2 p ercent ban k loan , whi le 
Un~ver s al emp loys notes p a y able and sinkin g f un d debentur e s 
at 3¥ . 
This process of debt reduc tion , retir ement of 
seni or securities , and t h e streng t h enin ry of workin g capi tal 
have result ed in g enerally c onservative di vi en d p ol! cles 
a:mon g t h e c 0mpe..nies a lthough t h e treatE1 ent of stockho l der s 
h as varie d wi de l y . Disbarsements in 1945 a n d 1946 increased, 
but t h e smaller pe rcent ase in t he latter y e ar ref lected a 
much more marke d r ise in the e ar·nlng s, which natul"ally de -
cre ased t he pe rcent of the di vi d ends . In 1947 t h e r e was a 
s h arp rise for _wentie t h Centur·y - Pox and Peraraount di sburse -
ments , whi ch was o c casioned by lower ea.l~ n ings, vhi le a 
l a r g er annual ayment l ifted t h e ratio for "~arner Brothers . 
These fi gures are s h own in the followin p' ':2ab le No . :r.: ent i tled 
" D:_ viden d s on Com111on Stock . " 
10 3 
Loew 1 s r e cord of d~_ vi d.e n d s h as been the n ost out-
stand:l.n :r ove11 a p eriod of ye a rs s i n c e payment on c ommon s to ck 
:1.as been omi tt ed only once i n t vventy-five ye ars. 1:7a11 ner 
Brothe r s and R. K. o., wh o had t h e i r cap~ tal structu res 
wh:: ttled d own and l ar g e cash -oalan ces bui lt u p , sta:c t ed to 
pay d:lv:"~ dends on t h e j_l .... common s t o cl{s in 1 946, bu t t h e con-
t i nu a ti on of a dverse fact ors in 1948 tha t had d eve l ope d i n 
1 9 4 '7 n e ces s ita te d t he reductio n of rates of not on ly r!arner 
Bro t~ ers and H. K. o. but a lso Twent i eth Centut•y P ox and 
Univer sal . By noting the tab le, it can b e seen t h at Uni -
v~rsal in 1948 omJ tt e d payments and s i nce 1 949 has paid no 
dividen ds . A better understandin g of t h e tab le wi ll be 
p oss ible if i t i s n oted t h at t he percentag es e i ven are t h e 
fisc a l y e ar dj_vidends p a id pe r s h are divi d ed by ne t earn i n g s 
pel'' c omm on share. The tab le f urth er sh ows t ha t over a lon g 
u ePiod of t ime t h e posit l on of t he comm on stockholders of 
many of t h e c omp an i es was not an en vi ab le one a s e v:tden ce d 
by t he di vidend recor d of v.:arner Brother. s, Un :'L ve r sal, and 
Pal .... amoun t. 
TABLE NO. IX 
( 1929-1949) 
20th United 
Colum- Para- Cen- Para- Uni - . Wal'"'ner 
Year bia Loe w' s mount tury mount versal B l'"'OS . E . K. o. 
194 9 Ni l ( 1) 46.7 Nil 69.9 ( 1) 
1 948 ( 1) ( 1) 46 . 5 ( 2 ) 85.2 ( 1) 
1947 18 . 8 66 .4 62 . 4 64 . 3 49 . 5 92 . 3 
1 946 6 .5 44 .5 50.6 37 . 6 28.6 28 . 4 
1945 11.5 52 . 9 47 . 2 4L2 Nil Ni l 
1944 10 . 4 45 . 9 33 .1 38 . 8 Ni l Ni l 
1943 11.7 48 . 9 37 . 2 15.2 Nil Nil 
1942 Nil 42 .7 23.6 Nil Ni l Nil 
1 941 Ni l 48 . 8 Nil Nil Ni l Nil 
1 940 Nil 41.6 Nil Ni l Ni l Ni l 
l g3 9 ( 4) 46 . 9 63 . 3 Nil Ni l ( 3 ) 
1938 ( 2 ) 62 . 2 59 .7 Ni l Nil 
1937 56 . 5 88 .7 60 .7 Ni l Nil 
1936 21.7 37 .5 56. 3 Nil Nil 
1932 24 . 6 83 . 8 Ni l 
1929 Ni l 37 . 9 
( 1) Dividend s exceeded profi ts 
( 2) Dividends p aid de s pite loss 
(3) In re ce ivGr ship, 1 931-1939 
( 4 ) Paid in stock 
sour ce: Standard and Poor ' s Industry Sur veys. 
Definition : Fisc a l year d ividends paid per s h are divided by 
net earning s per common share . 
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Un ion Poli ci e s and ~ffe cts 
E ver s in ce mo ti on p i c t "Ll.l' e s b e came an imp or· t a n t 
in dustry , t h ey we r e located in Los Ange l e s a nd that vicinity, 
wh~ ch was at that time an "op en s hop " area . OrGanized labor 
made the uni on ization of t he fi l m s t udi os t h ei r objective b e -
cau se i f t hi s cou ld b e a c complish e d , then t hey believed t hat 
t h ey could mak e furtb er g ain s in uni on izin g t hi s tex•r i tory 
hos til e to l abor organ i z ation s. ~<- I t is not wi thin the scope 
of t hi s r e p ort to g ive a long dr a wn out hi story of the union -
ization of t h e film in dustry but merely to point out i ts ef-
fe e t u · on the financial condi t ion of t h e industry . It will 
suff ic e to say t h at today everyone in t h e industry f rom t he 
h:lghest p aid directol''s to lowly electricians is org an i zed i n 
his own group. 
The s tudi o emp loyee belong s to one of four major 
c a tegori es: 
1. Creative t a lent, inc l u ding wr i t ers , actors , 
mus ician s, and direc t ors ; 
2 . Ski lled profe ss ionals especially t rained in 
studio publici t y, set de s ign ing , f i lm edi ting , and cu tting , 
etc.; 
3 . studio techn icians skilled in work pecu l i ar to 
the industa~y such as c amera men, sound men , technician s, etc.; 
4. Craf tsme n, such as carpen ters, machinis ts, 
painters, a nd p l urobex•s. 
-'t. 
" 6, p . 5 . 
The natural eff ect of this unionization from the 
f in anc ial viewpoint is t h e increased r igidity of costs and 
t~e inability of manag ement to cut down it s l abor payrolls 
whe n in come begins to fa ll. Thj_ s f a. ct has been more t h an 
vex• i f ied by the impos i t i on of the Briti sh 75 percent tax on 
Araex•ic an fi l ms when a survey pointed out t hat manat; e:n en t 
must cut all costs and increase effi ciency by elimi nation of 
waste i f it were to survive t h e effects of t h e tax, but 
practic a lly none of the labor costs could be l"educed • .;~ How-
ever , it was p ointed out t h at actors and directors could be . 
requested to make more f ilms per year and to wor k lon g er 
hour s if they could see t h at it was to t h eir advanta.~; e to d o 
so , bu t t !:le oth er lab ol" costs would remain f ixed reg ard l ess 
of t h e effect of t h e tax. 
u nion Conditions 
One rather p e culiar result of the un i onizat ion of 
Hollywood is the inter - union stri fe which somet~_m es reaches 
proporti ons g reater than that b etween l a b or and mana2; ement . 
~t results from t he desire for power and control b etween 
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the v arious unions but regardless of h ow t h e strike or strife 
starts, it i ncreases the cost of production as far as manag e -
ment i s concerned . In addi tion, the };1 o t ion pi cture industry 
faces t h e fact t h at t h e un i ons are forever sens i tive to 
t e chnolog ical ch ang es and con stantly op p oses them . whenever 
t h ey tend to displace men with machines . This point is 
~~ 
1 9 , P • 9. 
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illus trated by the oppositi on of the mus i cian ' s union to 
11 canned musi c " because it di s pla ce d t h e a ter orchestras . 
~he ov e r a ll effe ct of u nioni z ation ' s policies and 
prac tices has b e e n t o increase t h e c os t of production hi ,h 
a b o ve it s ori 7in al costs when t h e indus t ry wa s youn g , but 
in the r es ec t the industry i s no diffe rent t han any oth er 
l ar g e busi ness of the pl~es ent day . 
Denreciation Po licies 
Th e 11 straight-line 11 me t h od of depre ci a tion i s 
i 'ollowed by most of t he c ompanies in t h e i n dustry an d the 
ra t e a lso a pp l i es to any of t he company ' s subs idiaries, but 
as b etween companies t h e rate varie s on the different assets . 
-~ e xamp le of the d e preciat i on p ol -· cie s of t h e three lead in g 
comyanies wi l l be given . 
De preciation Po l i cy of Loew's* 
Depl'e ciate bui l d i ng s and equipment by straight -
l ine me t h od over t h e e xpected life. 
Theater Stud io 
Bu~ ldi n g s 5<:~ I 
Bui lding · ,. qu~_pme n t 5d J O 
Gen era l E quipment 
De pr e ciation Policy of R. K. o.** 
Thi s company provides for rates be l i eved appr o-
pr i ate to write off assets ove r e s timated us efu l l i ne s. The 
... ~ 7 , p . 664 . 
-:E<- 7 , P • 2603 . 
schedule is as f ol lows: 
Bu ::_ l din ,.s , most ma chinery , and equipment 2 -105& 
ut om obi l e s 
Certain Building s and Equipment I 1o% 
Special De preciation Res erve for Sul phuric Acid Plan ts 
The company makes no de duc t ion i n accounti ng for 
de y l eti on of mini ng propert ie s . 
De9rec i at i on Poli cy of Tvent i eth Century 
A straight l i ne me t h od i s employe d as f ollows : 
Bu i l din g s on own ed l and 
Home Of f ice 2 . 22 to 10% 
;.;;xchan ge Off ices 2 . 50 to 12 . 50% 
Roxy 2 . 50 to 10 . or& 
n a t ional 2 . 8 6 to 6 . 7% 
I mprovemen ts to Leased Proper t i es and Lease Holds 
Home Off ice 
Exch an ge Offi ces 
Thea t er Leaseho lds 
Thea t er : mpr ovement s to 
Leased Properties 
~ quj_ pmen t, ll'ur n ~L t ur e , and 
Fixture s 
Ch arge s to Pr oducti on Cos ts 
studi o Pr ooerti es 
( Depen ding- on type) 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
Over 
Life of 
Lease 
5 Oocl t <;>r...4 • ;a 0 .._v; o 
5 . 001 to 20% 
( per' annurn ). 
I 
I 
I 
The de9rec i ati on r a t e s g i ven in the ab ove co~p or -
ati on s a r e t ypi cal of t~J.e i ndustry an d are :lmportant f:J;>om 
'7 , p . 260 6 . 
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the financial standpoint since they r epr esent co sts for 
t h e bus i ne ss during a given p er iod of time. The d epreci-
ation ra tes c an b e used to di stor t f!n ancial statemen ts b y 
u s :.ng an exce s si ve rate t o understate earn _i_ ngs and t here by 
reduce t h e tax b ase 01 .. else revalue t h e a ssets at a high 
val ue and use t he s ame rates . 
Methods of F inancing 
The method of financing the indi vidual comp an i es 
depends upon whe t her the p articular com p any is classified 
as a major or an independen t. The majors are finan ce d on 
the same oasi s as any l arge corporat ion a nd in the East are 
i' i nanced domin antly by the Pirst Nationa l Bank of Boston and 
t h e Bankers Trust Comp an y of New York . On t h e o ther hand, 
inde p endent c ompan i es have be en financed out of J_,os lngeles, 
especi a lly by the Security-First National, wi t h eastern banks 
pal•t5_c ipating , and by the Bank of .P~eri c a . In 1948 , inde-
penden t finan c ing was e st imate d at no t more t h an 0 50 mi llion . 
But s i nce a pic ture may take five years to amol .. tize, although 
it should t ake les s t han t wo, t h ere i s estimated t o be a 
g ood deal more t han $50 mi l li ons t ied u p in i n d e pendents . 
The California bank ers' purpose in financing the pic t ure s 
is t v.ro - fold . In t l1.e first p lace, t hey wish, of cou.l .. se, to 
earn money on money and sec on d l y t h ey realize t h e value of 
t he i ndu stry to the lo cal i ty. Hollyw ood i s c on s i d ered to be 
t he show c as e of t hat area , t h e lo cat i on's g reatest attrac -
t5_on apart from t he climate, a 1.~ o od to~)i c f or national a dver-
·t:; ~ c:d n r;·· and a maunet for b oth tour :7. sts and those desiri ng -~ -- 0 ' 0 
permanent l'esidences . Furtherm ore, the fi lm :oroduction 
bring s into that area every year a bout ~300 m:llion of 
outside mon ey, whi ch aids the local economy . 
Or i ~inally, the b anks go t in terest ed in indepen -
de nt f i nancing in 1 936 and after 1 939 found easy g oing on 
t h e rising marke t. Recently, however , t h ey lost confi-
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den ce in t h e secur i ty of individual pi ctur e loans, except 
where t h ey are backed with suffic i ent sup:') lementar y col-
lateral . i n examp le of on e of the reasons why bankers 
hesi tate on the loans is the case of the p:t cture "Joan of 
Arc, 11 whi ch was }Jr oduced by Walter Wan g er as an i ndependent 
and f:i_nanced by the Ba11kers Tl"us t Company . In s pi te of 
tremendous advance pub l i city, the pi cture nroved to be an 
abysmal financia l f ailure to such an extent t h at Wang er 
was f orced into bankruptcy . 
Individual pi ctul"es ar e fi n anced wi th three kinds 
~~ 
of money, c a lled firs t, second, and th~rd . rrhird, or end 
money, is the producer ' s, and it often consists of sals-.ry 
deferments by the prin cipals, including writer, director , 
and sta1~ . second money is risk c a~o i tal ::Jut U:r:J by a finance 
con ;'_)any or perhaps a wealthy industr i alist or oil man en-
tranced by Hollywood wildcatting . Y. i th thi.s type of money 
g oes a big :l.n teres t i n the picture . The ban~c puts up the 
first money at 4 or 5 percen t and has a first lien on t h e 
r•et"'..lrns af t er• :pr i nts, advertising , and distri bution costs . 
* 22 , PP • 98 - 102 . 
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\ h en a pr oducer has a known r ec ord of performance and a 
:9::_ c tur e vvl th a maximum of tried-an d-true ma k eup, banks have 
put up as much as 80 p ercent of the cost of production. 
I!'Jb.en a bank puts up money for a px•oduction , it 
ta£es t wo 1~isks: Will the picture be finished? Y. ill it 
br :~_ng the money back? The fi rst question de •;lends upon the 
producer and his re sour ces; the bank desil1 es a comp leti on 
guarantee .f:eom the backer of t h e picture or the studi o. This 
costs the independent producer another p iece of the pi cture, 
and if the producer gets into too much trouble brin ging in 
t h e g uarantee, he stands t o have it t aken over by t he guaran-
tor. Th e banker starts with the basic collateral, t h e copy-
right or title to t he story, and develops lu s interest over 
every inf:lni te detail ; every contx•act is exam :i_ ned, every 
expenditure controlled . The banker doe s not p ositively tell 
t he p roducer what to write , but he does tell 1 • • J .lm v.fhat to 
leave out . Therefore , contrary to expectat ions, it i s not 
3 ener a lly the inde p endent who can e x periment, but r a t he r t h e 
old ma jor conservative studio who i s not fett ered by the 
st:r•:i_ ng en t r·equiremen ts of the financin g banks. 
Independen t production c anno t r e ally b e independent 
u ntil it gets on its own fin an c:i_al feet and therefore take s 
i t s ovm risks . A fe,.v big :independen ts, Sll ch as Goldwyn and 
Selznick, have large an d continuous opera t i ons financed not 
by t h e picture but by a line of credit back e d by a backlog 
of successful pictures . On t he whole, distr :!.bution con di tions 
in the past h a v e not favored competi t i on with the majors 
vv-ho had theate1 ... s to take their pl~oduct . Unti l an i nde -
pendent has bui lt up his bus ;n ess reputati on by l ar g e 
Profi table pict··1 ' ... e s over a ·pel'"'_i od o->" t i ·-ne he " i 11 b 
- - ~-'- - .J.. • _ ,, ' - 'l'v - e 
for ce d to t ake the strict and rigid te~ns of the banks 
f' ~ nan cl ng independen t s instead of t he easier terms ac corded 
to t h e ma jor c ompanies . 
Indep endent production forms a lal'"' g e part of the 
mo tion picture industry; an d of the 2 25 fi lm s released by 
maj or companies last year , 20 percent of t hem were mad e by 
independents . The biggest earner on record was "Gone With 
The V!ind, u an independent production whi ch g1~ossed ~~ 45 
ni ll~on after b e i ng re - issued half a dozen t ime s . The 
indepe ndents have lower overhead costs , use f e wer stars , 
cheaper scri p ts and less elab or a te sets , but o c cas i onally 
risk a heavy investment ventu re when they believe that the 
return vdl l be larg e. This i s i llustr a t e d by the g reater 
than usual expense put into "Gone 1:Vi th The \Vind 11 by Producer 
David Selznicl-c . 
An e x ample of an independent f~nan cing i s that of 
John Sti llman , a Florida dry g ood s merc .1an t , who backed t wo 
soli d rrhits 11 of 1949- - " Home of t h e Brave" and 11 Champion , " 
wh2. ch cost ('; 938 , 000 and both s rossed C: 4:i rn~llions by l',lay 
of 1 950 . So e;re at was the success of Stillman on t h ese 
two pictures tbat hundreds of :L nvestors rush ed to Hollywood 
to invest in i ndependent produc t ions . These invest ors note 
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on ly t he succ es eful atternpt s at fin an cin e; :t nd.epen d en ts but 
fai l to di scern t hat only one ou t of tb..ree :independent 
films su cce ed in breaking even in t h e United States and 
Canada . Even b ank s can make mistake s as a lr eady note d in 
t h e ca s e of the Ban ke r's T11 ust Comp any and 11 Joan of Al"' c," 
wh:. ch cost (A mj_ll ::i_ on but lost i ts backers a f or tune when 
t~e pi ctur e fai led in its public a ppeal. 
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C1{APT:t::R VII 
ANALYSIS Oli' F INAN CIAL STATJ.:~ l'T.i.::HTS 
Up to t h is p oin t t h e emphasis h as been rather on 
t he overall aspects of the i ndu stry, es pecially in re g ard to 
the h is tory of f:inancia1 p olicies , c ons o l idat ions, merg ers, 
un i onization, and anti - trust d ecre e s . Now it becomes neces-
sary t o take a representRti ve group of' t h e ma j or companies 
of t b.e i n dus try and anal .:rze their specific f i nancial state-
ments i n order to determin e h ovv eac:1. of t hese c ompanies stand 
today in t he i n dus try and to det e rmi ne t he tl"end of t heir 
prog ress. Since 1941 to 1 946 were 'Nar years , a c ompari son 
of i ncome statements or balance s h eets to any of t hose inter-
ven j_n g ye ars vroul d alway s p l a ce the company ' s present p osi-
tion at a disadvantag e because the war ye ars vvel:>e an era of 
un -,Jr ecedented boom in the bus:'Lne ss . Therefore it ~:vas de -
cid e d t o take 1939 as the base y e ar to comp are the most re -
cent :C i_;ures of 1 949 . The year 1939 was not i nfluenced to 
mu ch of nn ex tent by t ~J.e d epr·e ssi on nor• h a d the be g i nn i n g of 
war pr o s peri t y been fel t to any 0 re a t d e g ree. As a result , 
a c om Dari son of 1 94 9 t o 1939 wi ll Give a truer p i cture of 
the trend and financ:2.al po s i t ion of each c om :;> any during t he 
past decade . Actu ally if condi t ion s hsd be e n normal or ap -
proximate ly nor mal, it might be better to com:Jare ten f inan -
cia l stat m;1ents in a row, but such a large mass of f:l.gu res 
tend to cloud t h e r eal i s s ue and ob scure our main ob,jective 
of det e rminin g t he present condi t i on of t h e c om) any . Further -
more, since financial ratios will be used to analyze the 
state~ents , a lon g row of comparative ratios yould be 
useless and confusing . 
In order to g ain a clearer pic t ure of the financial 
statements of each company , the comp onents of each statement 
have be en condensed and t h e fi s ures l"'educed to a lmvest 
0 100 , 000 . In analyzin g t h e statem en ts, s pecial emphasis 
wi ll be p l aced u p on chang es i n assets , current assets , and 
t b.eir va1~ious ratios . Other f ac tol"'s t o be noted w:L 11 be 
chanses i n t he capitali z a t i on, the increas:Lnr or de creas ing 
of f u nded de b t and preferr ed stock and t h eir diff erent p er-
centa~ es to capitalization. The i ncrease or decrease in 
sales wil l be an important fa ctor since i t is upon thi s one 
element that many vital ratios c an be worked out . Finally, 
an analysis of operation will b e worked out ·wi th "Total 
Operat ing Revenues" as the base and by whi ch t he operating 
effi c i ency of t he comp any can b e determined . 
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LOE\'I' S IIJCOT.", PCRNI'ED 
AS OF AUGU ST 31 
Assets 
Cash 
Go vernment and Ma r ketab le 
securitie s 
Heceivao les 
In ven tori es 
Total Curren t _ss e ts 
Oth er In vestments 
Gross Proper ty 
Less Reserve f or Depre ciation 
Othe r As se ts 
Tota l Assets 
Liabilitie s 
Payables 
Total Curr en t Li abi l i ti e s 
Funded Deb t 
Oth er Liabi l i t i es 
Res e rves 
Preferred Stock of Vfuo lly Ovmed 
Conpanie s 
Cumu l a t i ve Pr e f e r l''ed ( Par) 
Comm on Stock ( No Par 
s urp l us 
1 949 
dh t;p 23 , 400 , 000 
10 , 800 , 000 
5 , 500 , 000 
7 6 , 600 , 000 
116 , 300,000 
11,600, 0 00 
125 , 200 , 000 
40z200 2 000 
85 , 000, 000 
6 , 7oo 2 ooo 
~~219 2 600 2 000 
23 , 000 , 000 
23 , 000, 000 
52 , 900, 000 
2 , 300 , 000 
2 , 000 , 00 0 
600,000 
45 , 800 , 0 0 0 
93 , 000 , 000 
Tot a l Liabi l itie s & Ne t Wor th 0 219 , 600 , 000 
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1939 
lJ, 13, 800 , 000 t.,> 
3 , 400 ,000 
4,200,000 
44,300 , 000 
65 , 700 , 000 
14, 600, 000 
100 , 600 , 000 
27 , 600 .! 0 00 
73,000 , 000 
4 , 000 ,00 0 
~p l57 , 3002 000 
12 .! 800,000 
12, 800 , 000 
30 , 000 , 000 
3 , 900 , 000 
200 , 000 
1 , 300 , 000 
1 2 ,900 , 000 
43 , 800 , 000 
52 , 400 , 000 
':~ 157z 300z 000 
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YEARS E ~~D:;i;D AUGU ST 31 
1 949 1939 
Gross He ce ip ts t •. \> 160 , 200 , 000 ~:? 112, 500 , 0 0 0 
Cost of Operatio ns 
Operatin g ~xpen ses 
Depr e c i ation 
General .~: dm:tni strative Expense 
ot .1er I n come 
T otal ::n come 
the r :)educti on s 
Federal I ncome Taxes 
Net In come Aft e r In come Taxe s 
Preferred Dividends 
Coum on Dividends 
Ren ain der f or Comm on 
145,500 , 000 
2,000,000 
2 ,600 ,000 
10 ,100, 000 
2,000 , 000 
1 2 ,10 0 , 000 
1, 900, 000 
10 ,20 0 , 0 0 0 
4,200, 0 00 
6 , 000 , 000 
'7 000 000 
---t'- ' 
Sunp lementary Prof it and Loss Data 
1a in ten a nce and Re pair s 
Depr e ciation , Dep letion , and 
Arn orti zation 
Ta es ot: .er t han Federal Inc ome 
Rents and Royalti e s 
2 , 000, 000 
3 , 200, 000 
4 , 300, 000 
2 , 900 , 000 
Finan cial and Operatin g Ratios 
~arned Per Share--Pre f erred 
Com.nwn 
Di vidends Per Share --Pre f erred 
Comm on 
Ne t Assets per Shar e--Preferred 
Comm on 
Net Assets per $ 1000 ~1nded Debt 
Net Current Assets er ;:;:1, 000 Funded 
De b t 
1. 50 
2 '7. 0 0 
~$ 3 , 600 . 00 
1, 800 . 00 
96 ,10 0 , 000 
2 , 80 0 , 000 
1, 900 , 000 
11,700 , 000 
1,500 , 0 0 0 
13, 200 , 000 
2 , 000 , 0 00 
11, 200 , 000 
1,70 0 , 000 
9 , 500 , 000 
900 , 000 
4 ,10 0 , 000 
5 , 000 , 000 
4 , 500 , 000 
90 0 , 000 
3 , 400, 000 
5,700,00 0 
3 , 000, 000 
~:; 70 . oo 
5.20 
6 .50 
2 .50 
800 . 00 
59.00 
~.~ 4 , 300 . 00 
1,600 .00 
Finan cia l and Operating Hati os 
Curr e nt Assets--Curren t Liabil i t ie s 
~ Cash and Secur i ti e s t o Current 
_ ssets 
% I n ventory t o Curr ent Ass e ts % Ne t Current As sets t o Ne t Worth 
~ Pr op er t y De preciat ed % 1nu al Depreciation to Gross 
Propel"ty 
Capitalization 
)b Long - Ter m Debt 
% Pre f err ed Sto ck 
;& Comm on sto ck and s u rp lus 
Sal e s + I nventory 
Sale s + Re ce ivab les 
% Sa l es to Ne t Prop er ty 
% Sal e s to Tot a l 1 s se ts % Ne t In c ome to Tot a l Ass et s 
% Net Income to Ne t Harth 
Preferre d Dividends Time s Earne d 
filla l y s i s of Oper ation 
Total Operating ~a venue s 
Operating Expense 
epreciation 
Operating Profi t 
Ot h er In come 
•r ota l In come 
Interest 3 x _ens e and Ot he r De duction s 
Balance 
·~ e deral Income Taxe s 
Net .Ln come Af t er Taxes 
1 949 
5 . 06;& 
29.39 
65 . 77 
67 ~ 25 
32 .12 
2 .5 
28 . oo~& 
oo . o o 
72.00 
2 .1o;& 
29 . 00 
188 . 00 
73 . 00 
2 . 70 
4 . 30 
% 
"-
1oo . oo;s 
92 . 40 
1 . 30 
6 . 30 
1. 30 
7 . 60 
1. 20 
6 . 40 
2 . 60 
3 . 80 
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1 939 
5 10 c1 
• / 0 
26 . 00 
68 . 0 0 
48 . 00 
27 . 00 
3 . 40 
23 . 00% 
9 . 90 
67 . 00 
2 . 50% 
45 . 00 
150 . 00 
72 . 00 
6 .10 
8 . 60 
11.00 
6/ 
~ 
100 . oo~& 
8 7 . 00 
2 . 50 
10 . 00 
1. 30 
12 . 00 
1. 70 
10 . 00 
1.50 
8 .50 
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Loew ' s I ncor p or ated 
Th:.. s c omp a ny ' s assets h a ·,; e l n o1" e as e d a p i)ro.:ri ma t e ly 
40 perc ent since 1 9 3 9 , its current assets h a ve incre as e d 
'7'7 per :: en t, while its !::> lant and propel"ty (net) h ave i n-
creas e d on l y 1'7 p ercent . Th e tremend ous i ncrease i n t h e 
cu r : ent ass e ts is d irectly attr i but able to t h e company's 
he a vy i nve stment i n 6 0vernment an d rnarketab le securi t i es , 
•Nh :l ch 1nor e than tri p led dur i ng t h e 10 - year period . Alth ough 
t h e i n v e n tory carried by t h e comp any has i ncreased by over 
0 32 , 0 00 ,000 , the ratio of inven t ory to current assets h as 
declined by 3 perc e nt as reveal e d by the f i nanc i al and op er-
atin6 ratios . _n ac'l di t i on , the ratio of net current assets 
to ne t ,, orth has 5_n creased by almost 20 p ercent , whi l~ t h e 
current r a tio h as l"ema i ned the s am e at 5 . Alton·eth er t h e 
cu r _•e nt posit5_on o.f J_,o ew1 s as depi cted by its .financial 
stateme n t s a nd ratios i s excellent d e s o i t e t h e curr ent d e-
or Gssion of t h e industry . 
From 1 939 to 1949 , t h e funde d de b t i ncreased by 
5 pe rcent to t h e present mark of 28 percent , bu t a ll of t ._e 
p r eferred st o ck was ca l led i n vvh ich previously ma d e U:r,J a p -
proxima tely 10 p ercent of t h e ca.pi tal so t h at now t h e comm on 
stock a nd surp l us ma ke u p '72 percent of t h e capi tal or an 
i n er e a s e of 5 per cent from 1 9 39 . Since t~1e funde d de b t does 
not even a :r,J p l'oach the maximum of 50 - 60 p ercent ratio f or 
i n du strials , its f i xed ch arg es wi ll not be too much of a 
burd en for future pr of i ts . 
Ne t sales b a ve incr e ased 43 percent duri ng t he 
last ten year s bu t at t h e s ame t ime operating e x-o en ses h ave 
in cre ased by ove r 5 percent t o 92 . 4 pe rcent . T~s h as re -
duced t h e oper a t in g pr ofi t f r om 10 per cent i n 1 93 9 to 6 . 3 
per cent i n 1 949 . 1 ost of the i n cr ease i n costs i s due to 
t h e ~ 1 :t rsher wa ::::es and sa l arie s and ::i.ncreased film am ortiza-
t i on vvhi ch :'.' e su l t s when fi l ms of poor r e venue ab:t li t y are 
r~Jade . 
The comp any ' s e arrJed pe r s h ar e of c orm-non d e cr e as e d 
from ';5 . 20 in 1 939 to i~; l. 20 in 1 94 9 , t he di viden d s per s h ar e 
of c orrw1 on was ~ ,i 2 . 50 in 1 939 but on l y ·,;1.50 ten yea~," s la t er . 
As noted b efore , t he f unde d de b t a d :i.ncl"e 8 s ec_ by 5 percent 
of t h e cani tal i zat5.on bu t fixed ch arg e s we :c• e ear ned e i gh t 
t im es i n 1 9 3 9 as a g a i ns t seven t im es in 1 949 . l l thou gh t h e 
d e b t has i ncreased, t h e ratio of ne t cu rrent ass e ts to 
~~;a , oo o funded d ebt i s ~~) 1, 800 or an incr eas e of ~) 200 f rom 
1 93 9 , :v~ ich, when c ons i d e ::·ed :!. n con j un cti on Yvi t~ .L t h e other 
fact or s, p laces t h e c omp any on a fair l y s oun d f i nan cia l 
b as:t s . 
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AS 01" AUGU ST 31 
_ssets 
Cash 
Governmen t an d ilarke ta~ le 
Se cul•i t ies 
Recei vab l es 
Inven tor ies 
Total Curr ent ~ss e ts 
Oth er Inves t men t s 
Gross Property 
Less Re serve for Depreciation 
Other Asset s 
Total Ass e ts 
Liabi l:i_ ties 
Total Curr ent Liabi l itie s 
Fun ded Deb t 
Other Li abilities 
Rese.l:'ves 
Pr eferx•e d Stock of Wholly Ovmed 
Company 
Cumu l ative Pref . ( 
Common Stock ( :)1 Par ) 
Sui>p l us 
To t al Liabilities and Net 
YJ orth 
1 949 
;::; 46 ' 500 , 000 
3 , 400 , 000 
8 , 000 , 000 
38 ,100 ,000 
96 , 000 , 000 
14,200 , 000 
1 34, 000 , 000 
55,300 , 000 
'78 , '700 , 000 
12,000, 0 00 
"" 
,:~ 209, ~00 .! 000 
18 , 300 , 000 
18 , 300 , 000 
23 , '700, 000 
l 0 , 80 J , OOO 
5,60 0 , 000 
6 , 500 , 000 
1 36 , 0 00 , 0 00 
;· 9 ) 200 , oo, ooo 
1 939 
~· ·; 10 , 500 ' 000 
300 , 000 
4 , 000 , 000 
1 9 , 900 , 000 
34, '700 , 000 
15 , 900,000 
90 , 200 , 000 
34, 600 , 000 
55 , 600 , 000 
59z OO Oz 000 
(~ 10 9 .2 600 l 000 
8 , 8 0 0 ,000 
8 , 800 , 000 
11,100 , 000 
2'7 , 500 , 000 
1, '700 , 000 
14 ,500, 000 
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5,600,000 
2 ,500 , 000 
3'7 , 900 , 000 
~) 109 ' 600 .! 000 
P AR1Ufi01JJ.\fT PI C'i'UFLG S 
1949 
GX'OSS Rec e ipts t,i l62 , 400 , 000 
Cost of Operations 
Operating Expenses 
Deprec i ation 
Genera l Administrative 
Expe nses 
Other Inc ome 
Total In come 
Oth el" De ductions 
F ederal In come Taxes 
Ne t Income After In c ome Taxes 
Pref e rred Dividends 
Comraon D:l vi dend s 
ReHJainder· f or Common 
8'7 ; 9oo;ooo 
34, 400 , 000 
25 , 200 , 000 
l4 , 9oo ; ooo 
1 4 ; soo; ooo 
29;700, 000 
1 , 900 , 000 
27 , 800 , 000 
7, ooo;ooo 
20, 8oo, oo6 
13 ,100 ~ 000 
?, Ffoo, ooo 
Su p p lementary Prof it and Loss Data 
Maintenan c e and Re pairs 
Deprecia tion , Dep l etion , and 
Amortization 
Taxes other t han F edera l Income 
Rents and Roya l ties 
Not stated 
4 , 900 , 000 
Not Stated 
Financial and Operating Ratios 
Earned Per Sh are --Preferred 
Comm on 
Dividends Per Share- - Preferred 
Common 
Ne t . ssets Per Sh are --Preferred 
Comm on 
Net Assets Pel" ~::n,ooo Funded Debt 
Net Curr en t Assets Per $ 1, 000 
Funde d Debt 
~ 3 . 20 
2 . 00 
21 .80 
~~ 7 , ooo . 00 
3 , 300 . 00 
1 939 
~~ 96 , 200 , 000 
61 , 100 , 0 00 
3,300 , 000 
29 , 600 , 000 
2; 2oo;ooo 
3 , 400 , 000 
5 ;600, 000 
2 , 300,000 
3 , 300, 000 
500 , 0 00 
2 , 800 , 000 
1,100 ,000 
400 , 000 
1 , 300 , 000 
1,200 , 000 
3 , 800, 000 
3 , 900, 000 
8 , 000 , 000 
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lst 2nd 
(~ 19 . 06; 
00 ~ 60 
6 . 00 
0.15 
473 . 00 
16 . 00 
'"~ 2, 8 00 . 00 
730 . 00 
0 . 60 
83 . 00 
Financial and Operating Ratios 
Cu~rent Assets ~ Current Liabilities 
% Cash and Se cu r i ties to Current Assets % I nven tory t o Curr ent Ass ets 
1s Ne t Current Asse ts to Net ·uorth 
~ Prop er ty Deprecj_a ted % Annual Depreciation to Gr oss Proper ty 
CaDi tal i z ation 
~& Lon g - r_rerm Deb t 
~ Preferred Stock 
~·6 Common Stock and S1U'plus 
Sales + Inventory 
Sales + Receivab les % Sales to Ne t Property 
% Sales to Total Asse t s 
~ ~ Net In come to Total Assets 
Pref e rred Dividend t im es E arned 
% Ne t Income to Net Wor th 
.~alysis of Operation 
~ otal Op eratin g Reve nue s 
Operating Expe nse 
Depreciat i on 
Ope r ating Profit 
Other -ncome 
Total Income 
Interest Expense and Ot h er Deductions 
Balan ce 
Federal I ncome Taxe s 
Net Income Af t er Taxes 
1949 
5 . 20 
52 .10 
39 . 70 
54 . 50 
41.30 
3 .70 
14.24 
85 . '76 
4 . 30 
20 . 60 
206 . 30 
80 . 80 
10. 40 
14 .60 
Clf 
.2. 
100 . 00 
90 . 80 
9 .20 
9 . 10 
18 . 30 
1. 20 
1'7~10 
4 . 30 
12 . 80 
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1939 
3 . 90 
31 . 00 
57 . 40 
40 . 50 
38 .40 
4 . 20 
35 . 60 
20 . 20 
44 .20 
4 . 8 0 
24 . 00 
1'73 . 00 
8 '7 . 80 
2.50 
2 . 30 
4 .30 
d 
; 0 
--
100 . 00 
97 . ?0 
2 . 30 
3 . 50 
5.80 
2 . 40 
3.40 
. 60 
2 . 8 0 
Pal~amoun t Pictures 
This c ompany's ass e ts have i ncreased by 83 per-
cent s i nce 1939 , its current assets h ave increased by 
274 percent, vvhi le its net p rope1•ty has increased by 41 
pe l~ cent . Althoug h t h e inventory ha s d oubled dtu•in g t his 
period, t h e per cent of inven tory to current assets has 
dropped from 57 percent in 1939 t o 40 p er•cent in 1 949. On 
t h e oth er h an d , cash p lus securi ti e s h as :lncrease d from 31 
percent to 5 2 percent of t h e current assets :t n 1 949 . This 
p laces t he c ompany in an e x ceedin g ly liquid p os i ti on tod ay 
even thou gh the net property and inventory have increased . 
The cap itali zat i on of t h e c omp any has underg one 
a decided ch an g e in t h e ten - year period since the long -term 
de" t has decreased from 36 pel~ cent in 1939 to 14 percent 
in 1 949 ioiThi l e t h e preferred s tock , whi ch formed 20 percent 
of t h e capi tal in 1 939 , was c ompletely called in . This , 
of course, l' esulted in an increase of t h e comm on stock and 
sut•p lus to 86 percent of t h e c api talization as c ompared to 
only 44 per cent i n 1 939 . Also t h e low funded deb t ratio of 
1 4 percent reveals t hat t h e burden of fixed ch arge s wi ll not 
be too heavy in t he fu ture. Fixed charges were earned 3 . 32 
times in 1 93 9 but as a result of debt reducti on, t h ey were 
ea~ned at t h e very high level of 67 . 41 t ime s in 1949 . This 
i s one of t~J.e b est f i nanc 1 a l aspects of t h e corn) any . 
Sales increased 69 percent from 19 39 to 1949 but 
contrary to t he usual course cost of operations did not 
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i ncreas e pr op or t i ona t ely vith the resu lt t hat t~e comn a ny 
s h owed a l arg e profi t in 194 9 to t h at of 1939 . The o er -
at i ng expense s of 1 939 were 97.7 p er cent of t h e tot al op er-
at in g revenues wl:.i le in 1949 t h is r a t i o h a d droppe d t o 90 . 8 
p ercent . Th e result i s t hat t h e c ompany h a d a n ope r a t in g 
pr of~ t of 9 . 2 per cent a s c ompare d t o only 2 . 3 p er cent in 
193 9 . The net in come after Federal tax es was 12 . 80 n er> -
cent, a treme ndou s in cre a se over 2 . 80 per> cen t in 1939 . 
The earnin g s per share of c omr'l on were ~::> 3 . 20 in 
1949 bu t 7e r e only 60 cents ) er sha~e i n 1 939 . Divid en d s 
to comm on -~vere ::)13,100,000 i n 1949 but were only ')400 , 000 
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in 1 939 . Th l s dividend sti ll l eft a remain der f or> c omm on or 
s u r p l us of ~7 ,700 ,000 in 1949 . Net as se ts p er 0 1,000 funded 
d e b t have a l most trebled t hat of 1 939 wh i le net curr ent assets 
per :::n , ooo fund e d d e b t have i ncr ease d over f our t ime s , lar gely 
as a result of the reduction in t h e funde d debt an d t h e in -
er e a sed curr• en t ·o os i t i on of· t h e c ompany . 
' .1' ARNER BROTHERS PIC'I'URB S , I NCCRP ()RATE D 
AS OF AUGUSr.r 31 
Assets 
Cash 
Government and Marketable 
Securities 
Heceivables 
Inventorie s 
Total Current Assets 
Oth er Investments 
Gross Property 
Less Reserve f or Depre ciation 
Oth er Assets 
Total Assets 
Liabi lities 
Payabl es 
Total Current Liabi l ities 
Funded Deb t 
Other Li abilities 
Reserves 
Pr ef erred Stock of Wholly Owned 
Conpany 
Cumulative Px•eferl'"'ed ( Par) 
Common Stock ( Par) 
surp lus 
Total Liabi l i ties & Net Worth 
1949 
t~ 21 , 700 , 000 o.,P 
3,100 , 000 
2 , 400 , 000 
36 , 700, 000 
63,900,000 
5,200 , 000 
137 , 500 , 000 
51, 800 , 000 
85 , 700 , 000 
11, 400~000 
l66 .!200 z000 
16,000,000 
16, 000 , 000 
------
15, 800,000 
3 , 500, 000 
------
------
36 , 500 , 000 
94 , 400 2 000 
~~ 166.! 200 2 000 
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1 9 39 
('a 
',( 5 , 500 , 000 
2 , 000 , 000 
17 , 900 ,000 
25 , 400 , 000 
3 , 100,000 
1 48 ,200,000 
32 , 300 , 000 
115, 900 ,000 
24,200 , 000 
168 z600.!000 
16,800 .! 000 
1 6 , 800, 000 
59,200 , 000 
8 , 600 , 000 
400 , 000 
5 , 700,000 
19,000,000 
58 z 900z 000 
(; 168 ' 600 z 000 
Y·IA_BFBR BHOTJ-:lmS PI C'l'URii S , I NCORPORNl'El) 
CONDENS:GD CON SOLIDAT:J:D Cm.1PA..f1NrrVE TNCOI'.m AC COUNT 
Y.8AJ:W l!;NDi!;D AU GU ST 31 
Gross Receipt s 
Cost of Operations 
Operating Expenses 
Depreciation 
General Administrative 
:t:xpenses 
Other Income 
rrotal In come 
Other Deductions 
7 edera1 Income Taxes 
Net In come Af t er In co.ne Taxes 
Pr eferred Dividends 
Comm on D~- vidends 
Remain d er for Common 
1 94 9 
~~ 140 ' 900 , 000 
28 , 800 , 000 
96 , 20 0 2 ooo 
15 , 900, 000 
2 , 300 ~ 000 
--rn, 2oo ; ooo 
600 l 0 00 
17, 600, 000 
7 , 200 , 000 
10 , 400 , 000 
-----
7 2 300 2ooo 
3 2 100 2 000 
Supp lemen t ary Profi t and Loss Data 
~aint e nance and Re p airs 
Depreciation , Deple t i on , and 
Am orti z a tion 
•r a :::es other• than Federal Income 
Rents a nd Royalties 
1 , 900 , 0 00 
4 , 800 , 000 
4 , 900 , 000 
59 , 800 ~_ 000 
F1nanc4 al and Operating Rati os 
Earned Per Share --Preferred 
Comrnon f:5 1. 43 
Div: d en d s Per Share - -Preferred 
Common 1 . 00 
Net Assets Per Share-- Preferred 
Com11 0n 17 ~ 80 
Net Assets Pel" ~: ~a,ooo Punde d Debt$1.0 , 126 . 00 
Net Current Asse ts Per ~ji l ,OOO 
Funded Debt 3 , 400 . 00 
1 939 
'~>102 ' 100 ' 000 
23 , 700, 000 
71 2 700 2 0 0 0 
6 , '700 , 000 
300~_000 
7 , 000, 000 
4 , 600 ~_ 000 
2 , 400 , 000 
'700 , 00 0 
1 , 700 , 000 
-----
---... --
1 , 700~_000 
1 , 400, 000 
5 , 800 , 000 
5 , 200 , 000 
43 , 900 ~_ 000 
:::il6 ~ 98 
. 36 
814 .70 
20 . 20 
~~ 2 , 300 . 00 
140 . 00 
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Financial and Operating Hatios 
Current Assets + Current Liabil i tie s 
~ Cash and Se curitie s t o Current Assets 
% Inven t ory to Current Assets 
%Ne t Current Assets to Ne t Vorth 
~ Proper t y Depre ciat ed 
~ b Annual De pre ci at ion to Gr os s Prope 1~ty 
ca-oi tali za t ion 
~;s Long - Term Debt 
% Preferred Stock ;s CorrB on St ock and Surplus 
Sal es + Invent ory 
Sal es + Receivab les 
~ ~ Sales to Net P1"' opel"'ty 
~ ~ Sal es to '..L otal As se ts 
~ Ne t Income to To t a l As se ts 
~b Ne t In come to Net Horth 
Pr ef el"'l~ed Dividends rrimes Earned 
Analysis of Operati ng 
Total Operating Re venues 
Operating Expense 
De pre ci at i on 
Operating Profit 
Other I ncome 
'rotal In come 
Intere st Expense and Other Dedu ctions 
Balan ce 
Fede r a l Income Taxes 
Net Inc ome After Taxe s 
194 9 
4. 00 
38 . 8 5 
55 . 30 
36.60 
40 . 00 
3 .10 
9 . 8 0 
90 .10 
4 . 00 
58 . 50 
15 3 ~ 10 
84 . 80 
6 . 30 
8 . 00 
cY/ 
e 
100.00 
88 . 70 
11. 30 
L 60 
12 . 90 
.. 40 
12~50 
5 .10 
7. 40 
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1939 
1.50 
2 1. 80 
70 . 40 
10 . 30 
24 . 90 
3 . 40 
47 . 70 
3 . 80 
52 . 50 
5.70 
51 . 00 
78 .00 
60 .50 
1. 00 
2.10 
4 . 40 
% 
100 ~ 00 
93 . 50 
6 . 50 
. 30 
6 . 80 
4 . 40 
2 . 40 
. 70 
1. 70 
Wa rner Bro t h ers Pictu res , Incorporat ed 
This comp any 's assets h a ve decr e as ed by 1. 2 per-
ce n t since 1 939 bu t :!_ts c1.u•rent as se ts l:'J.ave increas e d 156 
per cent O'Jer t h at of 1 939 . Th e e x ceedin g ly l iqui d pos i t:ton 
of t he c om9any i s a r e su l t of i t s heavy cash p os ition of 
(: 2 1 milli on , whi ch is four t im es t h at of 1 939 . In a ddi t i on , 
t h e c ompany has over ;:!;3 mi l lion i n g overnment and ma1:k etable 
s ecur :!._ t ie s, v1.rhi le it had none in 1 939 . The i nventory h a s 
in cr e ased over 100 per cen t bu t so l iqui d i s t he comp any 
t h at t hi s has had l i ttle eff e ct. A sut•vey of t h e f ~_ns.ncial 
r at i os shows t h at cash and secu r i ties equaled 3 9 per cent of 
t l:'JB cu rrent assets i n 1 9 4 9 and on l y 2 2 percent in 1 9 3 9 . The 
percen ta~e of inve ntory to current asse ts h as ac t ually 
dropped 15 percent from t h e 70 p ercent of 1 939 . The net 
9roperty account h as decreased 29 p el"cen t dur i ng the p el"iod 
whi ch , a lons wi t h t he de crease of oth er ass e ts , h as l" e sulted 
in a decrease of total as s ets , a lth ou gh t h e cu rren t as s ets 
m o~e t h an d oubled . 
Dur ing t hi s t e n-ye a r period, t h e long - term d e b t 
has been reduced from 48 percent of cap i tal ~_zati on to 10 
pel.,c e nt . The pre f erred stock, wh l ch pre vi ously made up 
4: _i) e rcent of t h e cepl tal, has been comp letely called with 
12 9 
the o vrsrall result t h a t t h e p er cen ts.g e of c omr10n s tock and 
su:.,p lus to c s_pi tal h as i ncreased f rom 53 p ercent to 90 p er-
cent . Th e l ow percentag e of funde d debt is f ar be low t h e 
arb itr a r y ma x i mmo of 50 - 60 per cent a n d s hows l i ttle ch an c e of 
a h e a v-.r bur den u p on futur e e a rn i ng s . 
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Sales h ave incre ased by 37 p erc ent but at t h e 
san e t ime cost of operations, ·wh1 le increas2.n g , d1d n ot 
in crease ·orop orti onately an d t h e total :Lncome bef ore taxes 
mor e t h an doub l ed dur j n g the per1od . Th e total operat1n g 
profit i ncreased f rom 6 . 5 percent of tota l operating revenu es 
i n 1939 to 11.3 perc ent in 1949 . In s pite of t he Fe de ral in -
cone taxes heavy bu rden in 1949, t h e ne t i n come af t e r such 
tax es was a b out ten t im es g reater t han that of 1939 . T o be 
more s p ec i fi c, t h e net income after taxe s in 1949 was 7 . 4 
pe rcent of t he total operat in g revenues or an incr ease of 
5 . 7 percent over t hat of 1 939 . 
In 1 949 , t h e c ompany earned :::;1. 40 per. s h a r e of 
corm:J on a s compare d t o on l y 40 cents per share :tn 1939 . 
Di v:t d en d s pa i d co::nmon h olders i:vere :~~ 1 a s h are i n 194 9 and 
no d i vidends were paid in 1 939 . In s p i te of t h e di vi dends 
i n 1949, t h ere stil l :t ... ema i ned over ;·,_; 7 mi llion for surp lus . 
As a re sult t· of t h e debt re duct i on , net assets per ·.; 1 , 000 
fun d ed de b t in cre a se d five t i mes to ~~ 10 , 000 in 1949 wh i le 
t h e net cu r1,ent assets per (a , 000 funded debt i ncl,eased 
twenty-four t i mes to 0 3,400 1n 1 949 . 
T1.' .!.::NTIBTH C~~~TURY-FOX F TLlvl COHP Ol=tA'l'I ON 
AS OF DE CE L'IB.L;;R 31 
Assets 
cash 
Gov ernDent and ~arke t ab le 
s ecu r i ti e s 
Re c ei va ~J les 
Inventol"ie s 
Total current Assets 
Oth er Investments 
Gr oss Property 
Less Reserve for Depreciation 
Ot h er Assets 
Total Assets 
Liabi l ities 
Payab les 
Total Current Liabili t ie s 
li'unde d Debt 
Ot~er Liabi lities 
Reserve s 
Preferred Stock of ~holly 
Owned Companies 
Cmnulative Preferred ( 
Coumon Stock ( Par) 
SUJ:p l us 
Par) 
Total Liabilities and Net 
YJorth . 
cl \ 
'H' 
1 949 
3'7 , 000 ,000 
'7,500,000 
'7 ,100, 000 
59,000 ,00 0 
110 , 600 ,000 
8 , 50,) , 000 
8 3, 800, 000 
32 , 000 , 000 
51, 800 , 000 
1, 800,000 
1'72~700 ,000 
2'7 , 400 , 000 
27,400 , 000 
4 , 800 , 000 
25,100,000 
6,100,000 
) 
7,500 , 000 ) 
) 
) 
) 
32,00 0 , 000 ) 
69,800,000 
~~ 172 , 700,000 
(.\ 
1,.' 
1939 
8 ,100, 000 
2 , 500,000 
20,300,000 
30 , 900 ,000 
14, ~-100 ' 000 
2 ~3 ' 300, 000 
9 , 700 , 000 
12,600 , 000 
400 , 000 
58 2 800z.OOO 
4 , 500 , 0 0 0 
4,500 , 000 
900 ,000 
1, 300 , 000 
15, 900,000 
36,200 ,000 
~)58 ' 800 ' 000 
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COND •'NS:l.!; D COl>: S OL T: DNT'ED CU!·'IP.t-\RA'l'T './E Tl'JCOl'Ji: ACC OUNT 
YEAR S 1m DED D:CC:SiviB£R 3 1 
Gross Receipts 
Cost of Ouerations 
Operatin 0 ~.::xpen s e s 
De pre c i a ti on 
General Adm5_nistrati ve 
Expense s 
Other In come 
'l1 o t a 1 In c om e 
Ot 1.er Deductions 
F ederal ~ncome Taxe s 
Net Income 1 f t e r Ta xe s 
Preferred Dividends 
Comn on D:i_ vidend s 
Re J.lainder for Common 
1949 
c:pl 69 ,500 , 000 
64 , 900 , 0 0 0 
2, 900 , 000 
90 , 700 , 000 
158 , 500,000 
11,000 , 000 
13 , 400 , 000 
24 , 400 ,000 
4 , 800,000 
1 9 , 600 , 000 
7,200 , 000 
12,400, 000 
Goo; ooo 
5 , 50 0,000 
6 ,300, 000 
Suppl ement ary Profi t and Loss Da t a 
Mainten ance and Repai rs 
De p r e c i ati on , De p l e t ion , and 
Arn or ti zati on 
Taxe s o t her than Federal I ncome 
Rents an d Roya l tie s 
4 , 900 , 000 
3 , 8 0 0 , 000 
6,100 , 000 
7 , 300 , 000 
~inancial an d Operating Ratios 
~~ 1. 5 0 Conv . Pr . 
Earned Per Share --Pref erred $84 . 50 & 
Comm on 
Dividends Pe r Share --Pr efe rred 
Con . Pfd . 0 1.50 & Pri or 
Pfd . 
Common 
Net Assets Per Share--Pre f erred 
Comm on 
Net Curr a n t Ass e ts Per 0 1, 000 Funded Deb t 
Net As sets Pe r ~) 1, 000 Funde d Debt 
1 939 
t 
.;'55 , 800,000 
12, 900 , 0 00 
38 , 400 , 000 
4 , 500,000 
4 ,500 , 000 
4 , 500,00 0 
300,000 
4,200,000 
1, 400 , 0 0 0 
1,70 0 , 000 
1,100 ,000 
700, 000 
1,100,000 
1, 800 , 000 
500 , 000 
Prior Prfd . 
(~ 166. 70 
4 . 28 
4 .50 
1. 50 
2 , 200 . 00 
35 ~ 00 
74 . 50 
4 . 97 
!~s 4 . 48 
·· 1.58 
1. 50 
1. 00 
56 . 30 
11.30 
T\- ..;; jJTI-:.-c;TH Cl_I;N'l1URY- FOX :nu :1 C0.1PO:i1A'P·roN 
Financial and Operating ~ati os 
Current Assets + Current· Li abili t ies 
~ ~ Cash and Secur i ties to Curr ent Assets 
j& In,ven t ory to Current Assets % Ne t Current Assets to Net ~brth 
% Property Depreciated % Annua l Depreciation to Gross Property 
Capi tali ze.ti on 
~& Long - 'rerm Debt 
% Pre_erred Stock 
~~ Comrn on Stock and Surplus 
Sales +Inventory 
Sales +Re cei vables 
~ Sales to Net Property 
~ Sales to Total Assets 
~ ~ Net In come to Total Assets 
~ ~ Ne t In come t o Ne t rv·or th 
?referred Di vidends Time s Earned 
Px·ior Pfd . 
Analysis of Opera t ion 
Total Ooerating Re venues 
Operatin g ~xpen se 
Depre c i at i on 
·operat ing Profit 
Ot l1.er In come 
Total In come 
Interest ~xpense and Other Deductions 
Balance 
Federal In come Taxes 
l'Je t Income Af t er Taxes 
1949 
4.03 
40 .20 
49 . 66 
'76.00 
38 . 20 
4 . 50 
20 .12 
9 . 09 
'70. 8 0 
3 .10 
23 . 70 
327.40 
98 .10 
7 . 20 
11.40 
36 .40 
55 . 40 
r;f 
e. 
100 . 00 
93 . 50 
6 . 50 
7 . 90 
14.40 
2 . 20 
12.20 
4 . 30 
7 . 90 
) 
) 
) 
1 939 
6 . 8 0 
2 6 . 30 
65 . 60 
50.60 
43 . '70 
5 . 10 
100 . 00 
2 . 66 
21 . 40 
428 .10 
91 . 40 
7 . 20 
8 . 10 
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3 . 04 
<Jj, 
,o 
100 ~ 00 
92.00 
8 .00 
. 20 
8 . 20 
8 . 20 
. 60 
7 . 60 
'T'vventieth Century- P ox Fi lm Corporat:ton 
The ass e ts of t his company i ncr e ased 193 percent 
during t he past d ecade wh:i_ le t h e current assets i ncre ased 
26? per cent . Cash and securities of' t h e company to current 
assets i ncreas ed from 26 pex•cent ln 1 93 0 t o 40 percent in 
1 949 , whi l e t h e in ventory to current assets decreased f rom 
134 
66 pe rcent t o 50 percent. The net p roperty of the c ompany 
:in creased over four t i mes to a total of ~51,800 ,000 in 1 949 . 
Hmvevel'', in s pi te of t he increase of Government an d marketable 
securitie s from n i l i n 1 9 3 9 to ~!:i 7 , 500 , 000 in 1 949 , t h e com-
pany's current ratio droppe d from 6 . 80 to 4 . 03 in 1949, but 
th:!.s l a t tet' ratio i s s t i ll adequate . The d r op wa s c aused 
by t h e marked increase of current liabili t ies by six times 
its arnount of ~·.~ 4 , 500 , 000 in 1 939 . 
Un l ike the oth er moti on pi cture c om ·oanies , t h e 
funde d d eb t of this c omp any increased from n i l in 1 9 39 to 
;;A, 800 , 000 in 1 949 or 20 percent of the caui talizati on . In 
1 949 , preferred sto ck make s up 9 . 0 9 percent of t he capital 
whi le c omm on s tock and sur p lus make up 70 . 80 percent . Al-
thoug~ t he debt has be en in cr eas ed to 20 percent of t he 
capi tal , it is s till f a r below t he arbitrary maxi mum of 50-
60 percent and should not be too mu ch of a bur d en for futu re 
earn in g s . 
Net sal es increased 204 percent dur in g t his ten -
year per :!.. od, but in t he case of thi s com:;>any, operat:i.ng costs 
ros e mor e t han !)ropor t i onat e ly wi t h t h e re sult t h at t h e 
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ope r ating profit was 6 . 5 per cent of total operating revenues 
COL1p a re d to 8 . 00 pe rcent i n l <J39 . However, the o t her :tncome 
account in cl" eased to (;13,400 , 000 in 1 949 from nil in 1 939 , re -
sulting in a ne t in come before taxes b e ing •:a9 , 600,000 or 
alr.10st five t i mes as much as t h at of 1939. In ter!:!J S of per-
cents, t h is was a total in come of 14 . 4 percent of total oper-
atin g revenues comp ared to 8 .2 percent in 1 939 , out interest 
expense and l"ederal in c ome taxes brought down t h e ::')el"cent of 
operatin g pl"ofi t to almost equal terms --7 . 9 per cent in 1 949 
a nd 7.60 per cent in 1939 . 
The return on the stockholder ' s investment was 
11. 4 oer cent in 1949 as a s a i ns t 8 . 10 percent in 1 939. The 
eal:' n inr::; s per sbar e of con vel"ti b l e preferred we :re {~84 . 50 and 
fo:c~ prior p r·eferred ·.:· 166.70 in 1 949 as a~ainst ~::> 4 . 48 per 
s h are of preferred i n 1939 . The earn i ng s per s h are of common 
were fp 4 . 28 in 1949 but were only ~:.> 1.58 per shru"' e in 1939, an 
in cr e ase de s pi t e the increase d debt . The divi den d s oer 
s h are of convertible preferr ed and prior preferl'ed were 
0 1 . 50 and 0 4 . 50 respe ctively comuared to a dividend of $ 1.50 
in 1 939 . The common dividend per shm~e rose only to ';:n .5o in 
1949 compared to a 0 1 dividend in 1 939 . The remainder after 
dividen d s was 0 6,300 ,000 in 1949 or a lmost s ix t ime s that of 
1 939 . 
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Ta b le No . X reveals the statistical posi tion of 
t h e stocks of a repr e s en tative g r oup of co~) ani e s of t he 
motion pi ctUl•e indus try . Th~ s tabl e g i ves a c le arer com-
p arat ive analysis of t h e po s i t ion of t h e stocks of each 
c om9 any rather t han an i ndi vidual survey of each se l ec t ed 
cor:1 p any . Special emphas is will be stl"essed u p on the com -
panie s alre ady an a lyzed : name ly; Loew ' s, Par amount, 'I1wen-
tieth Centruy- F ox, and Warner Brothers. ':I..'h ese c omp anies h ave 
a l ready been a n a lyzed f i nancially and h ave b e e n s hown to b e 
in e x cellent f i nancial p osit i on . 
I n the case of Loew 1 s , t h e earn ing s per s h are of 
com 110n were ~~ 1. 53 in 1950 a n d a re cent pr i c e of ~) 16 g ives a 
pr•i ce earnin g s ratio of 10. The ~~ 1.50 divide nd on c om_ on 
g i v e s a current yield of 9 . 4 per cent, whi ch might be rated 
as highl y s p e cu l a tive but cons i d e r ing the strong as se t po ai -
tion of the com p any alr e a dy revealed by its f inan ci al ana l..;, 
y s is , t he common stock of Lo ew 1 s may be rate d as of t h e pre -
sent t ime a g ood s pe cu l a tive purch ase . 
F or t h e ye ar 1 950 , Parrunount Pi ctures h a d an 
eaJ:' n i ng s pe r share of com~non of :') 3, ·whi ch w1 t h a recen t 
pr ice of 821 g ave a pr1ce e arning s ratio of 7. rn ., • • _,_ 1.e QJ. VJ. -
den d s p er s h ar·e of c omlrl on at (~ 2 f or 1 950 g ave a current 
yie l d of 9 .5 per cent at t b.e p r i ce of .:~, 21. Thi s yie l d of 
9 . 5 p el"cent 1a i ght als o a~·:near to b e h i ghly s :oeculative but 
t he s tX' ong f i nanc i a l p os i t 1 on of the c om;any make s th1s s tock 
dec1ded ly u n de r pr i ce d and a n e xcellent s Deculat i ve purchase . 
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Twentieth Ce ntUl~y-Fox had a n earn i ng s per s h are 
of conEn on fo r t he ye ar 1950 of ~2 . '75 , wb ich when us e d :L n 
conjun ction with a recent price of $ 20 g ives a price earning s 
ratio of '7 . The ~2 dividend for 1950 derives a yield of 10 
percent at the same price of Ji20. Considering t h at th:;.. s com-
pany p ossesses one of the l arges t production facil i ties of 
a ll the moti on pi cture com~o anies a nd t h a t a most recent anal-
ysis s h ows t h e comp any to be in a fair ly strong f :tnancial 
position , the yield of 10 p ercent appears to ~e too h igh and 
t h e stock rated as under pr i ce d . 
r. arnel" Brothers eai' ned : ~ 1. 46 per s h are in 1 950 
and a recent pl"i ce of ~.>11 '7 /8 g ave a pr i ce earn i ng s ratio of 
8 . Th e divide nds per s h are of 01 g ives a y i eld of 8 . 4 per -
cent. This yi eld cannot be cons idered as s:peculative when 
it c a n be p o:lnt ed out that Wal,nel" Brot~1.er s i s i n e xce llent 
fi n ancia l c ondi tion . It s h ould be f urther p oin te d out t h a t 
the s h o.rp re du ction of t h e f un d e d debt fl"orn 48 p e l"cen t of 
capi talization to 10 p ercent dur i ng t he past ten ye ars will 
inul"e to the b enefit of the common stockh olders . I n addition , 
a recent analysis s b.ows v·a:t'ner Brothers to be in an exceeding l y 
li quid p osition w'.:.l.i le s a les h ave in creased 37 percent during 
the p ast ten years but the operat ion ratio did not increas e 
propol'ti onately, result i ng in an i ncreased profi t margin . 
In the c as e of t h e oreferred stock~ not too much 
em-;hasis wil l be p lace d U]) on this type of secur i ty. The 
shor tcomi ng s of such secur i ties al"e too well k nown to need 
re~e t i t i on here and i t shou l d be no te d by re fere nce to 
Table No. that t he pre f erred of t he smaller co~9anie s 
such as Co lumbia, Repub lic , and Uni v ex•sal offer much 
hi s her yie lds t han that of the more stable larg e companies 
such as t i:J e t wo i ssues of Twentieth Century- F ox . The cur-
r en t yield of Co lumbia's ~) 4 . 25 pref erred wa s 6 . ? percent; 
Universal ' s ;'\A . 25 prefex•red ·was 7 . 6 pe r cent; and Republic 's 
yie ld on it s :.~ 1 convertible prei'er.'r'ed was 10 . 1 pex•cent. On 
t h e other hand , Twentieth Century-Fox's :)4 . 50 pr-eferred 
yielded t h e exact same rate of 4 . 50 percent, but t h e ~~ 1 . 50 
conve rtib le preferred was more speculative and yielded 
4 . 4 pel~cent. 
A re c a pitulat ion of t h e position of the l e ading 
stocks of the motion pi ctUJ~ e compan i es would seem to reveal 
t h at, in c on s i deration of the present financial condition 
of t-~ese ma jor companies and in vie -v  of t h eir present 
ea.J~nin g s as compar ed to that of the war years ( or:1i tting 
1 946 as unusual), the common stock of t h ese companies has 
been decidedly underpr i ce d . At t h e present pr ice s, the 
purchase of t he common stock of t h e strong er fino.!lc ially 
secure c or1manies could be r a te d as a wise sneculative move . 
However, the pux•pose of this c:1.apter wa s to re-
veal t h e fi nancial c ondi tion of t he ~ajar com9anies and to 
note whe t her :eecent bus 5 .. ness cond:Lt :I.ons and trends in the 
industry have b.ad a de t eri ora t i ng ef fe ct upon any c mnilany . 
Since the ma jor c orapanj_es are shown to b e in fa i rly sound 
positions f i nancially, t he succeed:'L ng chap ter wi ll a ttempt 
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to l~evea l, araon0 oth er t h:i.n ,,. s , why the i ndustry has b een 
underso l d and whe t h er t he future of t he r.1ot ion ~'):i.c ture 
industry is as dark as has been pain t ed for t he past 
s eve1~a1 yea1~ s . 
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CT{L PTBR VIII 
SUMIJIA.~.-qy AND CONCLCTS I ONS 
Bef ore arri ving at any conc l usions c oncern inR the 
fi n anc i a l status of t h e mo t ion pictur·e i ndus t ry, it wi ll be 
necessary to g ive a bl"ief review a nd s1.unro ary of t h e purp oses 
and aims of t hi s report . At t he outset it was sta te d t hat 
the pu r p ose of t he report was t o reveal t he present condi-
tion of t h e i ndustry by an analysis of i ts past and present 
fin a n cial hi story with an aim of es t abli s hing i ts po s i t ion 
i n the future . It shou ld be p ointed out that it was no t 
stated that the industry wa s either in g ood or bad condi -
t ion and an attempt t h ereby made t o prove t he statemen t true 
either way, but t he pur p ose, rath er , wa s to analyze t h e in -
dus try i n -,J oth pas t e_nd present and t h en a r r i ve a t the c on -
clus i on . By t hi s method , the report was not biased either 
way until an overall surv e y crru l d be made and a conclusion 
could be arrived at whi ch was n o t ~-nf luenced by a pre -
j uds e d op i n i on . In other words , if t he opi n i on h ad bee n 
stated at t h e b eg : nnin g t h at t h e mo t i on plcture in dustry 
was in a poor condition, t her e would have b een a tenden cy 
to h ave ob se r ve d a ll t h ose fac tors wh ich tended t o -orove 
t h=._s poin t an d to ami t t t10se fac t ors whi ch mi 0 h t p oss ibly 
bring a diff erent c onclus i on. In addi t ion , it mi ght a p pe a r 
that in order to es t ab lish t h e financ~al condi t ion of any 
indus try , it would be on l y nece8se.ry to consult industrial 
r ating r anuals and t he tren d of the fi n ancia l statemen ts 
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of t h e c ompanies of t h e industry , but many aut h or i ties 
po~nt out t h at t h e fin a ncial statemen ts form only one as-
·~i­pec t of s u ch a survey. 
Eautens t rauch in hi s INDU S':i:'IUAL S1L VJ!,YS Al!D RE -
PORTS st a tes t hat in the present state of na t ional and 
wo::-old economics, no one c a n f oJ.: ec Hst wi th any de '>·ree of 
accuracy the condit i ons of busine s s enterprise ten years 
from now or for any a ppr e ci able t im e in t h e :Lu ture. ~<--:~ 
However , in orde r to determine as accu r ate l y as possibl e 
the ) resen t and fu ture cond i t ion of a n i ndustry, it would 
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be necessary to g ive a brief his t ory of t h e ent i re :ndustry, 
a :1is tory of each of the major com,Jan i es of t h e i n dus try, 
a t~eneral survey of the industry, an ana l y sis ·of t~1.e d e gr e e 
of cmrme t i t ion i n t he i ndustry, the business and f i !1ancial 
po l i c ies , and f i n a lly t he analysis of t h e financial st a te-
ments of t he major com ~o anie s. Such a survey g ives a more 
r e alistic and sound viewp oint of a n indus try rather t han the 
mex>e f i nancial stat emen ts, t h e r e li abil:i. ty of wh: ch may be 
e a s i l y inf luenced by the accountin r; practices of the 1ndustry . 
I t is now p oss ible to analy ze and note h ow these 
hi storic factors have affected t he i ndustry . I n t h e first 
p lace, it shoul d be noted that t he mo tion pi ctures h a ve not 
al'.vays had a long , smooth risin ,; r oad of success character -
ized b y large p lateaus of prof i ts and pros per i ty, but rather 
t he opposite cas e h as been true. As t h e novel effect of t h e 
~~ 1, P • 41. 
~H<- l, P • 36 .. 
n icke lodeon wore off, the publ i c b e g an to t i re and p rofits 
drop ped but were prom .; tly r e stored and e xo an d ed as D. F . 
Griffiths , Ad olph Zukor, and others brought i n the four -
r·ee l long features . Onc e rnor e after ~. J orld 1r ar I , profi ts 
and s a les dropped but wer e restore d by t h e introduction of 
soun d . During t h e depression , t he movies alons '!v5.th a ll 
oth er i n dustries , suffered severe setbacks p artly b ecause 
of t h e current bu siness condi t ions and partly oecause of 
p oor f inan cial p ol:lc i es pursued durin g t h e b oom years of 
t he lat e t wenties . Th is era too was followed by incre ased 
ous in ess as the war boom of 'J orld V"tar -I b egan to be felt 
and v!Tas finally cul min at e d i n t he peak years of 1946 and 
1947 . Once mor e t h e ye ars of hi g h profits were supp l anted 
by years of lower pr ofi ts and even deficit s, but thi s t j_me 
t h e mo vie s were f orce d to contend wi t h a new form of com-
pe t i t ion --televi s i on. The close of t he war li f te d all 
restr i ct :l ons u p on domes t ic tele v:i. s i on product ion, but i t 
was not unti l s everal year s l a t e r t ha t t h ey cou ld be p laced 
economically u p on t he market. Th e hom e sets came ou t a t 
ap~)roximate ly the same t ime as movie pr or ts be g an to dip 
and ins tantly ana lysts, botb expe:r•t and inexp erienced, cor-
r•ela t ed t~1e decline of one industry with the r:i..se of another 
c omp etiti ve rival . Reams of art :i.c les wel''e Wl"'itten, too 
nun e r ous t o men t ion here , stating t h at televi s i on h ad ar-
rived, peop le wer e tired of movi ng pi ctures, the drop in 
movie pr ofi ts was p erman ent, and tele v i s i on was the :lndustry 
of t he future • -.~ 
* 11, p . 36 (1316). 
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But as l a t e as March of 1949 it was st a te d by 
Mr. Pau l Rai bourn, Vi ce-President of Pa.r>a:moun t Pictures 
and Direc tor of DuMont La borator j_es, a tel ev:l.. s i on company, 
t h at after numerous s t udie s, t h e effect of t elevision 
upon t h e motion pi cture industry coul d no t be determin e d . ->~ 
Ot h er wri te :e s conn_Jared the advan t of t e l e vision t o that of 
t~1.e radio a n d state d that it would serve to compleme nt the 
motion pict ure industry. This statemen t was made by 
Mr . Spyros K. Skouras , Pres:!.dent, Twent i eth Century- F ox 
gi l m Corporat ion, who went on t o p oi nt ou t t hat television 
was t he g r eat e st impetus t o the i n dus t ry s~nce the adven t 
of sound . ->~-:~ Mx· . Skoura s c onclude d that the :i.ndustry still 
had headaches in f ront of i t but t bat as t h e market for 
tele v i sion set s i ncrease d so wou l d t h e d emand for n ew 
movies and t h en mo t ion pic ture, radio , and televi s ion wo,.:t l d 
b e one . 
Another fac t or , i n a ddi t i on to that of televi si on , 
wa .s pu t for t h as a contributin g force to t he dm'Vntr•end of 
moti on picture secur i ties and profits and t h i s was t h e anti -
trust s uit i ns t i t uted by the g over nment , whi ch fina lly cul-
minate d in t he di vorce of produc t i on and dis tribution f r om 
exhib i t i on. :.t:xhibi t i on vvas alwe.ys c onsidere d t o b e t h e 
• os t profitable part of t h e i n dus try and i t was reason e d 
tha t if t h e ma jors we l"e separated fl"om t h e ir exhibi t ion t h en 
~~ 11, p . 36 (1316) . 
** 12, p . 8 (164). 
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they too would s u .L f er the fate of Co l u..111bia and TJn2.versal , 
'Nho we ~r e only producers and distributors and never expe~C' -
ienced the l arg e p rofits of majors because of thei:c· lack 
of exh ibition f ac i l i ti es . It has alrea ~y been stated t ha t 
bc~ ore t h e dissolution to ok p l ace , the bettinG was t h at 
whex•e the executives of a ll com}anies wel"e forced to choose 
between , reduction and d istribution and eJ~ibi tion, t h e 
belief was that most would t akt'J exh::_bi tion because of its 
~: 
relatively greater profi ts. This wa s t h e short-term view-
poi nt a nd t h e executives took the long- ter111 view·point by 
choosing :oroduction . 'l'he " ajor executives realized t h at 
televi s ion was the greatest com ,e t itor to exhibition and 
t hat -· n t h e long run, outside of s portin g events and n ajor 
polit i c a l occurrences, televi s i on '.ias only a new method of 
distr:lbution and would always require pictures to supp le-
me ·1t 1whatever other fo rm of entertainment it p ossessed . 
The choice of t h e major executive s more than substantiated 
the fact that i t wa s t h eir belief that the i ndustry was 
·~ oin 2; t hrough a cy clical ch an g e i n which it wou l d emerg e as 
sti ll a top producer of enter tai nment in t h e Un~te d States . 
The major e xecutives' choi ce wa s correc t s:;_n ce it was u r oven 
by t he s ood showin g financia lly of Co l umbia and Universal 
in 1949 that -oroduc tion and dis tribution wi thout t h e owner -
... 't..~~ 
ship of t h eaters could be rofitable . n" 
18 , p . 26. 
~H~ 1 3 , P • 777. 
Hhen the British app l i ed the 75 pel" cent tax upon 
.Arner i c a n fi lms, t h e lmme d iate re a ction was that this too 
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would cause movie profi ts and sales to sli de i nto ob l ivion. 
l': ven t he con servative and renowned Br i tish :_oub l i c ation TFill 
:t;;CONOi.IIST in 1 u gust of 1 947 pointed out that t h e .Ame r ican 
comp an i es bare ly covered t h eir costs and overhead with a 
slight mar g in of pr ofit in their own domestic market and 
t h e tax woul d severely cut the United State s corr9anies' 
.. 
f . t ~~ pr o 2. s . The E COlifOl'E ST g ave no fac ts, fi gures, or charts 
to ba ck its statemen t but h ad evidently f igured t hi s result 
by c orn~arin g United States costs and profits wi t h t he pro-
fits de rived fr om Great Br it a in 's s howin g s of .tun erican 
film s . ThB ECONObiST fai led t o cons ider several bond~ t i ons 
whi ch might occur' in the i n dustry: 
1. The industry might cut costs. 
2 . The indus try ' s exports outs ide of Great 
Britain might increase and pay off. 
3. F oreig n c om:tJet i tj_on mi gh t drop . 
Pre c i s ely each one of t he se condi t ions occurred . 
In October of 19 4 9 :l t was p oin ted out t hat t b.e i ndustry was 
able and had a lready s u cceeded in cuttin g costs in an 11 AY 
picture by 20 p ercent to 40 percent.* The cut costs were 
achi eved at t h e expense of low-s a l arie d off~ce and cler i c a l 
workers. Large and expens ~ ve s cenes wer e e l iminated and 
i ncrease d e f f i ciency of operation lowere d t h e cost of over-
head . Hi gh salari ed pers onn el a nd sta ':' s were not a :ffected 
~r- 20 , p . 290 . 
-iHt- 1 4, p . 26. 
by t h e cuts since i t i s Hollywood ' s p oli cy t hat )i ctures 
arc a big - name indus try whose stars attract revenue b y 
... ' ~ 
re ·.Ju t a ti on ." 
Th e sec ond fac tor t h at t he i ndu stry ' s exports 
m1ght in cr e ase was :n ore t h an surpris i ng when it actually 
occu~red . Fr om 1 ~47, t h e y ear the tax went i nto effect , 
ove rseas e arn i ng s rose s t e a di ly t o such an e xtent t h at one 
1nernber of t h e i ndustry pre di cted t hat Hollywood ' s busine ss 
abroad would be almost doub l ed in the next five y e ar s . ->H~ 
In 1 949 t he g ross froD overseas operations pi led 0 210 mil -
lion high, whi ch ran :..{ s the mo vies as an e xpol"t 'Nel l a ·oove 
motor , f ue l, and g asoline , and n o t much below wood and 
pa:')er exp orts . -;HH(- Out of t h i s amount , f i lm c om ~Janies 
manag e d to carry back to the Un i ted States G90 million in 
dollal1 S . Some of t hi s came b ack t h rough regu l a:r• chan ne l s , 
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but much of i t even t u ally returned t h rourrh tortuous an d 
in ,; en ious deals negotiated to u nblock blocked balanc e s . -1H!--:H~ 
One c ompany l"ai sed a sunken tanker in Fr an ce and other com-
panies :::mrchased the products of the l and and t h en r eso ld 
t h em in the United Stat e s to obtai n do llars . 
->t- 14 , P • 28 . 
-lH!- 15 , p • 113 • 
-;HH~ 15' P • 113 . 
Ibid . 
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Actually t he dl~op in f oreig n com ::)e t :~ t :L on \'Ias t he 
most unexpec t ed factor whi ch g a ve Ar.1e r ican fi l m coml)a n ie s 
a -ori._:;~1ter view of the futur·e . By Au gus t of 1 950 t h e 
o.l.:' ~'- tish c om;)eti t ion seem e d to have d issolve d . Fi rst , t tere 
1Nas a 10 :9 er cent cut in t h e quota of Br :i_ t i s h f~ lm s t ha t 
must be shown on Br i t i s h screens ; sec ond , t her e was an 
announcemen t b y t h e g overnment ' s F ilm l~' inan c e C Ol~p ol~a t~_on 
t ha t it was run ni ng ou t of ftm ds for subs i di zin g t !1e in-
dustry ; an d t hi rd , J. Ar t hur Rank ' s Pinewood studio ,,vas s hut 
down. Tc1e Br i t i s h , alon g \Vi t h othe r cou n t ries , beli eved 
t hat t h ey cou ld cut t he quota of Un ited States film s and 
malce up t he b alance by dome stic production . Other coun tri es 
h avi n g t he same idea j umped into moti on picture maki n g wi t h 
t he i dea of l ar 0 e profits in vi e w. But n one had reck oned 
with t he main ob j ect of the production and t hat was t h e end 
pr odu c t whi ch was to be exhibi ted . The avera g e forei g n 
pl~odu c t , with t h e e x ce p t ion of ce .l: t ain fe a tures, could no t 
.. 
con;0ete ni th that developed by the Un ited St ates .'·~ The 
quality of t h e film s k e p t t h e au diences at a rn:!nimu_rn . 
Th e noted British producer , J. Arthur Rank, fam ous 
f or h i s individua l productions of high cal~ber , attemp ted to 
double his produc t i on i n 1 947 wi t h t he l"esult t hat whe l" e hj_ s 
films h ad been haile d as few but precious ma ster pie ces , tb~y 
were n ow mere duds a t t h e box office . The Fr ench h a d the 
pe cu l i ar e~p erience t h a t t h eir pr odu ction was insuff! c i ent 
to f i ll up a ll t he e :zhibi t ion t ime of t h eir t h eaters and as 
·~t- 15 , P • 114 . 
a resu lt are neg otiatin g wi t h United Stat e s -or oducers for 
mm:e f i l ms. E ven in Ita l y w·he re t he d omesti c r::_ l m indu stry 
h as be en revived , t he A..rneri can fi l ms c ont inue to outdraw 
149 
i ts own pr oduction s. Th e forei g n e x cb.a nge quota reg ula t i on s 
h ave had t ··!.e effect of forc i ng .f:l.rn e r i can pr odu cers t o g o o ver-
s e as fol" pr oduction , but t h e r·e 5.s a n o t her nwre L _ _)ortant 
reas on a n d t h at i s t h e c ost of producin g lar g e - sc a l e films 
i n t h e Uni ted States . ll' e atul''e pictuJ:es such as "Ki ng 
Solomon 1 s I:Ii ne s," 11 Kim , 11 and 11 Q,uo Vadis 11 were made abroad 
not only f or t h eir natura l effects but a ls o b ec ause of t h e 
lal., !:O: B am ou nt of ext r a s requi red 'Nh ose labor c osts i n the 
Un ~ te d States wou l d b ave been prohibitory . 
A brief his tory of each comp any h a s a l ready been 
given to~e ther wi t h a financ i a l analysi s of t h e stateme n t s 
of t h e ma j or c omp an:les . It is n o t t r.. e ·)ur -oose he r e t o r· e -
a n a lyz e t1.e statements of t h e comp anies bu t r a t~1.e r to p oint 
out t h e i m::. ort nnt fac t o:c s wh :i. cb. re veal t hat t h e . aj ors are 
in g o o d. con di t ion des pite t h e long per:tods of p oor busin ess. 
In t h e c a se of Paramount Pictu.l"c s , ne t 1ncome after tax es 
increased from (~ 2 . 8 million i n 1 93 9 t o :') 20 . 8 in 1949 . This , 
of c our s e, was a drop from the peak year of 1 9 47 vvhen n et 
income af t er taxes wa s ~ ·.i 39 . 2 mi llion but was still g r eater 
thHn the t hree war years ~)revi ous to 1 947 vhe n t e net i n-
c o:Je av e rage d ;~ 15 mi lli on i n 1 943, 1 944 , an d 1945 . The p e r-
centag e of n e t in c om e to n e t wor t h 'NBs 14 . 6 ~oe x• cent or over 
10 p er cent ~rest er t han t ha t of 1 9 3 9 . Usin g t h ese fi gu r e s 
in c on j unc tion wi t h t h ose a lre ady z i ven in t he prece di n g 
chap ter , it can b e re v e a led t 1 at thi s connany i s in an ex-
cellent f i nancial cond i t ion . 
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The experience of Harner Brothers , ; n so far as 
n e t in c om e afte1~ tax es i s c on cern ed, di rectly parallels t h a t 
of ? ar am ount . In 1 93 9 t h e ne t :1.. ncorne before t axes v as ~;a.7 
mi ll i on and i n 194 9 had i ncreased to ) 10.4 mi lli on . The 
years 1 946 and 1947 were t he p eal{ ye ars at ~· 1 9 . 4 and ::~ 22 .1 
milli ons res l)ectively, but 1949 1 s net ~- nc om e :t s still hig h er 
t han t h at of any of t he t h ree prece din g war years. In oth er 
words, dur i n g t h e war years no one was p_edi ctin ~ t h e col-
lap se of t h e industry when i ts in come ave r a g e d b e t ween 6 
and 9 :million and yet t hi s com~o any' s most r ec e nt net :..n corn e 
ni ~ure i s greate r t han any of the war years e x cludin G 1 946 
and 1947 . Th e percent of net income to ne t wor t h wa s 8 or 
approximate ly t wi ce t hat of 1 9 39 . 
The c a se of Twentieth Century- F ox is siui l ar to 
t hat of the t v.ro ·or e cedi n g c omp anies wi t h t h e exce:ption that 
thi s c om Jany has maintai ned a steady f l c;ure of net in c om e in 
t he vicini ty of over 0 1 2 mi l li on ye arly wi t h the exce p tion 
of 1 946, whi ch, l ike al l oth er com 9 anies 1 exper ienc e s , v,ras 
the pea _ year of f? 22 . 6 milli on as n e t in come a f ter t axes . 
There f ore, t h e c om_Jany' s present f i g ure of :?12. 4 million ne t 
in come is as high as any of t he war years and pu ts the com-
p any in a s g ood a financia l cond~ tion as i t was a t t h e close 
of t !.1.e war when t h e indu st1•y b egan t o e xperi en ce i ts p eak 
year s . Dul,:i.n g t h e ten-year· period, t he net :lnc om e i ncre ase d 
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to ·::a2 . 4 in 1949 from ;)4 . 2 mi llion ib 1939 . Tha t t hi s compaby 
has had a steady r e c ord of in come is furth er e vidence d by 
noting t h at t h e percentag e of net i nc ome to b e t worth ib Cl"eased 
only by 3 per cent from t h e 8 .1 pe J•cent of 1 939 to t he r ati o 
of 11 . 4 pe rcent in 1 949 . 
The r e cor d of Loew's d o e s not parallel t hat of the 
o t h er thre e majoJ•s a l ready discussed . L:~l >:: e al l of t h e other 
coup ani es , Loew 's had i ts peak years in 1 946 when i ts net 
i ncome a i' tel'"' taxes was ~:; 1 7 . 9 mi llion an d prior to that year 
h a d net ::..ncome of (i l3 FJi llion i n t h e t h ree prece d:'_ ng years . 
However , in 1 948 t he fi g re dropped s h ar p l y to 0 4 . 2 mi lli on , 
h . h 1 t" t h 1 f' I'· 4 ,..., . 1 1 . . \Y .. l C was ess t1an .... e ow year o_ .,_, • r ml l Oll lD 1 93 3 . 
:n oth er word s , the fi gu re ~a s at the lowes t p oin t of all 
f i tEu r e s g i ven for net i n come af t er taxes i n t h e pr e ce d i n g 
eig h teen years . Tn 1 949 t h e net in come rose t o ~6 mi ll i on 
but ,,-as sti l l far b elmv any of t h e war ye a.rs and was t h e 
t hird lowest f igure g ive n in t he past e i gh teen years . The 
percenta::~ e of net =. nc ome t o ne t wor th was 4 . 3 percent in 
1 949 as c oEnare d to 8 . 6 percent in 1 939 . This was t h e only 
on e of the ma j or com Jani es cons i d ered that h a d a d eclin e i n 
th:~.S rati o . r he low i ncome fi g:u re may ·oe attr:'L bute d to hi 0 h 
op eratin g cost 1•atio and a run of poor L icture s dur i ng t h e 
pas t t wo ye ar s. Thi s c omp any i s the only one of the majors 
cons idered whi ch is not e x periencin g at l east a s g ood profi ts 
nmv as d u l'"'i n :!; t h e war· . 
But in t h i s case, sa l e s is no t t h e of fen d i n g factor 
s i nce t h ey h ave averag e d over Gl60 mi llion from 1 946 to 1949 . 
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In 1 948 when the n e t in c ome ·was at its loves t, sales wer e 
only r; l m:t ll5_on off the h i gh -ye ar of 1 946 •Nhen the -p · 
_ :::.. ;o;ure 
·was (;; 1 65 mi lli on an d t h e n e t in come to s Ul"plus was ~'il8 
mil l i on , while i n 1 9 48 t1e net income was only ~) 4 . 2 mi llion . 
The causat i ve factor was t he tremend ous increase in t h e tot al 
oporating and g en eral expenses . All o f t he i teDs akin g u p 
t _is c ontro lli ng account r emai ned a ppl ... ox:~_ m ate ly t h e s am e ouring 
t he p ast five ye ars with the e x ce p t i on of &1ortization of 
w~~ ch showed treme ndous in cr eas e s i n 1947, 1948 , and 
194 9 . Thi s i s t he large st i tem of t he e xpense ac count and in 
1948 increased by 09 mi l l ion over t h e preceding ye ar of 1 9 47, 
wh:Lch had in creased by ~~ 5 mi llion over 1 948 . In 1949 a better 
run of i cture s droppe d t h e fi gure for &llortizati on b ack to 
6 9 mi llion . 
By t hi s an a lys is of the p recedin g f igures, it can 
b e revealed that Loew 1 s recent difficulti es were a p oor run 
of ui ctu res ~hi ch r e quired high amortiz a tion char ge s. Tn 
ad0 i t i on, L oew1 s i s noted for i ts p ol i cy of sinking larg e 
funds of mone y in i ts pi cture s , whi ch usually enjoy g reat 
succe s s , bu t 1Nhen such heavily invested p:tctu res f ail to 
draw, t h en wi de f luctuation s in in c ome occur . However, a 
"roup of n e wl y l ... e le a sed pi ctures which requi red larg e out-
lay s of money hav e p r ove d e :: c eed i ng l y s l:tc cessful fi nan c :'L ally 
but t h eir effec ts h ave n ot yet been shown in f i nancial state-
ments b ecause of t h eir recency . such pi cture s are 11 Kim 11 and 
"I; ng so L :nnon' s Mines, rr whi ch are to iJe fo llowe d by rr '"'uo 
l!adis," not r e l e ased as y et . 'r he suc cess o_,_ t h ese new 
pictu r es p l u s t ~ excellent current p os i t i on as shown i n t h e 
~ i nancia l a n a l ysi s p laces Loew 1 s in a p os i t ion of a c ompany 
u p on t h e ups \ing . 
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Tiu3LE NO . XI 
CO~::?All.ATIVE Nl!;'l' I :JCO:J£ ;;5lro-:·!Ii:-YG OF fi v'E COi.?AlHES 
( I -J - ·r- r r ·y·TC o~ 001 -- "...,s) 1~ J.. L.u ULu 1' I lJL, 
193.5 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 191.~3 194h 19)+:) 191.~6 1947 1948 1949 
16 30 40 2) 22 21 42 83 137 131 124 175 12 2 81 75 
14 25 35 21 18 17 30 44 49 50 51 lOh 75 52 50 
I N !iELATI' !ES ( 19 39=100) 
75 136 18.5 116 100 96 191 378 624 599 566 7~7 558 369 343 
7o lL~o l ll9 117 100 9h 166 2ho 265 273 277 567 4lo 283 273 
o,:.Companies inclu de! Loew 1 s ; Paramount; Tvmntieth Century- Fox ; United PararlOlL'1t; ·vi'arner Brothers . 
Source : Standar d and Poor' s Industry Surveys , October, 19)0 . 
f-' 
V1. 
+="" 
The purpose of this analysis h as been t o reveal 
t he present r_;_nancia l condi t ion of t lJ.e maj ol"' compani e s and 
a re c a :;:> i t u lati on of these comp anies s hows t h at t h ey have 
l ev e le d off in the i r decline and are in no wor se 9 os i t ion 
t han the year s i mmedi a tely pre cedin g 1 946 . A g lan ce a t 
Table No . : I s h ows t hat in terms of mi l lions of dol l ars 
t he net :tnc om e of five l e a d in g c omp anie s was a t {~50 rail -
lion i n 1 949, . whi ch wBs a p:orox i mately the s ame as of those 
years of 1 943, 1944, and 1 945 . In t e r ms of relatives wi t h 
1939 = 100 the n e t i ncome was equal to 1 942 , 1 943, 1944 , and 
1 945 and was still mu ch greater t h a n any y ear p r e ceding 1 939 
back to 1935 . 
The main r eason why most of the pu b l i c be l ieved 
t h at t he moti on picture industry was on the d own s win g and 
would c ontinue to do so is t h at they cons idered in c ome and 
sales in terms of 1 946, whi ch was an e x traordi nary year . If 
t b.e y had chosen a more normal year such a s 1 941 when :!.n c ome 
equa. l ed ~p 30 mi l lion , then they vwuld have realize d t 1at t h e 
fi gur e of 050 milli on for 1949 was 6 7 percent ~reater t han 
t h at of a normal year . 
To conclude, t h e motion picture i ndu stry ~as s hown 
its abi l i ty to mee t f oreig n c ompeti t i on by cu tting costs , it 
h as we atb.e1:e the effects of t h e Br i tis 1 '75 percent tax , 
whi. ch in raany respec t s b o omel"' ang e d , the unin tegrated c om -
p an ie s ~1ave s h own tl::.at production and exhibition c a n be 
profi t a b le w:: t hout exhi bl t i on and t~1 ereby a llevia t e t he 
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e ff ect of t he a n ti - tru st su~ t, a n d f inally t e l evi s i on as 
yet can n ot b e h e l d respons ible e x clusively f or t h e decl i ne 
o f movie pr of5. ts aft el' t h e war . I t would be :~8.r b etter to 
s tate , not t h at mov: es a re f i nis h ed , but rath er t h at tele -
vi s i on c ombine d wi t b t h e r e ular f i e l d of e xh ibi t i on wou _d 
f or m an expandi ng mar k e t i n the fu t u re to ush e r i n a ne w 
era :C o ~c> t b e nroduc t ion fac :tl.5_t ies of the mo t i on pi c t ure 
industry . 
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